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Summary 
 
The eviction process relating to immovable property utilised for residential purposes 
can broadly be subdivided into three phases: the procedural; adjudicatory and 
execution phases, respectively. The procedural stage is characterised by the 
necessary procedural steps that need to be taken by an owner (or person in charge) 
or organ of State, in accordance with the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”) in order to launch an application 
for eviction of unlawful occupier(s) from private or public land. The adjudicatory phase 
entails a substantive determination by the courts whether it is appropriate, just and 
equitable, after considering all the relevant circumstances of the case as required by 
PIE, to grant an eviction order. The execution phase is only applicable when an 
eviction order was granted by the court. In line with PIE, just and equitable dates, 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the matter, are also set for (a) eviction; 
and (b) the execution of the eviction order. Where the land or property is vacated 
voluntarily on the date set, the eviction process is complete. However, when the land 
or property is not vacated as required, the eviction order is executed on the further 
date, as set out in the eviction order. This execution phase is invariably effected with 
the assistance of the South African Police Force or other State agents or officials and 
involves the removal of unlawful occupiers from the land or property in question. 
However, failure by the State to execute eviction orders has become more prominent 
and therefore, increasingly, contentious. As a result, the land owner is left without a 
remedy to protect his or her right to property, whereas the unlawful occupier’s position, 
with regard to access to land and adequate housing, remains in limbo - leaving both 
parties without an effective remedy.  
In light of the above, the objective of this study is twofold. Firstly, the research sets out 
to establish what constitutes effective relief regarding residential property, following a 
failure to execute an eviction order granted in terms of PIE. In this regard, effective 
relief, in the context of evictions pertaining to residential property, constitutes 
appropriate relief for all affected parties that can be executed within a reasonable time. 
Secondly, the aim is to analyse whether or to what extent a structural interdict; 
constitutional damages and/or a contempt of court order could be regarded as 
effective relief, both from the perspective of the land owner and the unlawful 
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occupier(s), given the conflicting rights and interests of the respective parties. The 
thesis also considers the role and involvement of the State as a facilitator and/or as 
an owner in the process of eviction in order to determine what would be regarded as 
effective relief from that perspective. The impact of the respective remedies on the 
abovementioned parties is analysed in order to determine whether the relief granted 
can be regarded as “effective relief” relating to residential property, following a failure 
to execute an eviction order.  
In this regard various recommendations are suggested, relating to the choice of 
oversight model and the formulation of the structural interdict. In relation to alternative 
relief, it is suggested that PIE either be amended or that a framework for direct 
constitutional damages be developed by the courts. Presently, and in conclusion, it is 
clear that a combination of remedies may need to be employed in order to provide 
effective relief where eviction orders are not executed.  
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Opsomming 
 
Uitsetting vanaf onroerende eiendom wat vir residensiële doeleindes aangewend 
word, behels drie fases: die prosedurele, beregtings- en uitvoeringsfases 
onderskeidelik. Die prosedurele fase word gekenmerk deur die nodige prosedurele 
stappe wat deur ‘n privaat- of Staatsgrondeienaar geneem moet word, ooreenkomstig 
die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsetting en Onregmatige Okkupasie van 
Grond 19 van 1998 (“Uitsettingswet”), ten einde ‘n uitsettingsaansoek vir die uitsetting 
van onregmatige okkupeerders vanaf openbare of privaatgrond te loods. Die 
beregtingsfase behels ‘n substantiewe ondersoek deur die howe ten einde te bepaal 
of ‘n uitsettingbevel toepaslik, regverdig en billik, na oorweging van alle relevante 
omstandighede - soos vereis deur die Uitsettingswet, sal wees. Die uitvoeringsfase is 
slegs van toepassing indien ‘n uitsettingsbevel inderdaad toegestaan is. Soos vereis 
in die Uitsettingswet word regverdige en billike datums gestel vir (a) uitsetting; en (b) 
die uitvoering van die uitsettingsbevel. Waar die grond of eiendom op vrywillige basis 
deur die onregmatige okkupeerders ontruim word, is die uitsettingsproses voltooid. 
Waar die grond of eiendom egter nie op die datum soos vasgestel deur die hof ontruim 
word nie, word die uitsettingsbevel op die latere datum, soos uiteengesit in die 
uitsettingsbevel, uitgevoer. Die uitvoeringsfase word gewoonlik met behulp van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiemag of ander Staatsagente of -beamptes hanteer en behels 
die verwydering van die onregmatige okkupeerders vanaf die relevante grond of 
eiendom.  
Versuim deur die Staat om uitsettingsbevele uit te voer het gaandeweg meer 
prominent geword en dus toenemend omstrede. In hierdie omstandighede is ‘n 
grondeienaar weerloos gelaat om sy of haar regte in eiendom te beskerm, terwyl 
onregmatige okkupeerders se toegang tot grond en behuising ook nie beredder is nie. 
Dienooreenkomstig is beide die grondeienaar en onregmatige okkupeerders sonder 
effektiewe remedies gelaat.  
Die oogmerk van die studie is gevolglik tweeledig. Eerstens, beoog die studie om vas 
te stel wat onder “effektiewe regshulp” verstaan word in gevalle waar die Staat versuim 
om ‘n uitsettingsbevel by residensiële eiendom  uit te voer. In hierdie konteks kan 
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effektiewe regshulp (of effektiewe remedie) beskou word as gepaste regshulp vir alle 
betrokke partye wat binne ‘n redelike tydperk uitgevoer kan word.  
Die tweede oogmerk is om ondersoek in te stel na die vraag of en in welke mate ‘n 
strukturele interdik, grondwetlike skadevergoeding en/of ‘n bevel vir minagting van die 
hof as effektiewe regshulp beskou kan word. Hierdie ondersoek word gedoen vanuit 
die onderskeie perspektiewe van beide die grondeienaar en onregmatige 
okkupeerder(s), gegewe hul botsende regte en belange. Die tesis oorweeg ook die rol 
en betrokkenheid van die Staat as fasiliteerder en/of as grondeienaar gedurende die 
uitsettingsproses ten einde vas te stel wat moontlik as ‘n effektiewe remedie vanuit 
daardie perspektief geag kan word. Die impak van die onderskeie remedies op die 
bogenoemde partye word gevolglik ontleed ten einde die oorhoofse navorsingsvraag 
te beantwoord, naamlik of sodanige regshulp “effektiewe regshulp” daarstel waar daar 
‘n versuim was om ‘n uitsettingsbevel ten opsigte van residensiële eiendom uit te voer. 
 
In hierdie verband word verskeie aanbevelings, wat verband hou met die keuse van 
model vir toesighouding en die fomulering van die strukturele interdik, voorgestel. Ten 
aansien van alternatiewe regshulp, word voorgestel dat PIE gewysig word of dat ‘n 
raamwerk vir direkte grondwetlike skadevergoeding ontwikkel word.  Dit is tans 
duidelik dat ‘n kombinasie van remedies nodig mag wees ten einde effektiewe 
regshulp te verleen waar daar ‘n versuim was om ‘n uitsettingsbevel uit te voer. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The eviction process relating to immovable property utilised for residential purposes 
can broadly be subdivided into three phases: the procedural; adjudicatory and 
execution phases, respectively. The procedural stage is characterised by the 
necessary procedural steps that need to be taken by an owner (or person in charge) 
or organ of State, in accordance with the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”) in order to launch an application 
for eviction of unlawful occupier(s) from private or public land.1 The adjudicatory phase 
entails a substantive determination by the courts2 whether it is appropriate, just and 
equitable, after considering all the relevant circumstances of the case as required by 
PIE,3 to grant an eviction order. The execution phase is only applicable when an 
eviction order was granted by the court. In line with PIE, just and equitable dates, 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the matter, are also set for (a) eviction;4 
and (b) the execution of the eviction order.5 Where the land or property is vacated 
voluntarily on the date set, the eviction process is complete. However, when the land 
or property is not vacated as required, the eviction order is executed on the further 
date, as set out in the eviction order. This execution phase is invariably effected with 
                                            
1 Sections 4(1)-(5), 5(2), 6(4) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998 respectively, depending on whether the eviction application was lodged by private 
parties, on an urgent basis or by an organ of State. See also Ndlovo v Ngcobo and Bekker v Jika 2003 
1 SA 113 (SCA) para 23 specifically; JM Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 720-723, 734; G Muller The 
impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the Eviction of Squatters in South African Law LLD 
Stellenbosch University (2011) 114-115; AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of 
Property 7 ed (2016) 373-374.  
2 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 33. See also Pienaar Land 
Reform 482 where she states that even if all the procedural requirements have been met, a court may 
still refuse to grant an eviction order on the basis that it is not just and equitable in the circumstances 
of the case to do so. See for example Pitje v Shibambo 2016 4 BCLR 460 (CC); City of Johannesburg 
v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA); Mahogany Ridge 2 Property Owners Association 
v Unlawful Occupiers of Lot 13113 Pinetown 2013 2 All SA 236 (KZD); Johannesburg Housing 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v The Unlawful Occupiers of the Newtown Urban Village 2013 1 SA 583 (GSJ). 
See also in general S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a transformative 
Constitution (2010) 268-316, 349-351.                     
3 Sections 4(6)-4(8), 5(1) and 6(3) respectively of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 
(CC) paras 33-36; Pienaar Land Reform 749-765 for a discussion on the approach to “just and 
equitable” and the factors and considerations that a court may take into account when deciding whether 
to grant an eviction order. See also J van Wyk “The role of local government in evictions” (2011) 14 
PELJ 55-57 and G Muller “On considering alternative accommodation and the rights and needs of 
vulnerable people” (2014) 30 SAJHR 41-62.  
4 Section 4(8)(a) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998. See Pienaar Land Reform 725-727. 
5 Section 4(8)(b) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998. See Pienaar Land Reform 725-727. 
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the assistance of the South African Police Force or other State agents or officials and 
involves the removal of unlawful occupiers from the land or property in question.6  
2 Research problem 
2 1 Introduction  
 
Failure by the State to execute eviction orders has become more prominent and 
therefore, increasingly, contentious.7 Mbazira acknowledges that the reluctance of 
State officials to adhere to the rule of law and respect court orders forms part of the 
reasons why there has been a failure to implement court orders.8 However, he also 
attributes the failure to the deficiencies in the court’s approach.9 Mbazira identifies a 
list of contributing factors for the failure to execute court orders. These include a lack 
of transparency and consultation in the execution of court orders; an absence of inter-
governmental cooperation and coordination where participation of more than one 
sphere of government is required to execute court orders and generally incapacity to 
carry out socio-economic reform.10 Incapacity, in terms of providing adequate housing 
has made timely delivery of quality housing very difficult.11  
 
                                            
6 Section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 read with section 14 of the 
South African Police Service Act 65 of1995.  
7 C Mbazira You are the “weakest link” in realising socio-economics rights: Goodbye: Strategies for 
effective implementation of court orders in South Africa (2008) vi; C Mbazira “Non-implementation of 
court orders in socio-economic rights litigation in South Africa: Is the cancer here to stay?” (2008) 9 
ESR Review 2-8. See for example Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha 
Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
2005 5 SA 3 (CC) and Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). 
These cases are discussed in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 respectively. See also E MacDonnell Chilemba 
“Evictions in South Africa during 2014 - an analytical narrative: feature” (2015) 16 ESR Review 3-6.   
8 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation vi. 
9 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation vi where he states that the court’s reluctance to use 
the structural interdict is reason for the failure to execute court orders. 
10 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation vi. See in general Van Wyk (2011) PELJ 50-83; JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet: die verhouding tussen artikel 
25(1), artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (slot)” (2006) 3 TSAR 522-536.   
11 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation vi. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
As a result, the land owner is left without a remedy to protect his or her right to 
property,12 whereas the unlawful occupier’s position, with regard to the acquisition of 
land13 and adequate housing,14 remains in limbo.15  
2 2 The right to effective relief 
 
“There can to my mind be no doubt that the authors of the Constitution intended that 
those rights (that is, the rights entrenched in the Constitution) should be enforced by 
the courts of law. They could never have intended to confer a right without a remedy. 
The remedy is, indeed, part and parcel of the right. Ubi jus, ibi remedium”.16  
The well-known principle ubi jus, ibi remedium captures the simple yet fundamental 
idea that rights are of little value absent a remedy that can be executed.17 The principle 
warrants that a remedy must either be found or forged18 by the courts where there is 
a proven violation of a person’s right.19 In this regard, the South African courts are 
mandated to grant appropriate and effective relief where it has been established that 
a constitutional right has been infringed,20 and the State has a corresponding 
                                            
12 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general AJ van der 
Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 17-18 and T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 12 2003) 41-1-41-37.  
13 Section 25(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Pienaar Land 
Reform 378-509; JM Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (OS 3 2007) 48-25-48-52 and J van Wyk “The relationship (or not) between the rights of 
access to land and housing: de-linking land from its components” (2005) 16 Stell LR 466-487. 
14 Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-82; K McLean “Housing” in S Woolman 
& M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (OS 7 2006) 55-8-55-14.   
15 M Kruger “Arbitrary deprivation of property: an argument for the payment of compensation by the 
state in certain cases of unlawful occupation” (2014) 131 SALJ 328 330; G Muller & S Liebenberg 
“Developing the law of joinder in the context of evictions of people from their homes” (2013) 59 SAJHR 
554 555; S Wilson “Breaking the tie: Evictions from private land, homelessness and a new normality” 
(2009) 126 SALJ 270-290; Pienaar & Mostert (2006) TSAR 522-536.    
16 Minister of the Interior v Harris 1952 4 SA 769 (A) 781. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 
1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Kruger (2013) SALJ 358. 
17 Minister of the Interior v Harris 1952 4 SA 769 (A) 781; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 
7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Kruger (2014) SALJ 358. See also article 6, the right to a fair trial of the European 
Convention on Human Rights which holds that “[E]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law” read with section 13, 
the right to an effective remedy which provides that “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth 
in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 
18 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (RS 6 
2014) 9-6. 
19 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5.  
20 Section 38 read with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 18 
and 33. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” 
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obligation to ensure the effectiveness of the order granted by the court21 “for 
without…remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights entrenched in the 
Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced".22 Absent an effective remedy, it 
is not only the right itself which is rendered trivial but also the values underlying the 
Constitution.  
The absence of an effective remedy may give rise to further constitutional breaches. 
The court will be in breach of its constitutional duty to grant litigants appropriate and 
effective relief as guaranteed in the Constitution.23 The State will not only be in breach 
of its obligation to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”24 
but it will also be in breach of its constitutional duty to provide measures to ensure the 
effectiveness of an order granted by the court25 which will ultimately result in an 
infringement of the right to access to courts.26 These constitutional breaches are 
incompatible with the rule of law27 as one of the founding values of the South African 
Republic and threaten the South African constitutional dispensation. 
Therefore, it is essential that relief, which can be executed, be found or forged.28 In 
this regard, it is the role of the courts to determine what would constitute appropriate 
and effective relief in a particular case29 and it is the State’s role to ensure that the 
relief granted is executed. This requires a remedial norm embracing affirmative judicial 
                                            
in CLOSA 9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 377-461. 
21 Section 34 read with section 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
Modderklip Boerdery  (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) 
para 43. 
22 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-
65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
23 Section 38 read with sections 164, 165, 172 and 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69 where the court held 
that “this Court has a particular duty to ensure that within the bounds of the Constitution effective relief 
be granted for the infringement of any rights entrenched in it”. See also Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 
9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 377-
461. 
24 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 82-87, 344-347; S Viljoen “The systemic violation of section 26(1): An appeal for structural relief 
by the judiciary” (2015) 30 SAPL 44-46.  
25 Section 34 read with section 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
Modderklip Boerdery  (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) 
para 43; M Euijen & C Plasket “Constitutional Protection of Property and Land Reform” (2005) ASSAL 
402-415. 
26 A Pillay “South Africa: Access to land and housing” (2007) 5 IJCL 544-545.  
27 Section 1(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
28 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-
65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
29 Fose v Minister of Safety 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 18. 
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action30 in conjunction with the State providing reasonable mechanisms in ensuring 
the execution of court orders.31  
2 3 Appropriate and effective relief 
Although courts are inclined to use “appropriate” and “effective” relief interchangeably 
it is posited that there is indeed a distinction to be drawn between the two phrases. 
This is the case because “the enforcement of constitutional rights in South Africa faces 
two formidable challenges. The first challenge is devising appropriate, just and 
equitable relief in response to violations of constitutional rights”.32 Appropriate relief 
will in essence be a remedy that is just and equitable in the circumstances for all the 
affected parties.33 When determining whether a remedy is “appropriate”, it is 
necessary to strike a balance between the competing rights and interests of the 
affected parties.34 In the context of adjudicating eviction applications, this would entail 
a substantive determination by the court, in accordance with PIE,35 whether or not it 
                                            
30 TA Thomas “Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process” (2004) 
41 San Diego LR 1633 1633-1634 where it is explained that “affirmative judicial action” entails action 
by the court in the form of a powerful remedy such as a mandatory injunction (i.e. structural interdict) 
that would compel constitutionally-required change in order to provide meaningful relief to litigants and 
society as a whole. See also M Swart “Left out in the cold? Crafting constitutional remedies for the 
poorest of the poor” (2005) 21 SAJHR 215 215 where the author equates affirmative judicial action with 
providing “affirmative remedies including declarations, damages, reading in, mandatory interdicts and 
structural interdicts. Of these, constitutional damages and structural interdicts are particularly suitable 
as remedies that would increase government accountability” (my emphasis).  
31 Section 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Modderklip Boerdery  (Edms) 
Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) para 43.  
32 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5.  
33 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 33-36; Pienaar Land 
Reform 749-765; Pitje v Shibambo 2016 4 BCLR 460 (CC); City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA); Mahogany Ridge 2 Property Owners Association v Unlawful Occupiers 
of Lot 13113 Pinetown 2013 2 All SA 236 (KZD); Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v The 
Unlawful Occupiers of the Newtown Urban Village 2013 1 SA 583 (GSJ). See also in general 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 268-316, 349-351. 
34 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 45; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 33-38; Kruger (2014) SALJ 329. 
35 Sections 4(6)-4(8), 5(1) and 6(3) respectively of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. See in general Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 33-38. See also Pienaar Land Reform 482 where she states that even if all 
the procedural requirements have been met, a court may still refuse to grant an eviction order on the 
basis that it is not just and equitable in the circumstances of the case to do so. See for example Pitje v 
Shibambo 2016 4 BCLR 460 (CC); City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 
(SCA); Mahogany Ridge 2 Property Owners Association v Unlawful Occupiers of Lot 13113 Pinetown 
2013 2 All SA 236 (KZD); Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v The Unlawful Occupiers of 
the Newtown Urban Village 2013 1 SA 583 (GSJ). See also in general Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 268-316, 349-351.                     
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would be appropriate, just and equitable, given the conflicting rights and interests of 
the land owner; unlawful occupier(s) and the State to grant an eviction order or not.  
However, “an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy”.36 In this regard, 
“the second challenge is to devise effective remedies where there is an omission to 
comply with a court-ordered mandate”.37 It is this second challenge postulated by 
Mbazira which forms the focus of this thesis. The distinction between “appropriate” 
and “effective” relief and the determination thereof on the basis that it can be viewed 
as two separate challenges, leaves room for the assumption that the courts’ 
interchangeable use of the phrases may not necessarily be correct. For purposes of 
this thesis, the courts’ determination of appropriate relief accordingly precedes 
devising effective relief. Appropriate relief is therefore to be regarded as implied in the 
use of the phrase “effective relief”.  
Having established the importance that the courts have placed on providing 
appropriate relief that is also effective, it is necessary to consider what constitutes 
effective relief.38  
According to Bishop “effective relief” is “relief that leaves no gap between the right and 
the remedy: It makes the constitutional ideal a reality”.39 The definition of effective 
relief in eviction cases is accordingly twofold. Firstly, effective relief will be relief that 
realises the land owner’s right to be protected against the arbitrary deprivation of his 
                                            
36 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-
65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. See also President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 57; Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board 
of the Eastern Cape 2007 3 BCLR 280 (CC) para 29 where Moseneke DCJ stated: “In each case the 
remedy must fit the injury. The remedy must be fair [just and equitable in the circumstances] to those 
affected by it yet vindicate effectively the right violated” (my emphasis). 
37 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
38 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-65-9-78. See in general Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 
7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
39 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-67. 
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or her property40 and the unlawful occupier’s right to have access to land41 and 
adequate housing42 and the right not to be arbitrarily evicted from his or her home 
without a court order.43 Secondly, effective relief will be relief that demands the State 
to act in accordance with its mandate to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights”44 of the land owner and the unlawful occupier respectively.45 In this regard, 
courts usually grant eviction orders, where all the procedural and substantive 
requirements had been met subject to the provision by the State of alternative 
accommodation to the evictees.46 The availability of land plays a crucial role in eviction 
proceedings, especially with regard to the date upon which an eviction order may be 
executed.47  
Ideally, an effective remedy in eviction cases would be an executable eviction order 
granted in terms of PIE provided that alternative accommodation is immediately 
available.48 Such a remedy not only realises the respective rights and interests of the 
                                            
40 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) which established the test for 
determining whether a deprivation amounts to a procedurally and/or substantively arbitrary deprivation. 
See in general Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 190-333 where he comprehensively discusses 
the definition of an arbitrary deprivation of property. See also Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-28; 
J Strydom & S Viljoen (Maass) “Unlawful occupation of inner-city buildings: A constitutional analysis of 
the rights and obligations involved” (2014) 17 PELJ 1207 1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235; Kruger (2014) 
SALJ 336-341 who also discusses whether an unreasonable delay in the execution of an eviction order 
amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of property.  
41 Section 25(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Pienaar Land 
Reform 378-509; Pienaar & Brickhill “Land” in CLOSA 48-25-48-52; and Van Wyk (2005) Stell LR 466-
487. 
42 Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-82; McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-
55-14.   
43 Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Muller The 
impact of section 26 of the Constitution 93-99; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-347.  
44 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 82-87.  
45 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
46 Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1207. See further cases as discussed in Chapter 2 at 4.  
47 K Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive but otherwise lawful regulatory state action LLD 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 247; AJ van der Walt “The state’s duty to protect property owners v the 
state’s duty to provide housing: Thoughts on the Modderklip case” (2005) 21 SAJHR 144 150.  
48 Section 25(1) and sections 25(6), 26(1) and (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 respectively; Strydom &Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1207; Swart (2005) SAJHR 217. See in 
general Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 17-18 and Roux “Property” in CLOSA 41-1-41-37; 
Pienaar Land Reform 378-509; Pienaar & Brickhill “Land” in CLOSA 48-25-48-52; Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-
351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-82 and McLean “Housing” CLOSA 55-8-55-
14. Furthermore, see Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop 
“Remedies” in CLOSA 9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
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land owner and the unlawful occupier, but also ensures that the rule of law is upheld 
by requiring the State to adhere to its constitutional obligations. However, while the 
concept of effective relief may be determined in principle there may be certain 
inevitable limits on achieving it.49 In this context courts have accepted that there will 
be particular cases where “other considerations will justify affording relief that is less 
perfect [for all the affected parties]”.50  
Firstly, conflicting rights and interests may be of such a nature that the rights in 
question cannot all be satisfied.51 On the one hand, section 25(1) of the Constitution 
protects the land owner against any arbitrary deprivation of property.52 In this regard, 
the obtainment of an eviction order in terms of PIE will be in the primary interest of the 
land owner in order to ensure the private use and enjoyment of his or her property.53 
However, the land owner’s rights may be restricted temporarily to allow the State to 
provide alternative accommodation.54 In this regard Sachs J in Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers55 held that the property rights of land owners should 
                                            
49 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-71. 
50 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-60-9-61; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 
217 (CC) para 23; Wilson (2009) SALJ 270; Kruger (2014) SALJ 328. 
51 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-71; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1207, 1211. 
52 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC); Van der 
Walt Constitutional Property Law 190-333; Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-28; Muller The impact 
of section 26 of the Constitution 72. See in general Wilson (2009) SALJ 270-290; Pienaar & Mostert 
(2006) TSAR 522-536.    
53 Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 17 and 22; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
266-316, 349-351. The approach to evictions and the remedies available for eviction in the pre- and 
post-constitutional era differ dramatically. See CT Cloete A critical analysis of the approach of the court 
in the application of eviction remedies in the pre- and post-constitutional context LLM Stellenbosch 
University (2016 forthcoming) 4 2 1 3 where she explains that there has been a shift in the conceptual 
understanding of ownership. Ownership under the Constitution is no longer regarded as absolutely 
exclusive, but rather accepted to be inherently limitable. See CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert 
& JA Faris (eds) LAWSA  2 ed (RS 1 2014) para 151; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access 
rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD Stellenbosch University (2015) 102; P Dhliwayo & AJ 
van der Walt “The notion of absolute and exclusive ownership” SALJ (2016 forthcoming) 19 in this 
regard. Furthermore, the promulgation of PIE, which gives effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution 
replaced the common law rei vindicatio as well as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 
92 of 1976 (“PISA”). In this regard Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 17 notes that the 
promulgation of PIE marked a shift in the focus of eviction legislation from the prevention of illegal 
squatting under PISA during apartheid to the prevention of illegal eviction in the post-constitutional era. 
Accordingly, land owners have to employ PIE to evict unlawful occupiers from land. See Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 39; Pitje v Shibambo 2016 BCLR 460 
(CC); H Mostert & A Pope (eds) PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 247; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 271; Pienaar Land reform 688 
in this regard. Notably, even where a land owner follows the procedures set out in PIE to evict unlawful 
occupiers, the eviction application does not guarantee that he or she will succeed with the application.  
54 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 30; Strydom &Viljoen 
(Maass) (2014) PELJ 1211. 
55 2005 1 SA 217 (CC).  
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be understood against the social and historical background of forced evictions and the 
consequent need for the establishment of secure property rights for those who were 
either denied access to land or who were deprived of such rights during apartheid.56 
Over time and in some instances, a temporary restriction on the rights of the land 
owner may amount to an indefinite deprivation of rights, which may be regarded as an 
arbitrary deprivation of property.57  
On the other hand, the Constitution affords everyone, including unlawful occupiers, a 
right to access to adequate housing.58 Realising the right to access to housing is 
intrinsically linked to the provision of access to land,59 legally secure tenure60 and the 
right to be protected against arbitrary evictions.61 In this regard Pienaar states:   
“[T]he application of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998…may, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, result 
in access to land. That may be the case where the granting of an eviction order is prevented 
on the basis that it is not just and equitable or where the order was granted but cannot be 
executed, for various reasons. In these particular instances the impact of PIE would thus be 
that (unlawful) occupiers would have effectively gained access to land (and housing), albeit 
usually for an interim period only” (my emphasis).62  
                                            
56 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 15. See Muller The impact 
of section 26 of the Constitution 33-53 for and overview of the urban and land tenure measures that 
deprived people of their land during apartheid.  
57 Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1207, 1211 1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235; Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) paras 34, 35 and 39-40; 
Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive state action 249-250. See First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner SSouth African Revenue Service; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC); Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 190-333. See also Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-28; Kruger (2014) SALJ 336-341 who also 
discusses whether an unreasonable delay in the execution of an eviction order amounts to an arbitrary 
deprivation of property.  
58 Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-82; McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-
55-14. See furthermore Wilson (2009) SALJ 270-290; Pienaar & Mostert (2006) TSAR 522-536.    
59 Section 25(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; JM Pienaar “Land reform and 
housing: Reaching for the rafters or struggling with foundations?” (2015) 30 SAPL 1 8. See furthermore 
Van Wyk (2005) Stell LR 466-487. 
60  Section 25(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Pienaar Land 
Reform 378-509 and Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” in CLOSA 48-25-48-52.  
61 Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 read with sections 4(6) and 
6(1) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. See in 
general Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 93-99; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
344-347. 
62 Pienaar (2015) SAPL 20.  
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However, providing access to land and adequate housing on an interim basis does not 
effectively realise the rights of the unlawful occupiers, because it does not provide 
them with permanent land and adequate housing and legally secure tenure.63 
Although courts are often unable to provide unlawful occupiers with lawful and secure 
land and housing rights64 there is a duty on the State to address insecure tenure 
progressively.65 It follows that the primary interest of the unlawful occupier in cases 
where an eviction order is granted, is the acquisition of alternative land and 
accommodation on a permanent basis, which will ultimately result in legally secure 
tenure. However, section 26 does not entitle any person the right to housing 
automatically and immediately.66 Instead, section 26 provides for a right to access to 
housing.67  
Realising the primary interests of the land owner and the unlawful occupiers will 
inevitably necessitate State involvement.68 In this regard, the State has an obligation 
to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights”69 entrenched in the Bill of rights. The 
State, within its available resources, must ensure that the rights of the land owner and 
                                            
63 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 47, 64; Van Wyk (2005) Stell LR 466-487. 
64 Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1211. Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996. See in general Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 
SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution 75-82; McLean “Housing” CLOSA 55-8-55-14. 
65 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 47. 
66 Section 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that “The state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right”. Access to housing does not imply that housing is available immediately. Instead 
it means that the State has to progressively realise the right over a period of time within its available 
resources, as envisaged in section 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 187-206 specifically and Muller The impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution 82-93 in this regard. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 
1 SA 46 (CC) paras 39-46 where the court analyses section 26(2). See further Pienaar (2015) SAPL 8; 
City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) para 15; Strydom & Viljoen 
(Maass) (2014) PELJ 1214.  
67 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 27-28 and 35-46 
where the court distinguishes the right of access to adequate housing in the Constitution in relation to 
the right to adequate housing as envisaged in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (“Covenant”). The court stated that: “The right delineated in section 26(1) is a right of 
“access to adequate housing” as distinct from the right to adequate housing encapsulated in the 
Covenant. This difference is significant. It recognises that housing entails more than bricks and mortar. 
It requires available land, appropriate services such as the provision of water and the removal of sewage 
and the financing of all of these, including the building of the house itself. For a person to have access 
to adequate housing all of these conditions need to be met: there must be land, there must be services, 
there must be a dwelling. Access to land for the purpose of housing is therefore included in the right of 
access to adequate housing in section 26”. See Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 187-206 
specifically in this regard. See also McLean “Housing” CLOSA 55-31-55-39.  
68 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 44. 
69 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Viljoen (2015) SAPL 44-46. 
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the unlawful occupier are protected and fulfilled through the progressive realisation of 
the right to adequate housing.70 The realisation of this right requires the State to enact 
reasonable legislation and other measures to ensure the progressive realisation of 
housing rights.71 The implementation of the legislation and other measures enacted to 
progressively realise the right to housing may necessitate a reasonable degree of 
patience from the land owner.72 In other words, although the landowner cannot be 
expected to be burdened with providing accommodation to the unlawful occupiers 
indefinitely, landowners must have a reasonable degree of patience pending the 
execution of an eviction order.73 If alternative accommodation is readily available, then 
the need to occupy the owner’s land unlawfully will diminish. The rights of the land 
owner and unlawful occupier mentioned above will be protected and fulfilled in 
accordance with the State’s obligation to do so. It is therefore also in the interest of 
the State to realise its obligation to protect and fulfil the rights of land owners and the 
unlawful occupiers.  
Secondly, it may be practically impossible for an effective remedy to be executed.74 In 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters (“Modderklip HC”),75 where 
the applicant’s farm had been invaded by people seeking land and the police were 
unable to evict them, the Supreme Court of Appeal76 and the Constitutional Court77 
opted for constitutional damages as an effective remedy in the circumstances, 
considering the practical difficulty of enforcing the eviction order. However, problems 
                                            
70 Section 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. For a comprehensive analysis 
of the housing rights of unlawful occupiers in the post-1994 constitutional dispensation see Muller The 
impact of section 26 of the Constitution 82-93. Furthermore, see in general Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; McLean 
“Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14 in general. 
71 Pienaar (2015) SAPL 8-9; Viljoen (2015) SAPL 44; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1216-
1218. See for example the Housing Act 107 of 1997 which provides that the State must establish and 
facilitate the housing development process. Other legislative measures to provide for the realisation of 
the right of access to adequate housing include: the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999; the Home Loan 
and Mortgage Disclosure Act 63 of 2000 and the Housing Consumer Protection Measures Act 95 of 
1998. 
72 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 
104 (CC) para 100.  
73 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) paras 
34, 35, 39-40 and 97; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1222; Kruger (2014) SALJ 329. 
74 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-72. 
75 2001 4 SA 385 (W). See in general A Christmas “The Modderklip cases: evictions and the right of 
access to adequate housing: case review” (2003) 6 ESR Review 4-7.  
76 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA); Van der Walt (2005) SAJHR 144 150. 
77 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). 
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with execution will not always be as extreme as in the Modderklip HC case. More often, 
problems with execution - regardless of the reason(s) behind it - may obstruct 
immediate effective relief only. In this regard, some commentators are of the opinion 
that the problems associated with the execution of an eviction order will necessarily 
prevent effective relief, because it obstructs immediate effective relief.78 However, for 
purposes of this thesis it is argued that effective relief will in principle constitute 
appropriate relief for all the affected parties that can be executed within a reasonable 
time.79 As there is no precise or definite definition of what constitutes a reasonable 
time in South African law, it is arguably best to be determined in light of the particular 
circumstances of each case.80 In this context the proceedings as a whole must be 
considered. Different or individual delays may not in itself give rise to an unreasonable 
delay in providing effective relief. However, different delays, when viewed together 
and cumulatively, may result in a reasonable time being exceeded. Accordingly, a 
delay during a particular phase of the eviction process may be permissible, provided 
that the total duration of the eviction process as a whole, does not amount to an 
unreasonable delay.81 The reasonableness of the length of the eviction process may 
be assessed in light of the following criteria: (a) the complexity of the case;82 (b) the 
conduct of the land owner in instituting eviction proceedings to protect his or her 
                                            
78 Swart (2005) SAJHR 217 where the author argues that “the emphasis in developing new effective 
remedies must be on immediacy. An effective remedy will be a remedy which is capable of immediate 
implementation”. See also Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-65-9-78. 
79 G Budlender “Access to Courts” (2004) 121 SALJ 339 354; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-60-9-78 
where the author acknowledges that immediate relief will constitute the ideal. However, he argues that 
immediate effective relief is not necessarily attainable and “other considerations will justify affording 
relief that is less than perfect”; Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 45; Fose v 
Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Mbazira Strategies for effective 
implementation 5. 
80 See the Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights “Guide on Article 6: The right to a fair 
trial” (2013) 51-52 <http://www.echr.coe.int> (accessed 30-05-2016).  
81 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights “Guide on Article 6: The right to a fair trial” (2013) 
51-52. 
82 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights “Guide on Article 6: The right to a fair trial” (2013) 
52. 
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property rights;83 (c) the conduct of the relevant State officials and departments;84 and 
(d) the consequences of an excessive delay in the proceedings as a whole.85  
In this regard, a reasonable time can be regarded as the extent of time which is 
necessary, to do whatever is required to be done, as soon as circumstances permit. 
The circumstances pertaining to the execution of eviction orders usually require the 
State to provide access to land and adequate housing to unlawful occupiers facing 
eviction.86 The realisation of these rights will accordingly end the unlawful occupation 
of land and/or property and will effectively result in the realisation of the land owner’s 
right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his property. However, this does not impose an 
absolute or unqualified obligation on the State to provide adequate housing 
immediately, but rather, as soon as practically possible within its available resources.87 
Although the meaning of a reasonable time may be vague and lead to uncertainty, the 
time period affixed to the execution of an eviction order should be flexible. This is 
imperative, given changing circumstances, such as the complexity of the case, the 
conduct of the parties, budget restraints and competency issues on the part of the 
State. Accordingly, what constitutes a “reasonable time” in the context of evictions may 
be regarded as case-specific, in consideration of the particular circumstances of each 
eviction case. Therefore, an eviction order that cannot be executed within a 
reasonable time does not constitute effective relief. 
                                            
83 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 
28-29 where it was held that land owners bear the primary responsibility to take reasonable steps to 
protect their property. Accordingly, where a land owner’s conduct amounts to a negligent or 
unreasonable delay, a court may be inclined to refuse to grant an eviction order or alternative remedy. 
See also Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) in this regard. 
Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights “Guide on Article 6: The right to a fair trial” (2013) 
52-53. 
84 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights “Guide on Article 6: The right to a fair trial” (2013) 
53. 
85 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights “Guide on Article 6: The right to a fair trial” (2013) 
54-55. 
86 Section 26(1) read with section 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See 
in general Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC);  Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-93; McLean 
“Housing” CLOSA 55-8-55-14.  
87 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 86 (CC) para 38. For a 
comprehensive analysis of how the Constitutional Court described this positive obligation and the 
academic debate around it see Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 84-92. See also 
McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14 and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 187-206.  
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Eviction orders that are not executable within a reasonable time, whether due to the 
State’s inattentiveness, incompetence or intransigence88 to act in accordance with its 
constitutional obligations, have increasingly become contentious.89 Depending on the 
circumstances, an eviction order may not be effective given the State’s attitude 
towards executing it. This may result in the courts having to “develop appropriate 
remedies [where] existing conventional remedies fall short of providing effective 
relief”.90 Effective relief is therefore needed to uphold the ubi jus, ibi remedium principle 
and to ensure that the rights and interests of all affected parties are realised through 
State compliance with its constitutional mandate “to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights,” entrenched in the Constitution.91  
It is presumed that the following remedies may constitute effective relief for affected 
parties to an eviction case where there is an omission to execute an eviction order 
granted in terms of PIE: a structural interdict, constitutional damages and contempt of 
court orders.  
3 Objective of the study 
 
In light of the above, the objective of this study is twofold. Firstly, the research sets out 
to establish what constitutes effective relief regarding residential property,92 following 
a failure to execute an eviction order granted in terms of PIE. In this regard, effective 
relief, in the context of evictions pertaining to residential property, constitutes 
appropriate relief for all affected parties that can be executed within a reasonable 
time.93 Secondly, the aim is to analyse whether or to what extent a structural interdict; 
                                            
88 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction: when is it appropriate, just 
and equitable?” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 346-351. 
89 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation vi.  
90 Section 38 read with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Swart 
(2005) SAJHR 217; President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 
SA 3 (CC) paras 18 and 33. See also Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for 
effective implementation 5; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 377-461; Fose v Minister of Safety 1997 
7 BCLR (CC) para 69 where the Court stated that that it could “forge new tools and shape innovative 
remedies” in order to vindicate a proven violation of a person’s right. 
91 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 82-87.  
92 The scope of this investigation is restricted to residential rural and urban property. Consequently, the 
effective relief regarding the execution of an eviction order in respect of commercial property is excluded 
from the scope of this research.  
93 Budlender (2004) SALJ 354; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-60-9-61 and 9-65 where the author 
acknowledges that immediate relief will constitute the ideal effective relief. However, he argues that 
immediate effective relief is not necessarily attainable and “other considerations will justify affording 
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constitutional damages and/or a contempt of court order will be regarded as effective 
relief, both from the perspective of the land owner and the unlawful occupier(s), given 
the conflicting rights and interests of the respective parties. It may also be important 
to consider the role and involvement of the State as a facilitator and/or as an owner in 
the process of eviction in order to determine what would be regarded as effective relief 
from that perspective. The impact of the respective remedies on the abovementioned 
parties will be analysed in order to determine if the relief granted can be regarded as 
“effective relief” relating to residential property, following a failure to execute an 
eviction order.  
 
4 Research questions 
 
The research questions for the study are accordingly twofold: 
 What constitutes effective relief regarding residential property, following a 
failure to execute an eviction order, taking into account the conflicting rights and 
interests of the land owner, the unlawful occupier(s) and the State? 
 Whether or to what extent a structural interdict; constitutional damages or 
contempt of court orders will be regarded effective relief from the perspective 
of the land owner; the unlawful occupier(s) and the State?  
5 Methodology 
 
The nature of this study requires a literature-based analysis of primary and secondary 
sources: the former comprising the use (analysis and/or discussion) of relevant case 
law and legislation and the latter comprising a discussion of relevant domestic and 
foreign textbooks and journal articles. Case law and legislation will primarily be used 
in order to establish the relevant circumstances under which the courts have granted 
structural interdicts, constitutional damages and contempt of court orders as 
comprising effective relief. It will also enable one to determine to what extent these 
forms of relief can be regarded as effective from the respective perspectives of the 
land owner, unlawful occupier(s) and the State. It is therefore crucial to analyse these 
                                            
relief that is less than perfect”; Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 45. See also 
Swart (2005) SAJHR 217; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5.   
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sources in order to posit a role for the courts in realising effective relief for all parties 
involved through “forging new tools and shaping innovative remedies”.94 Arguably, the 
use of the structural interdict, constitutional damages and contempt of court orders 
may provide effective relief for all parties and society as a whole if the court is willing 
to embrace the concept of affirmative judicial action and the State is willing to provide 
the necessary mechanism(s) to execute court orders within a reasonable time.  
 
For purposes of this thesis, comparative examples from foreign jurisdictions, namely 
Germany, Canada and the United States will be referred to, where relevant.95 
Importantly, the use of such comparative examples does not constitute an in-depth 
analysis or all-encompassing legal comparative study. Instead, the insights drawn 
from these examples will only play a supporting role, regarding the method for 
executing eviction orders, to the extent that it may be accommodated within the South 
African remedial processes. Accordingly, the investigation does not constitute an in-
depth legal comparative study per se.  
6 Qualifications of the study 
 
Although various phases, such as the procedural and adjudicatory phases, are 
relevant in eviction cases, the focus of this thesis is only on the phase that emerges 
after an eviction order was granted, but not executed.  The scope and focus of the 
research are accordingly restricted to effective relief regarding residential property 
following a failure to execute an eviction order and not whether it was appropriate in 
the circumstances to grant an eviction order in the first place.96 The research is limited 
to the execution of eviction orders and does not deal with substantial and procedural 
requirements97 regarding eviction applications per se. Furthermore, underlying 
reasons as to why eviction orders were not executed will not be analysed in detail 
either. Instead, reasons are alluded to insofar as they are linked to effective relief only. 
                                            
94 Fose v Minister of Safety 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69. 
95 Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 which provides that a court 
may consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.  
96 Sections 4(6)-4(8), 5(1) and 6(3) respectively of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 
(CC) paras 33-36; Pienaar Land Reform 749-765; van Wyk (2011) PELJ 55-57.   
97 Pienaar Land Reform  720-723, 734, 749-765; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 
114-115; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property (2016) 373-374; Van Wyk (2011) 
PELJ 55-57.   
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While the study is not focused on analysing the reasons for non-execution as such, 
these reasons may become relevant insofar as they relate to the effective relief 
dimension. For example, incapacity of local authorities may be relevant as it explains 
the reason for the failure to execute an eviction order. The underlying reasons for 
incapacity however, fall outside the scope of this study.  
 
Importantly, the scope of this investigation is also restricted to residential rural and 
urban property, essentially where PIE is applicable.98 Consequently, the effective relief 
regarding the execution of an eviction order in respect of commercial and business 
properties is excluded from the scope of this research.99 
 
Although cognisance has been taken of other remedies such as the mandament van 
spolie100 and administrative remedies found in the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000,101 the scope of this thesis is restricted to the following remedies within 
                                            
98 Section 26(1) read with section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and 
section 1(i) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(“PIE”). Pienaar Land Reform 701- 702 explains that a court order is necessary where housing, shelter 
and residential issues are involved. Accordingly, PIE applies “to all instances where a home, dwelling 
or abode is occupied unlawfully, generally impacting on housing and residential concerns, in relation to 
both vacant land and built environments. While permanency of occupation is not required, it is 
necessary that the home or dwelling in question is where persons habitually reside.  
99 Ndlovo v Ngcobo and Bekker v Jika 2003 1 SA 113 (SCA) para 20 where it was held that the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 does not apply to the 
eviction of juristic persons and persons that do not use buildings and structures as “a form of dwelling 
or shelter”. See also MR Chetty “The applicability of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act: cases” (2002) 
3 ESR Review 14-17 and MC Denneboom Service Station CC v Phayane 2015 1 SA 54 (CC) para 17.  
100 ZT Boggenpoel & JM Pienaar “The continued relevance of the mandament van spolie: recent 
developments relating to dispossession and eviction” (2013) 46 De Jure 998; ZT Boggenpoel “Does 
method really matter? Reconsidering the role of common law remedies in the eviction paradigm” (2014) 
7 Stell LR 72. 
101 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 54-58 where she holds that “Decisions taken by organs of state that relate to 
section 26(1) and (2) of the Constitution are often of an administrative nature since it impacts 
households’ rights and expectations negatively. The state’s failure to act also qualifies as an 
administrative action in terms of s 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2 of 2000 (“PAJA”). 
In this regard, section 8 PAJA lists a number of available administrative remedies. Whether 
administrative remedies will be available will depend on whether there has been a failure to implement 
an administrative decision (as defined in section 1 of PAJA. Although administrative remedies do not 
form part of the scope of this thesis, it can be argued that a decision taken by the State to evict a person, 
or a group of people, could be regarded as administrative action because the decision may have a 
direct external and prejudicial effect on the unlawful occupiers’ right enshrined in section 26(1). Failure 
by the State to adhere to the obligation to provide access to land and adequate housing enshrined in 
terms of section 25(5) and section 26(2) of the Constitution respectively, could also be regarded as an 
administrative action. In this regard, the State’s failure to act qualifies as an administrative action in 
terms of section 1 of PAJA.  
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the eviction context: the structural interdict, 102 constitutional damages103 and civil 
contempt of court orders.104  
7 Structure of the study  
7 1 Introduction  
 
Having established what can be regarded as effective relief,105 the following chapters 
seek to establish whether the structural interdict, constitutional damages and/or 
contempt of court orders can provide effective relief to affected parties where there 
has been a failure to execute an eviction order.  
7 2 Chapter 2: The structural interdict  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the structural interdict as a remedy to vindicate a failure to 
execute an eviction order pertaining to residential property. The chapter seeks to 
provide an exposition of the general requirements for a structural interdict. A 
discussion of the structural interdict’s nature, scope, purpose and features follows the 
discussion of the general requirements. Thereafter arguments against and in favour 
of the structural interdict are explored. It is proposed that the criticism pertaining to the 
use of the structural interdict can be addressed by formulating the structural interdict 
in such a way that it does not conflict with the separation of power doctrine. 
Alternatively, different models for supervision may be employed to address the critique 
against the use of the structural interdict.  
 
In this regard, the models for oversight developed and found in American 
jurisprudence have provided some insight. To reiterate, the examples and insights 
drawn from foreign law in this regard do not constitute an all-encompassing 
comparative analysis. American jurisprudence is used because the origin of the 
                                            
102 With or without meaningful engagement. See also Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 
in general and S Liebenberg “Engaging the paradoxes of the universal and particular in human rights 
adjudication: The possibilities and pitfalls of meaningful engagement” (2012) 12 AHRLJ 1-30 for an in 
depth analysis of the use of “meaningful engagement’’ as an important remedial response in the context 
of the execution of eviction orders. See Chapter 2 for a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the 
structural interdict.  
103 See Chapter 3 for a discussion and analysis of indirect and direct constitutional damages.  
104 See Chapter 4 for a discussion and analysis of civil contempt of court orders.  
105 See 2 2 above.  
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structural remedy as a constitutional remedy can be traced back to the United States 
school desegregation cases.106 Since the use of the structural interdict in school 
desegregation cases in the United States, the remedy has been utilised to also 
promote constitutional reform in other contexts.107 To the extent that it may be 
accommodated within the South African remedial processes, the bargaining, public 
hearing, expert remedial formulation, report back to court and consensual remedial 
formulation models provide different processes and methods for oversight, which are 
key to the structural interdicts’ anatomy. It is clear that the formulation of the structural 
interdict and model used for oversight must be structured and used in such a way so 
that it suits the very specific circumstances of each case. Changing circumstances, 
often present in eviction cases, may also justify and require the use of a different model 
for oversight for obtaining effective relief. In this regard, there is room for the South 
African courts to explore other models for oversight, apart from the report back to court 
model, which may provide different ways in achieving different outcomes to eviction 
cases.  
A discussion of the various possible models for oversight is followed by a discussion 
of the circumstances under which it would be appropriate to use the structural interdict. 
Ultimately, various factors are identified and discussed in relation to the use of the 
structural interdict in South African eviction case law. The discussion of the case law 
considers whether the use of the structural interdict was appropriate in accordance 
with the factors identified by the courts and academic writers and whether it provided 
effective relief to the relevant parties. It will become apparent from the selected cases 
                                            
106 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 347 US 483 (1954) (Brown 1) and Brown v Board of Education 
of Topeka 349 US 294 (1955) (Brown 2); C Mbazira “From ambivalence to certainty: Norms and 
principles for the structural interdict in socio-economic rights litigation in South Africa” (2008) 24 SAJHR 
1 4 states these cases were “propelled by the need to realise transformation of the dual school system 
based on race, into a unitary and non-racial school system. It required a great deal of organisational 
reform to transform the entrenched racial segregation, which had survived for hundreds of years. The 
courts were required to transform this entrenched status quo and to reconstruct the social reality in a 
radical manner. What was required included establishing new procedures for student assignments, new 
criteria for construction of schools, revision of transport routes, re-assignment of facilities, curricular 
modifications, reallocation of resources, and above all, establishing equity in the school system. The 
question is whether all these objectives would have been achieved through the conventional one-stance 
traditional litigation and remedial procedures. The answer is a definite no; it required protracted and 
unusual methods of litigation and remediation; hence the resort to the structural interdict to ensure that 
the obstinate school and local authorities implemented the desired reforms”; N Swanepoel “Die 
aanwending van die gestruktureerde interdik in die Suid-Afrikaanse konstitutionele regsbedeling: ‘n 
eiesoortige beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 Litnet Akademies 374 379. 
107 Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 379. See also D Zaring “National rulemaking through trial courts” (2004) 51 
UCLA LR 1015-1077. 
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that the structural interdict may not be the most effective remedy in all cases where 
there has been a failure to execute an eviction order.108 Alternative effective relief, 
such as constitutional damages, may prove to be more effective, given the 
circumstances of the case.109 The structural interdict may also not be the most 
appropriate or effective remedy where the affected parties have a different idea of 
what will provide effective relief to them.110 In this regard, the structural interdict should 
be used as a means to achieve a negotiated solution. The parties should be given the 
chance to engage with each other meaningfully on what they believe to be the most 
appropriate and effective way of achieving relief. However, a too detailed structural 
interdict with specific instructions, standards and terms may render the use thereof 
ineffective.  In this regard, the courts should have a clear idea of what the parties want. 
A structural interdict may also not be effective simply due to reluctance or a failure on 
the part of State officials to observe the rule of law and respect and execute eviction 
orders timeously.111 Further relief, such as contempt of court proceedings, may be 
used in this context to ensure that State officials adhere to their constitutional 
obligations. By way of contrast, Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg (“Olivia Road”),112 
illustrates that the use of a structural interdict, coupled with an order to engage 
meaningfully before an eviction order is granted, may prove to provide effective relief 
                                            
108 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) and Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC).   
109 See Chapter 2 at 4 2 where Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van 
Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) and President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) are discussed with regard to the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
constitutional damages as an alternative effective remedy to the structural interdict.  
110 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC). See in 
general L Chenwi “Upgrading of informal settlements and the rights of the poor: the case of Joe Slovo: 
case review” (2008) 9 ESR Review 13-18; L Chenwi & K Tissington “’Sacrificial Lambs’ in the quest to 
eradicate informal settlements. The plight of the Joe Slovo residents: case review” (2009) 10 ESR 
Review 18-24; K McLean “Meaningful engagement: one step forward or two back? Some thoughts on 
Joe Slovo” (2010) 3 CCR 223-242.   
111 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 2 SA 598 (CC); Mbazira Strategies for effective 
implementation vi.  
112 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). See in general B Ray “Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg: 
Enforcing the right to adequate housing through ‘engagement’” (2008) 8 HRLR 703-713; L Chenwi & S 
Liebenberg “The constitutional protection of those facing eviction from “bad buildings”: case review” 
(2008) 9 ESR Review 12-17; L Chenwi “A new approach to remedies in socio-economic rights 
adjudication: Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others” (2009) 2 
CCR 371-393; L Chenwi “’Meaningful engagement’ in the realization of socio-economic rights: the 
South African experience” (2011) 26 SAPL 128-156; G Muller “Conceptualising “meaningful 
engagement” as a deliberative democratic partnership” (2011) 22 Stell LR 742-758; Liebenberg (2012) 
12 AHRLJ 1-29. 
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to the affected parties.113 What is evident, and what was seemingly lacking from the 
other cases, was a willingness to participate and reach a negotiated solution.    
7 3 Chapter 3: Constitutional damages 
 
Following an illustration and discussion of the ineffective use of the structural interdict 
in South African eviction case law in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 explores the use of indirect 
and direct constitutional damages as a form of alternative effective relief where there 
has been a failure to execute an eviction order or a failure to adhere to a structural 
interdict.114 Where relevant, Chapter 3 encompasses a legal comparative explanation, 
as opposed to a fully-fledged legal comparative study, in relation to the following three 
aspects: (a) Ausgleich115 (also known as equalisation measures) in German law; (b) 
Charter damages in Canadian Law;116 and (c) Sharing in American Property Law.117   
A discussion of indirect constitutional damages precedes a discussion of direct 
constitutional damages. This is in line with the single-system of law principle and 
subsidiarity principles:118 Only where there is no legislation that provides for monetary 
compensation or where the common law does not provide effective relief may reliance 
                                            
113 Strictly speaking, this case falls outside the focus of this thesis, because the court in Olivia Road 
never granted an eviction order. Although the court did not grant an eviction order, eviction proceedings 
where instituted nevertheless. Arguably, an eviction order would have been inevitable had the court not 
issued a structural interdict - or an interim structural interdict to be more specific. While the case may 
not fall within the scope of this thesis, the remedy does. Ultimately, this thesis explores whether the 
remedies discussed may provide effective relief to those involved in the eviction process. It may be 
helpful and insightful to identify the elements of the structural interdict in Olivia Road which led to the 
realisation of the parties’ rights. For these reasons, the case is accordingly discussed. See Chapter 2 
at 4 5.  
114 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See in 
general A Christmas “The Modderklip case: the state’s obligations in evictions instituted by private 
landowners: case review” (2005) 4 ESR Review 6-10; S Khoza “Questioning the wisdom of moving 
40 000 people: the Modderklip saga continues: case review” (2005) 6 ESR Review 10-11; Van der Walt 
(2005) SAJHR 144-161.   
115 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 366-367 and 277-280; J Strydom A hundred years of 
demolition orders: A constitutional analysis LLD Stellenbosch University (2012) 350. 
116 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 SCC. This case has provided Canada with an authoritative 
interpretation of “appropriate and just relief” in section 24(1) of the Charter in respect of constitutional 
damages. See in general S Barns “Constitutional damages: A call for the development of a framework 
in South Africa” (2013) Responsa Meridiana 17; C Okpaluba “The development of Charter Damages 
Jurisprudence in Canada: Guidelines from the Supreme Court” (2012) 55 Stell LR 55-75 55-56; and 
CDL Hunt “Case Note: Constitutional Damages in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 115 
Cambridge Student LR 115-120 115. 
117 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut LR 647-723 647. 
118 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) 19-20; 
AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 1 CCR 77. 
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be placed on direct constitutional damages.119 In the context of evictions, PIE does not 
provide for a compensatory remedy nor does the law of delict provide for an effective 
remedy.120 PIE does not intend to permanently deprive a land owner of ownership or 
enjoyment of property.121 However, in some instances the application of PIE results in 
individual property owners having to bear disproportionate harsh and excessive 
burdens for the sake of some public purpose.122 However, it may be inappropriate to 
invalidate PIE, but also unfair to expect of private land owners to bear the harsh and 
disproportionate burden that results from a regulatory measure, such as PIE, in the 
public interest, without compensation. PIE is currently formulated in such a way that it 
does not provide for compensation in cases where the unlawful occupation of land 
amounts to an indefinite deprivation of a land owner’s land or property. In this regard, 
German law provides alternative approaches to declaring an excessive regulatory 
provision invalid.123 Ausgleich, the payment of compensation, may provide an 
alternative to invalidation.124 Consequently, it is argued and recommended in Chapter 
5, which sets out the final recommendations and conclusions, that PIE should be 
amended to include what is known in German law as an equalisation measure.125 This 
German concept only serves as an example of how PIE can be amended and does 
not constitute an in-depth comparative analysis of equalisation measures in Germany 
and South Africa.  
In the absence of a regulatory framework providing for compensation and in instances 
where PIE or the law of delict cannot be interpreted or developed to be in line with the 
Constitution,126 it becomes necessary for the court to step in and award direct 
                                            
119 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36, 40-43, 81-91. 
120 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive state action 246-280.   
121 Grobler v Msimang 2008 3 All SA 549 (W) para 132. 
122 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive state action 129; Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
v The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) paras 34, 35, 39-40 and 97; City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 100. 
Van der Walt (2005) 21 SAJHR 150.  
123 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive state action 204. 
124 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 204. Equalisation measures are similar to 
direct constitutional damages in the sense that they should only be used where the existing law does 
not provide for a remedy that fully vindicates the right(s) in question; Fose v Minister of Safety and 
Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 67. Importantly, equalisation payments differ from constitutional 
damages. Equalisation payments are awarded in terms of specific authorising legislation whereas 
constitutional damages are awarded in terms of the common law or by relying on the Constitution. See 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 277-280, 367; Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders 
329, 350-351 and Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151 in this regard. 
125 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive state action 246. 
126 Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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constitutional damages.127 In this regard, the Canadian court’s four step framework to 
direct constitutional damages, developed in Vancouver (City) v Ward,128 is discussed. 
Each of these steps are apposite to South African law.129 It may become evident that 
this approach may serve as an example of how the South African courts can establish 
a framework for direct constitutional damages for State liability under section 38 of the 
Constitution.130  Again, it is important to note that this section does not aim to provide 
a comparative analysis between Charter damages in Canada and constitutional 
damages in South Africa. Instead, this section aims to draw insight from the framework 
established in Ward to the extent that it may be accommodated within South Africa.131  
This discussion is followed by an analysis of the use of direct constitutional damages 
in South African eviction case law. Using the four step framework laid down in Ward, 
coupled with the listed factors in MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate,132 the 
discussion of the case law considers whether the use of direct constitutional damages 
was appropriate. Thereafter, the analysis determines whether employing direct 
constitutional damages was indeed effective.  
The particular facts and circumstances of the Modderklip scenario also warrants a 
further possible perspective. Having regard to the issue of effective relief within the 
context of damages and possible compensation, Dyal-Chand promotes the concept of 
“sharing” in light of the interest-outcome approach,133 as an alternative to resolving 
property law disputes. Accordingly, while not being an in-depth comparative analysis 
of the American and South African property law systems, the interest-outcome 
approach is applied to Modderklip CC in order to establish whether the court would 
have come to a different conclusion had it used the interest-outcome approach. The 
                                            
127 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 251; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 
1997 3 SA 786 (CC) paras 58-60, 67; Kruger (2014) SALJ 330.  
128 2010 SCC 27 40. 
129 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 17. 
130 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 22.  
131 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 21-22.   
132 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA). See in general RJ de Beer & S Vettori “The enforcement of socio-economic 
rights” (2007) 3 PELJ 2-26.   
133 See Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 647-723. 
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interest-outcome approach may be a viable method of finding or forging effective 
relief.134 
The chapter concludes with a comparison between the Modderklip scenario and the 
Blue Moonlight saga. The comparison between illustrates when direct constitutional 
damages will not constitute appropriate or effective relief. Instead, other relief such as 
the use of a structural interdict may constitute appropriate and possibly, effective relief.  
7 4 Chapter 4: Civil contempt of court  
 
Civil contempt of court orders form the focus of Chapter 4. The chapter draws a 
distinction between orders ad factum praestadum and ad pecuniam solvendam. It is 
necessary to make this distinction because the remedies available to enforce 
compliance with these different types of court orders differ. If the order is ad factum 
praestandum, then the judgment creditor can apply for an order of civil contempt of 
court by and committal of, the defaulting party.135 The Constitutional Court’s judgment 
in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2)136 is discussed in this regard. 
However, if the judgment creditor is trying to enforce an order ad pecuniam 
solvendam, then he or she can apply to issue a writ of execution, which will lead to the 
attachment of assets and the consequential sale thereafter.137 In this regard, the 
procedure set out in the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011 will be discussed.  
Accordingly, where a structural interdict is granted but not adhered to or where indirect 
or direct constitutional damages are awarded but not paid out to the successful litigant, 
civil contempt of court proceedings can be instituted to ensure compliance with court 
orders and ultimately provide effective relief to the affected parties. In this regard, 
contempt of court orders act as a means of enforcing another remedy, such as a 
                                            
134 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-
65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5 read with Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut 
LR 677. 
135 NJJ Olivier & C Williams “State Liability for final orders sounding in money: At long last alignment 
with the Constitution” (2011) Obiter 489-520 493. 
136 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). See in general A du Plessis & A van den Berg “Some perspectives on 
constitutional conflict in local disaster management through the lens of Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality 2012 2 SA 598 (CC): case note” (2013) 28 SAPL 448-468; G Muller “Evicting unlawful 
occupiers for health and safety reasons in post-apartheid South Africa” (2015) 132 SALJ 616-638. 
137 Sections 61-79 of the  Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944 and sections 36, 39 and 40 of the Supreme 
Court Act 59 of 1959; R Roos “Statutory mechanisms to enforce judgments debts against the state” 
(2005) 20 SA Public Law 167-175.  
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structural interdict or constitutional damages; and do not constitute effective relief in 
itself.  
 
In light of the outcome of the Pheko cases,138 it will also become clear that joinder of 
the correct defaulting party to the proceedings is crucial for the effective execution of 
orders ad factum praestandum or ad pecuniam solvendam.139  
It is clear that the State has a role to play in the realisation of the land owner’s and 
unlawful occupiers’ rights. The State must protect the land owner’s property rights and 
provide the marginalised unlawful occupiers with the means of realising their right to 
have access to adequate land and housing.   
7 5 Chapter 5: Reflection, Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
Chapter 5, catering the final conclusions and recommendations, seeks to provide 
suggestions that will contribute to the realisation of effective relief for the land owner 
and unlawful occupier(s) respectively.  
In this regard, certain procedural suggestions in relation to the eviction process are 
discussed. Furthermore, the choice of oversight model and the formulation of the 
structural interdict may also contribute to the realisation of effective relief. In cases 
where the structural interdict does not provide for effective relief, alternative relief is 
needed. In this regard compensation in the form of indirect or direct constitutional 
damages seems to provide effective relief to some extent. Accordingly, in light of the 
single-system-of-law principle140 and subsidiarity principles141 two options are 
                                            
138 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC); Pheko v Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 5 BCLR 711 (CC); Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
(No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016). See Chapter 2 at 4 4 and Chapter 4 at 3 1 for a 
discussion of these cases.  
139 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 
299 (SCA) paras 20-22; 24; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 
(SCA) paras 18-20 and 25. For a discussion of City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 
2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) see B Ray “Courts, capacity and engagement: Lessons from Hlophe v City of 
Johannesburg: feature” (2013) ESR Review 3-5; G Mirugi-Mukundi “Case Review - fundamental 
constitutional value of accountability requires municipal officials to obey court orders: feature” (2015) 
ESR Review 7-8.   
140 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 19-20; Van der 
Walt (2008) CCR 77.  
141 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36, 40-43, 81-91.  
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proposed. Firstly, it is recommended that PIE be amended to include an automatic or 
discretionary right of compensation to cater for situations where there has been an 
unreasonable delay in the execution of an eviction order. Secondly, in the event that 
such an amendment is not effected, it is recommended that a general framework for 
the use of direct constitutional damages be developed.  
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Chapter 2: The Structural Interdict 
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1 Introduction  
 
The well-known principle ubi jus, ibi remedium captures the simple yet fundamental 
idea that rights are of little value absent a remedy that can be executed.142 The 
principle warrants that a remedy must either be found143 or forged by the courts144 
where there is a proven violation of a person’s right.145 In this regard, the South African 
courts are obligated to provide appropriate and effective relief where it has been 
established that a constitutional right has been infringed,146 and the State has a 
corresponding obligation to ensure the effectiveness of the order granted by the 
court147 “for without…remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights 
entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced".148    
Where the courts fail to provide an effective remedy it will be in breach of its 
constitutional duty to provide litigants with appropriate and effective relief as provided 
for in section 38 of the Constitution.149 Absent an effective remedy, the State will not 
only be in breach of its obligation to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in 
                                            
142M Kruger “Arbitrary deprivation of property: an argument for the payment of compensation by the 
state in certain cases of unlawful occupation” (2014) 131 SALJ 328 358; DH Ziegler “Rights require 
remedies: A new approach to the enforcement of rights in the federal courts” (1987) 38 Hastings LJ 
665 678; E Ling “From paper promises to real remedies: The need for the South African Constitutional 
Court to adopt structural interdicts in socio-economic rights cases” (2015) 9 HKJLS 51 52; S Liebenberg 
“South Africa’s Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights: An effective tool in challenging 
poverty?” (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development 1; DE Hirsch “A defence of structural injunctive 
remedies in South African law” (2007) 9 Oregon Review of International Law 159. 
143 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 
6 2014) 9-6. 
144 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; W Trengrove “Judicial Remedies 
for Violations of Socio-economic Rights” (1991) 1 ESR Review 8; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 76.  
145 C Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation of court orders in South Africa: You are the 
“weakest link” in realising socio-economic right: Goodbye (2008) 5.  
146 Section 38 read with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South  Africa, 1996; 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 8 BCLR 786 (CC) paras 
18 and 33; JM Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 765-766; M Ebadolahi “Using structural interdicts and the 
South African Human Rights Commission to achieve judicial enforcement of economic and social rights 
in South Africa” (2008) 5 NYLR 1565 1574-1579. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 
7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective 
implementation 5; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 377-461. 
147 Section 34 read with section 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
148 Fose v Minister of Safety 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69 where the court held that “this Court has a 
particular duty to ensure that within the bounds of the Constitution effective relief be granted for the 
infringement of any rights entrenched in it”; G Budlender “Remedying Breaches of the Constitution” in 
J Klaaren A Delicate Balance: The place of the Judiciary in a Constitutional Democracy (2006) 84; L 
Chenwi “Putting flesh on the Skeleton: South African Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Adequate 
Housing for those subject to Evictions” (2008) 8 HRLR 105-137.  
149 Section 38 provides that “anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.” 
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the Bill of Rights”,150 but it will also be in breach of its constitutional duty to provide 
measures to ensure the effectiveness of an order granted by a court.151 This in turn 
ultimately results in an infringement of the right to access to courts.152 These 
constitutional breaches are incompatible with the rule of law,153 one of the founding 
values of the South African Republic and threaten the South African constitutional 
dispensation.154 In this regard the Constitutional Court in Pheko v Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) (“Pheko 2”)155 emphasised the importance of 
executing court orders when it stated that:  
“The rule of law, a foundational value of the Constitution, requires that the dignity and 
authority of the courts be upheld. This is crucial, as the capacity of the courts to carry 
out their functions depend on it. As the Constitution commands, orders and decisions 
issued by a court bind all persons to whom and organs of state to which they apply, 
and no person or organ of state may interfere, in any manner, with the functioning of 
the courts. It follows from this that disobedience towards court orders or decisions risks 
rendering our courts impotent and judicial authority a mere mockery. The effectiveness 
of court orders or decisions is substantially determined by the assurance that they will 
be enforced” (my emphasis).156  
Effective relief is therefore needed to uphold the ubi jus, ibi remedium principle and to 
ensure that the rights and interests of all affected parties are realised through State 
compliance with its constitutional mandate “to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights”157 entrenched in the Constitution.158 
                                            
150 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Ling (2015) HKJLS 52 and 54. 
See also Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 82-87; S Viljoen “The systemic violation of section 26(1): 
An appeal for structural relief by the judiciary” (2015) 30 SAPL 43 44-46. 
151Viljoen (2015) SAPL 42 44. 
152 Section 34 read with section 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) 
para 43; M Euijen & C Plasket “Constitutional Protection of Property and Land Reform” (2005) ASSAL 
429 430-431.  
153 Section 1(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
154 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) (2015) 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 1. 
155 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). For a discussion of Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 
2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). See Chapter 4 at 3 1.  
156 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 1.  
157 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
158 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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Effective relief will in essence constitute “appropriate relief”159  for all the affected 
parties that can be executed within a reasonable time.160 The development and 
increased use of the structural interdict161 by the courts in eviction cases can be viewed 
as an attempt by the courts to forge a new tool and shape an innovative remedy162 in 
order to ensure that effective relief is granted.163  
The court has the power to issue a structural interdict at any time during the course of 
the eviction process.164 In this regard, a distinction needs to be drawn between cases 
where a structural interdict is issued before165 an eviction order is granted and cases 
                                            
159Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 33-36 in which the court 
defined ‘appropriate relief’ as “a remedy that is just and equitable in the circumstances for all the 
affected parties”. See also Chenwi (2008) 8 HRLR 108.  
160 G Budlender “Access to Courts” (2004) 121 SALJ 339 354; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-60-9-
61 and 9-65 where the author acknowledges that immediate relief will constitute the ideal effective relief. 
However, he argues that immediate effective relief is not necessarily attainable and “other 
considerations will justify affording relief that is less than perfect”; Hoffmann v South African Airways 
2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 45. 
161Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services 1999 3 BCLR 342 (W); Grootboom v Oostenberg 
Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C); Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape 2001 2 SA 609 (E); Treatment Action Campaign v Minister of Health 2002 4 BCLR 356 (T); Rail 
Commuter Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail (1) 2003 5 SA 518 (C); President van die Republiek 
van Suid-Afrika v Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T); S v Z and 23 Similar Cases 
2004 1 SACR 400 (E); City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 5 SA 39 (C); Minister of Education (Western 
Cape) v Mikro Primary School 2006 1 SA 1 (SCA); Magidimisi v Premier of the Eastern Cape 2006 JOL 
17274 (Ck); Kiliko v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 4 SA 114 (C); EN v the Government of the RSA 2006 
JOL 18038 (D); Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC); Ebadolahi  (2008) NYLR 1593-
1595 who sets out the development of the structural interdict in the South African context. Although it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake a full comparative analysis, as explained, it is helpful to 
understand the structural interdict in its international historical context. In the United States, structural 
or ‘supervised’ interdicts developed in response to the constitutional civil rights era beginning in the 
mid-1950’s. See N Gillespie, Charter Remedies: The Structural Injunction (1989-1990) 11 ADVOC Q 
190, 191-198 which gives an overview of structural injunctions in public interest litigation in the United 
States, beginning with desegregation cases and extending to cases involving prison and mental hospital 
reform, public housing, and welfare programmes. See also CF Sabel & W Simon “Destabilization Right: 
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds” (2004) 117 Harvard LR 1016, 1016-1053.  
162 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of 
Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 199; K Grossenbacher “Implementing Structural Injunctions: Getting a 
remedy when local officials resist (1992) 80 George Town LJ 2227 2232; Viljoen (2015) SAPL 43, 58 
and 66-68.  
163 In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 106 the 
Constitutional Court indicated that “a mandamus and the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction” may be 
necessary to ensure an effective remedy for the breach of a constitutional right. See furthermore DL 
Horowitz The courts and social policy (1977) 24 who suggests that in a situation of a recalcitrant State, 
the courts will have to use all kinds of creative means to protect the values and rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution. The structural interdict is an example of such creative remedies used to achieve 
compliance with court orders.  
164 See Chapter 1 at 1 for an overview of the “eviction process”. 
165 See a discussion of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg 
v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) below at 4 5. See also L Chenwi & S Liebenberg “The 
constitutional protection of those facing eviction from “bad buildings”: case review” (2008) 9 ESR 
Review 12-17; L Chenwi “A new approach to remedies in socio-economic rights adjudication: Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others” (2009) 2 CCR 371-393; L Chenwi 
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where a structural interdict is employed after166 granting an eviction order. Where a 
structural interdict is issued before an eviction order is granted, the purpose of the 
order will be to find a suitable remedy for all parties involved given the circumstances 
of the case. In this instance the court will not have reached the conclusion yet that it 
is indeed just and equitable to grant an eviction order.167 Where the court issues a 
structural interdict subsequent to the finding that it is just and equitable to grant an 
eviction order, the purpose of the order will be to execute the eviction order within a 
reasonable time. Although a structural interdict can be constructed either before or 
after a court has granted an eviction order, the focus of this chapter primarily falls on 
the latter.168 Accordingly, appropriate and effective relief in this particular context will 
constitute an eviction order granted in terms of the PIE169 that can be executed within 
a reasonable time.  
A detailed discussion of the structural interdict is warranted in this context because it 
is often believed to provide effective relief to the land owner and unlawful 
occupier(s),170 while also ensuring that the State fulfils its constitutional obligations.171 
Consequently, the aim of this chapter is to determine whether this is indeed the case 
and furthermore, the extent to which a structural interdict can provide and be regarded 
as effective relief from the perspective of the land owner; the unlawful occupier(s) and 
the State.  
                                            
“’Meaningful engagement’ in the realization of socio-economic rights: the South African experience” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 128-156; G Muller “Conceptualising “meaningful engagement” as a deliberative 
democratic partnership” (2011) 22 Stell LR 742-758; S Liebenberg “Engaging paradoxes of the 
universal and particular in human rights adjudication: the possibilities and pitfalls of ‘meaningful 
engagement’” (2012) 12 AHRLJ 1-29 where Olivia Road is discussed comprehensively.  
166 See Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 
465 (T) below at 4 2; Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) below 
at 4 4; Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
below at 4 4 and Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 3 SA 
454 (CC) below at 4 3.  
167 See also in general G Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the Eviction of Squatters 
in South African Law LLD Stellenbosch University (2011) and specifically 5, 22-23, 29. 
168 See 4 below.  
169 Sections 4(6) and 6(1) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998. See also Ndlovo v Ngcobo and Bekker v Jika 2003 1 SA 113 (SCA) para 23 specifically; 
Pienaar Land Reform 720-723, 734; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 114-115. 
170 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A choice between corrective and 
distributive justice (2009) 165-166.  
171 Section 165(4) and section 26(2) of the Constitution; Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President 
van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) para 43; Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 65.  
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The chapter begins with an exposition of the requirements to succeed with an 
application for an interdict. In this regard, the same basic requirements need to be 
established for a party to apply for a structural interdict. Thereafter, a theoretical 
overview of the structural interdict is given, including a discussion of its nature, scope, 
function and features. A short discussion of the arguments for and against the use of 
the structural interdict follows. This discussion is followed by an exposition of the 
different models of the structural interdict that may be required for different 
circumstances in the context of evictions. Thereafter, the circumstances under which 
it will be appropriate to use the structural interdict are discussed with reference to the 
work of Roach and Budlender.172 The identification of circumstances under which it 
will be appropriate to issue a structural interdict may provide examples of when 
effective relief will be provided in theory.  Although the structural interdict may provide 
effective relief to the respective parties in theory, it is necessary to determine whether 
such relief is effective in practice. To that end the chapter concludes with a discussion 
and reflection of selected South African eviction cases to determine whether the use 
of the structural interdict is indeed effective in practice. 
2 The general requirements for an interdict and a structural interdict   
 
The interdict is a summary court order that either prohibits a particular act (a prohibitory 
interdict)173 or requires performance of a particular act (a mandatory interdict or a 
mandamus),174 which can be used both as relief for those whose rights have been 
violated and as a remedy to deter violations of a similar nature in future.175  The 
                                            
172 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction: when is it appropriate, just 
and equitable?” (2005) 122 SALJ 325.  
173 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 409-410; AC Cilliers, C Loots & HC Nel Herbstein and Van 
Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa 5 ed 
(2009) 1454. See also AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 7 ed (2016) 
224-226; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
(2006) 308-310 and H Mostert & A Pope (eds) PJ Badenhorst, W Freedman, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk 
The principles of The Law of Property in South Africa (2010) 84-85. 
174 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 410-423; Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Candid Electronics 
(Pty) Ltd v Merchandise Buying Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA (C); Cillers et al The civil practice of the 
High Courts 1454; J Berryman The law of equitable remedies (2000) 12; Van der Walt & Pienaar 
Introduction to Property Law 172, 224; Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
308-310 and Mostert & Pope (eds) The principles of The Law of Property in South Africa 84-85. 
175 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 166; Setlogelo v Setlogelo; 1914 AD 221 Van der Walt & 
Pienaar Property Law 224-226; Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 308-
310 and Mostert & Pope (eds) The principles of The Law of Property in South Africa 84-85. 
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interdict is normally employed where other remedies are either not available or when 
the delays associated with the use of other remedies could cause irreparable harm.176 
The decision of the Appellate Division in Setlogelo v Setlogelo (“Setlogelo”)177 set out 
the necessary requirements for a prohibitory or mandatory interdict.178 Firstly, there 
must be a clear right.179 Secondly, there must be an injury actually committed or 
apprehended. In this regard there must be proof of an infringement of a right in an 
unlawful and continuous way that will cause damage.180 Finally, the applicant must 
establish that there is no other alternative, satisfactory remedy available.181 The 
alternative legal remedy postulated in this context must be adequate in the 
circumstances, be ordinary and reasonable and must grant similar protection.182 The 
alternative remedy that most frequently arises for consideration in this regard is 
damages. Depending on the facts and circumstances, the court may use its discretion 
to determine whether to grant a structural interdict.183 Even where an applicant could 
                                            
176 Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 1455; Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Candid 
Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Merchandise Buying Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA (C); Van der Walt & Pienaar 
Introduction to Property Law 172, 224; Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
308-310 and Mostert & Pope (eds) Wyk The principles of The Law of Property in South Africa 84-85.  
177 1914 AD 221; Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Candid Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Merchandise 
Buying Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA (C); Van der Walt & Pienaar Property Law 224-226; Badenhorst 
et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 308-310 and Mostert & Pope (eds) The principles 
of The Law of Property in South Africa 84-85. 
178 1914 Ad 221 para 27; Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 1456; N Swanepoel “Die 
aanwending van die gestruktureerde interdik in die Suid-Afrikaanse konstitusionele regsbedeling: ‘n 
eiesoortige beregtingsproses” (2015) 12 Litnet Akademies 374-396 377. See also Van der Walt & 
Pienaar Introduction to Property Law 172, 224; Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law 
of property 308-310 and Mostert & Pope (eds) The principles of The Law of Property in South Africa 
84-85.  
179 Nienaber v Stuckey 1946 AD 1049; Bankorp Trust Bpk v Pienaar 1993 4 SA 215 (N); B Prest The 
law and practice of interdicts (1996) 43 submits that the existence of a right is a matter of substantive 
law and that whether that right is clearly established is a matter of evidence. This requires proof by the 
plaintiff, on a balance of probability, of the right which he seeks to protect; Cillers et al The civil practice 
of the High Courts 1457-1463. 
180 Van der Walt & Pienaar Property Law 225; Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 1464-
1467. See also Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Candid Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Merchandise Buying 
Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA (C); Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
308-310 and Mostert & Pope (eds) The principles of The Law of Property in South Africa 84-85. 
181 Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 1467-1470; Van der Walt & Pienaar Property Law 
225. See also Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Candid Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Merchandise Buying 
Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA (C); Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
308-310 and Mostert & Pope (eds) The principles of The Law of Propery in South Africa 84-85. 
182 Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 1468; Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Candid 
Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Merchandise Buying Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA (C); Van der Walt & Pienaar 
Property Law 224-226; Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 308-310 and 
Mostert & Pope (eds) The principles of The Law of Property in South Africa 84-85. 
183 Candid Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Merchandise Buying Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA (C) 326; Cillers 
et al The civil practice of the High Courts 1469; Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221. Interestingly, the 
American approach requires that the plaintiff must show that his or her injury is irreparable with money 
or that money will not constitute an adequate remedy, in order for the court to grant an interdict. In this 
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be compensated adequately by an award of damages, the court may still grant an 
interdict.184 Importantly, damages will not be considered to be an adequate remedy 
where there is a continuing violation of the applicant’s rights;185 when the damages will 
be difficult or impossible to assess; when the applicant is not likely to be able to recover 
damages from the respondent; or when the value of an award of damages in several 
years’ time will be of questionable adequacy because of inflation.186 
In the context of evictions, the land owner’s right to property187 and the unlawful 
occupier’s right to have access to adequate housing188 establish clear constitutional 
rights that have to be balanced and ultimately upheld.189 The ongoing failure to 
execute an eviction order causes a continued infringement of the land owner’s right to 
property and the unlawful occupier’s right to adequate housing. Furthermore, a failure 
to execute the eviction order granted in terms of the PIE is indicative of the fact that 
there is no other effective remedy available to those whose rights had been violated. 
In other words, there is no alternative remedy that will remedy the rights’ violations. 
Additionally, the court has the discretion whether or not to grant a mandatory 
interdict190 which directs the State to act in accordance with its constitutional 
obligations by taking positive steps to remedy the rights violations.191 Ultimately, the 
mandatory interdict will ensure that effective relief is granted to those whose rights 
have been violated.192 In order to ensure that the State adheres to the mandatory order 
                                            
regard, a plaintiff’s injury will be regarded as irreparable by money if it cannot be measured, 
compensated, restored or repaired. A plaintiff’s remedy for damages will be inadequate if it will be less 
efficient, speedy or practical than an interdict. In this regard, the presence of an inadequate remedy is 
regarded as a prerequisite for injunctive relief to be granted. See D Rendelman “The inadequate remedy 
at law prerequisite for an injunction” (1981) 33 University of Florida LR 346 346 in this regard.  
184 Candid Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Merchandise Buying Syndicate (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA (C) 327. 
185 Chapman’s Peak Hotel v O’Hagans 2001 4 All SA 415 (C) at 420.  
186 Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 1469. 
187 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Muller The impact of section 
26 of the Constitution 72. See in general AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 17-
18 and T Roux “Property” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(OS 12 2003) 41-1-41-37. 
188 Section 26(1) read with section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See 
also Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights 344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-82, 93-99; K McLean 
“Housing” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (OS 3 2007) 55-8-5514. 
189 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.   
190 Fose v Minister of Safety 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) para 19; Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign 2 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) paras 97-98. 
191 K Roach “Crafting remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural rights” in J Squires et al 
(eds) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) 
111; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 410-423; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-179.  
192 Fose v Minister of Safety 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) para 19.  
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granted, it may also be necessary for a court to supervise and monitor the execution 
of the order granted. The mandatory order granted then becomes what is known as a 
structural interdict.193  
3 The structural interdict  
3 1 Introduction  
 
Although South African law did not prohibit or limit the power of the courts to grant 
mandatory structural interdicts during the pre-constitutional era, such orders were not 
common.194 The use of structural interdicts is regarded as a recent development, 
resulting from needs and demands emanating from a transformative constitutional 
order.195 The inclusion of a wide range of human rights and corresponding positive 
constitutional obligations on the State, inevitably led to the increased use of the 
structural interdict.196  
3 2 Anatomy of the structural interdict  
3 2 1 The nature, scope and purpose of the structural interdict 
 
A structural interdict can be described as a mandatory remedy or interdict that enables 
a court to retain jurisdiction197 or oversight over the implementation of its order by the 
                                            
193 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 410-423; Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts (2009) 
1454; Berryman The law of equitable remedies 12; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to Property 
Law 172, 224; Badenhorst et al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 308-310 and Mostert 
& Pope (eds) The principles of The Law of Property in South Africa 84-85. 
194 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 328 were the authors note that the structural interdict was 
frequently used as a remedy in administrative law in the pre-constitutional era. See L Baxter 
Administrative Law (1984) 696-698 for a discussion of structural interdicts before the constitutional era 
in case law is discussed.  
195 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 328; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights 199. 
196 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights 199. See in general Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services 
1999 3 BCLR 342 (W); Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C); Ngxuza v 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2001 2 SA 609 (E); Treatment Action 
Campaign v Minister of Health 2002 4 BCLR 356 (T); Rail Commuter Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a 
Metrorail (1) 2003 5 SA 518 (C); President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Edms) Bpk 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T); S v Z and 23 Similar Cases 2004 1 SACR 400 (E); City of Cape 
Town v Rudolph 2004 5 SA 39 (C); Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School 2006 
1 SA 1 (SCA); Magidimisi v Premier of the Eastern Cape 2006 JOL 17274 (Ck); Kiliko v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2006 4 SA 114 (C); EN v the Government of the RSA 2006 JOL 18038 (D); Pretoria City 
Council v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC). 
197 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 496; Cillers et al The civil practice of the High 
Courts 1481; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 409-411; M du Plessis, G Penfold & J Brickhill 
Constitutional Litigation (2013) 124-125.    
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State in order to ensure effective relief within a reasonable time.198 Usually the 
respondent is required to take prescribed steps within a specified time-frame and 
report back to court for an assessment of the progress made and, if necessary, for the 
issue of further orders to effect compliance.199  
In the context of evictions, the court retains jurisdiction over a case in order to ensure 
the realisation of effective relief.200 Where a structural interdict is ordered during the 
procedural stage of the eviction process201 the court retains jurisdiction over the matter 
in order to ensure that the parties formulate an appropriate, reasonable and lawful 
remedy that will ensure the realisation of the rights of the parties involved in the 
eviction case. Where a structural interdict is ordered after an eviction order has been 
granted, the court retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the eviction order is 
executed within a reasonable time in accordance with the plan formulated by the 
parties. The court may find it necessary to issue either a general,202 limited203 or 
specific204 structural interdict. Although the form and scope of structural interdicts vary 
                                            
198 This is also referred to as a supervisory order. Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) 
(CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) para 1; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-179; Roach & 
Budlender (2005) 122 SALJ 32; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199; D Davis “Socio-economic rights in 
South Africa: The record of the Constitutional Court after 10 years” (2004) 5 ESR Review 3 5; Mbazira 
Litigating socio-economic rights 176; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 4.  
199 Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 1481; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 378; Viljoen (2015) 
SAPL 58-59.   
200 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 1.  
201 Before it is determined whether it would be just and equitable to award an eviction order. See for 
example Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) discussed below at 
4 5. 
202 See for example Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) at 4 4 3 
below where the court issued a general structural interdict requiring the State to identity land in the 
immediate vicinity for the relocation of the unlawful occupiers; to engage meaningfully with them on the 
identification of land and to file a report regarding the steps it has taken in compliance with the court 
order. See also Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 
July 2016). 
203 See for example Occupiers of Mooiplaats v Golden Thread Limited 2012 2 SA 337 (CC) where an 
eviction order granted against a group of people occupying private land was set aside and remitted to 
the High Court for reconsideration in light of information that the court ordered the relevant State parties 
to place before it regarding, amongst other things, the impact the eviction would have on them and 
making available suitable alternative accommodation to them. 
204 See for example the order in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 
(Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Amici Curiae (Joe Slovo 1) 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) where the 
Constitutional Court issued an extremely detailed, specific interdict. See also L Chenwi “Upgrading of 
informal settlements and the rights of the poor: the case of Joe Slovo: case review” (2008) 9 ESR 
Review 13-18; L Chenwi & K Tissington “’Sacrificial Lambs’ in the quest to eradicate informal 
settlements. The plight of the Joe Slovo residents: case review” (2009) 10 ESR Review 18-24; K 
McLean “Meaningful engagement: one step forward or two back? Some thoughts on Joe Slovo” (2010) 
3 CCR 223-242. City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) 
para 12 in which the court refers to the extremely specific reporting order of the High Court. However, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal held: “Objectively the reporting order conveys an intention to give 
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and are determined by the circumstances and demands of each case,205 the primary 
function of the structural interdict is usually to ensure that parties comply with court 
orders.206 In this regard, the structural interdict therefore sets out the manner in which 
and the time frame for execution. In this context, the provision of land and adequate 
housing can be considered as an inherent aspect in the execution of the eviction 
order.207 Specifically in the context of evictions, the function of the structural interdict 
would be to ensure that the eviction order granted in terms of PIE is executed 
systematically and within a reasonable time. Failure by the State to fulfil this 
constitutional mandate208 necessitates using the structural interdict to ensure the 
elimination of systemic violations existing in institutional or organisational settings.209 
Consequently, the purpose of the structural interdict in such situations is not only to 
provide effective relief to those whose rights have been violated, but also to redress 
the systemic failures by requiring the State to adhere to its constitutional obligations.210  
Where the court finds that the steps taken are unreasonable or where the time period 
has amounted to an unreasonable delay in the execution of the eviction order,211 the 
relief granted will not be regarded as effective. Consequently, further alternative 
                                            
directions to the City in respect of what is required to comply with the constitutional obligations to provide 
temporary accommodation to homeless persons in general. The questions [in the reporting order] 
require the City to answer to the notions of the court as to the manner in which obligations could or 
should be complied with...[but] the reporting order infringes the principle of separation of powers and 
for that reason…cannot stand” (para 28). For a discussion of the Hlophe case see B Ray “Courts, 
capacity and engagement: Lessons from Hlophe v City of Johannesburg: feature” (2013) 27 ESR 
Review 3-5; G Mirugi-Mukundi “Case Review - fundamental constitutional value of accountability 
requires municipal officials to obey court orders: feature” (2015) 16 ESR Review 7-8.   
205 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 129; Mbazira Litigating 
socio-economic rights 176.  
206 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 425; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-179. 
207 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 26; JM Pienaar 
“Land reform and housing: Reaching for the rafters or struggling with foundations” (2015) 30 SAPL 1-
25 7-8.  
208 Section 26(2) and section 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South, 1996. See Muller The 
impact of section 26 of the Constitution 82-93. Furthermore, see in general Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; McLean 
“Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14.  
209 Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 17; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 4; S Liebenberg “The value of 
human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 1 30. 
210 S Sturm “A normative theory of public law remedies” (1991) 79 Georgetown LJ 1355 1357; Bishop 
“Remedies” in CLOSA 9-67; S Liebenberg “Remedial Principles and Meaningful Engagement in 
Education Rights Disputes” (2016) 19 PELJ 1 8.     
211 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 2 SA 454 (CC); Pheko 
v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) discussed below at 4 4.  
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effective relief must then either be found or forged by the courts in order to ensure that 
the parties’ right to an effective remedy is upheld.212  
3 2 2 The features of the structural interdict  
 
The most prominent feature of the structural interdict is that it provides for a complex 
ongoing regime of performance,213 so as to achieve the abovementioned purposes. 
The ongoing nature of the structural interdict is facilitated by its flexibility and the 
court’s retention of jurisdiction, and sometimes by the court’s active participation in the 
implementation of the order granted.214 
The structural interdict’s flexible characteristic ensures that the remedy can be 
adapted to the changing circumstances of a particular case. For example, the 
specificity of the order and/or the model215 utilised at the beginning of the case may 
be adapted according to the changing circumstances of each case. Ultimately the 
formulation of the structural interdict may differ substantially at the beginning and the 
conclusion of a case.216   
Although flexibility may cause difficulties in the implementation of the remedy, it can 
also be argued that it is precisely this feature which contributes to the strengths of this 
kind of relief.217 The flexibility makes it possible to revise the remedy without having to 
institute fresh litigation. The flexibility of the structural interdict also allows for revisiting 
and restructuring the remedy to accommodate for factors that were not anticipated 
when the remedy was first designed and implemented. Factors could include changes 
in the degree of recalcitrance by the State (which could require general or more 
specific instructions from the court to ensure the compliance with its orders) or 
engagement (court-ordered or self-imposed) between the parties which could lead to 
alternative solutions to those proposed by the court.218  
                                            
212 Such alternative effective relief constituting constitutional damages and contempt of court is 
discussed thoroughly in Chapters 3 and 4 below. 
213 Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 381-383; Viljoen (2015) SAPL 55-57; A Chayes “The role of the judge in 
public law litigation” (1979) 89 Harvard LR 1281 1298. 
214 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 177. 
215 See models for supervision below at 3 3. 
216 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 180. 
217 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 180; R Lawrence The impact of supervisory orders and 
structural interdicts in South Africa LLM University of the Western Cape (2012) 61.   
218 See for example Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 3 SA 
454 (CC) below at 4 3. See also Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street 
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The flexible feature of the structural interdict thus enables the court to find and forge 
the most suitable and effective form of relief, given the gradual or radical changes in 
circumstances over a period of time. The court will concretise its order only after it has 
made a final determination and has found the most effective way of remedying the 
rights violations.219  
The flexibility feature enables the court to provide latitude to the executive, or the 
legislative branch of the State, so as to determine the most effective remedy for the 
violation.220 Initially, the court may merely require that the violation be remedied. 
However, the terms of the order granted may be revised by the court and become 
more specific over time, if for example it is found that there is a continuous lack of 
compliance with its orders.221 In this regard a spectrum of factors emerges that may 
lead to gradual specificity of court orders.222 Recalcitrance by the State usually leads 
to supplementary orders by the court, before contempt of court sanctions are resorted 
to. However, this does not suggest that contempt of court sanctions may never 
become applicable at the first instance of recalcitrance.223 
The most peculiar feature of the structural interdict is the court’s retention of jurisdiction 
over the case even after an order has been granted.224 The retention of jurisdiction 
over a case disregards the traditional functus officio doctrine.225 This is a necessary 
                                            
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) where it was unnecessary for the court to 
grant an order with specific instructions because the parties reached a mutually acceptable solution 
with regard to the steps that had to be taken by the State.  
219 K Cooper-Stephenson “Principle and pragmatism in the law of remedies” in Berryman J (ed) 
Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) 36; O Fiss The civil rights interdict (1978) 36. 
220 DM Davis “Adjudicating Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution towards ‘deference 
lite’” (2006) 22 SAJHR 301; M Pieters “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 383.  
221 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC), 
discussed below at 4 3.  
222 These factors are discussed in more detail below at 3 5.  
223 Fiss The civil rights interdict 36-37 states that: “The usual scenario…is for the judge to issue a decree 
(perhaps a plan formulated by the defendant), to be confronted with disobedience, and then not to inflict 
contempt but to grant a motion for supplement relief. Then the cycle repeats itself. In each cycle of the 
supplemental relief process the remedial obligation is defined with greater and greater specificity. 
Ultimately, after many cycles of supplement decrees, the ordinary contempt sanctions may become 
realistically available, but the point to emphasise is that it is only then - only at the end of a series- that 
threat of contempt becomes credible.” See Chapter 4 which focuses on civil contempt of court 
proceedings as a possible remedy to provide effective relief.   
224 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 181. 
225 M Pretorius “The origins of the functus officio doctrine, with specific reference to its application in 
administrative law” (2005) 122 SALJ 832 sets out a detailed discussion of the functus officio doctrine. 
The doctrine requires that once a court has made a final determination of a matter, its jurisdiction over 
the case ceases and the case is closed. 
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feature of the structural interdict in order to ensure that ongoing measures designed 
to eliminate the rights’ violations are executed within a reasonable time.226 The 
retention of jurisdiction may also enable parties to reach clarity on the details of the 
order granted so as to ensure that they are adhering to it. The continued supervision 
of the court will also enable it to alter its order as new facts or circumstances come to 
the fore. In principle a negotiated comprise can be reached between the parties in 
order to secure full implementation of the order,227 especially where there is evidence 
that the circumstances surrounding the case have changed.  
3 3 Arguments against and in favour of the use of the structural interdict  
 
The separation of powers doctrine requires that the functions of the government be 
classified as legislative, executive or judicial and that each function be performed by 
separate branches of government.228 However, the structural interdict inevitably 
requires the court to intervene and to take an active administrative role, through 
ongoing supervision, in order to ensure compliance with its directives.229 In this regard 
the use of the structural interdict can often be quite intrusive230 because it compels 
action which displaces the discretionary powers and functions usually enjoyed by the 
executive and/or legislative branches of the State.231 Currie and De Waal have 
suggested that it is therefore important that the terms of the order be devised in a 
flexible manner so as to prevent supervision becoming too intrusive and resulting in 
blurring the distinction between the executive and judicial functions.232 Mbazira also 
notes that the degree of failure and extent of State recalcitrance should dictate the 
level of judicial intrusion.233  
                                            
226 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 334; Ling (2015) HKJLS 63-64. 
227 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 183. 
228 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 18. See South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v 
Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC).  
229 A Pillay “South Africa: Access to land and housing” (2007) 5 IJCL 544 555.  
230 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 27.  
231 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 18; K Grossenbacher “Implementing Structural Injunctions: Getting 
a Remedy when Local Officials Resist” (1991-1992) 80 Georgetown LJ 2231-2232; E Frug “The judicial 
power of the purse” (1978) University of Pennsylvania LR 715-794 734-735; Currie & De Waal Bill of 
Rights 199-200; Lawrence The impact of supervisory orders and structural interdicts 62, 64-65.  
232 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 200.  
233 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 195.  
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The structural interdict is normally employed in situations that involve socio-economic 
problems,234 including the provision of adequate housing by the State in eviction 
cases.235 Relief that requires the State to take positive actions, such as the provision 
of housing, raises polycentric issues that affect multiple parties and budgetary 
priorities.236 Socio-economic problems involving budgetary allocations and making 
policy-related choices are considered to be within the exclusive domain of the 
legislative and executive branches of the State. Mbazira holds that this is because the 
process of making budgetary allocations and policy choices, such as the provision of 
housing, gives rise to very difficult questions relating to expenditure, policy and 
prioritisation.237 In a country founded on the principle of separation of powers, though 
not absolute,238 the combination of power and functions of the legislative, executive 
and judicial branches of the State239 will inevitably lead to concerns about the proper 
allocation of power among the State branches and issues of institutional 
incompetency.240  
In this regard, there are those who are concerned with the notion of a judge fashioning 
structural interdicts that will effectively usurp the discretionary functions of legislative 
and/or State officials.241 Some critics might also be uncomfortable with the use of the 
structural interdict because of the apparent violation of State comity that occurs when 
a judge mandates action by State officials. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
                                            
234 See in general Strydom v Minister of Correctional Services 1999 3 BCLR 342 (W); Grootboom v 
Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C); Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape 2001 2 SA 609 (E); Treatment Action Campaign v Minister of Health 2002 4 BCLR 356 
(T); Rail Commuter Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail (1) 2003 5 SA 518 (C); President van die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika v Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T); S v Z and 23 
Similar Cases 2004 1 SACR 400 (E); City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 5 SA 39 (C); Minister of 
Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School 2006 1 SA 1 (SCA); Magidimisi v Premier of the 
Eastern Cape 2006 JOL 17274 (Ck); Kiliko v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 4 SA 114 (C); EN v the 
Government of the RSA 2006 JOL 18038 (D); Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 2 SA 363 (CC). 
235 Horowitz The courts and social policy 9.   
236 Ebadolahi (2008) 83 NYLR 1565 1579-1584; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 384-385.  
237 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 192. 
238 In re Certification of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa (First Certification case) 1996 10 
BCLR 1253 (CC) para 108. See also DM Davis “The relationship between courts and the other arms of 
government in promoting and protecting socio-economic rights in South Africa: What about separation 
of power?” (2012) 15 PELJ 1-14.  
239 Horowitz The courts and social policy 20; Sturm (1991) Georgetown LJ 1403.   
240 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 54-58; Grossenbacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2227 2233; Ebadolahi 
(2008) NYLR 1597; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 200; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 383-384.  
241 Grossenbacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2233; Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) 
para 39. 
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in Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic 
of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (“Modderklip SCA”)242 articulated that:   
“Structural interdicts…have a tendency to blur the distinction between the executive 
and the judiciary and impact on the separation of powers. They intend to deal with 
policy matters and not with the enforcement of a particular right. Another aspect to take 
into account is the comity between the different [branches] of the State. Then there is 
the problem of sensible enforcement: the State must be able to comply with the order 
within the limits of its capabilities, financial or otherwise. Policies also change, as do 
requirements, and all this impacts on enforcement”.243  
To some, the willingness of judges to use structural relief represents a fundamental 
change in the judiciary’s view of its own power and not merely a means of addressing 
new problems.244 Some fear that the courts will lose its legitimacy as the activity of 
judges become, at least in the public perception, more politicised and less 
principled.245 This concern is however misplaced. Just because State officials are 
entrusted to make executive or legislative decisions from the outset, does not 
automatically render their actions correct or constitutional.246 Courts would not be able 
to remedy rights violations unless substantive constitutional rights and adjudicative 
processes that govern them are continually adjusted to maintain their vitality in the 
face of changing social standards and practices. If, in future, the structural interdict 
and what it portends for the role of the court in a democratic society causes more 
problems than it solves, then the court will have to adapt again. It is perhaps better to 
allow courts more flexibility instead of restricting their function purely on the basis of 
concerns about where flexibility may lead.247  
Despite critique against the use of the structural interdict as effective relief, the relief 
granted can be justified. The concerns postulated above, are outweighed by the fact 
that the judge may be the only State actor who can ensure a remedy for constitutional 
                                            
242 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA). For a discussion of Modderklip SCA see A Christmas “Property rights of 
landowners vs socio-economic rights of occupiers: case review 2” (2004) 5 ESR Review 11-13; AJ van 
der Walt “The state’s duty to protect property owners v the State’s duty to provide housing: Thoughts 
on the Modderklip case: notes and comments” (2005) 21 SAJHR 144-161.   
243 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 39.  
244 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 54-58. See also A Cox “The new dimension of constitutional litigation” (1976) 
51 Washington LR 791 821.  
245 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1595-1598. 
246 Hirsch (2007) Oregon Review of International Law 57.  
247 Grossenbacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2234. 
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violations, “for without [effective] remedies for breach, the values underlying and the 
rights entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced”.248  
Horowitz concedes in this regard that where there is reticence on the part of the other 
branches of State as regards policy decision making, or the implementation of a 
remedy, regardless of how imperfect a judicial remedy may be, the structural interdict 
may be the best available remedy, exactly because of the absence of performance by 
other branches.249 When judges act to vindicate constitutional rights they are acting 
legitimately and in accordance with their constitutional obligations to provide effective 
relief.250  
According to Davis:  
“The Court’s…refusal to grant structural relief [in the form of a structural interdict] that 
would empower courts to supervise the implementation of their own orders…in effect 
[means that it]… [surrenders] its powers to sanction [State] inertia and, as a direct 
result, litigants have not obtained the shelter…that even a cursory reading of the 
judgements promised”.251  
As Ebadolahi argues the structural interdict: 
“[P]reserves an active [and legitimate] role for the judiciary, yet avoids separation of 
power problems by requiring appropriate political actors to formulate plans for change. 
As such, structural interdicts circumvent institutional competence critiques; legislators 
and/or executive branch officials are required to take action, but are given the 
necessary flexibility to accommodate polycentric decision making”.252  
The use of a structural interdict thus asserts judicial power and legitimacy in cases 
where no other judicial remedies are capable of remedying the rights violations. The 
remedy preserves the court’s special role in South Africa’s democracy since the 
supervisory feature of the remedy allows courts to inspect proposed plans to ensure 
that the State’s proposed plans are not constitutionally suspect.253 Accordingly, the 
                                            
248 Fose v Minister of Safety 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69. 
249 Horowitz The courts and social policy 24. 
250 Grossenbacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2251-2251; A Rycroft “Judicial Innovation and the 
delinquent state: A note on The State and Mfezeko Zuba and 23 similar cases” (2004) 20 SAHRJ 
321 325. 
251 Davis (2004) ESR Review 3, 6. 
252 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1596.  
253 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1596; Ling (2015) HKJLS 63-65.   
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provision of an effective tool, such as the structural interdict to remedy rights violations, 
bolsters the integrity of South African courts.  
The use of the structural interdict also provides advantages for State bodies. The 
process of formulating and presenting a plan to the courts is said to improve 
accountability by assisting state officials to identify the relevant state official or 
department responsible for ensuring access to and the realisation of specific rights.254 
In appropriate cases, structural interdicts not only require the State to comply with its 
obligations, but actually assist it to do so better, and in a way that nurtures the 
democratic process.255 In this way the adoption and use of the structural interdict also 
serve to structure a dialogue between the courts and the elected branches of the State.  
Properly conceived, structural interdicts have the potential to facilitate the principle of 
co-operative governance256 and are particularly suited to a society committed to the 
values of accountability, responsiveness and openness in a system of democratic 
governance.257 However, the virtues of efficiently and effectively providing remedies 
for constitutional violations will probably not dispel the uneasiness of the possibility 
that the courts will usurp the powers and functions of the legislative and/or executive 
branches of the State.258 Despite critique against and concerns regarding the use of 
the structural interdict as an effective remedy, the recognition of the power of the courts 
to grant structural interdicts when necessary was established beyond doubt in Minister 
of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) (“TAC”).259  
                                            
254 See the example of Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C) para 293 where 
the court held: “On the existing evidence it is less than clear on which of the respondents [State officials] 
within the hierarchy of government the duty to provide shelter [rests]…It is to be hoped that the report 
which the respondents will have to place before this Court, will clarify this aspect of the matter”. See 
also Lawrence The impact of supervisory orders and structural interdicts 66.  
255 Liebenberg (2012) AHRlJ 1.  
256 Section 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
257 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199; P O’Connell Vindicating Socio-Economic rights: International 
Standards and Comparative Experiences (2012) 169 acknowledges that there are conventional 
criticisms which deem structural interdicts to be undemocratic, because of the judiciary’s limited 
democratic pedigree, but argues that the use of structural interdicts can be “deeply democratising”, 
because “[it] create[s] spaces for dialogue between the courts, the [State] and civil society actors. In 
this way [the use of the structural interdict] deepen[s] accountability and participation - the key elements 
of democracy”; S v Z and 23 similar cases 2004 4 BCLR 410 (E) para 39.  
258 Grossebacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2257.  
259 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 106; Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 325. 
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Having established that the courts have the power to grant structural interdicts,260 it is 
still necessary to consider the different models for supervision that can be used to 
achieve effective relief.  
3 4 Models for supervision 
3 4 1 Introduction  
 
The structural interdict, as explained, is a remedy that enables a court to retain 
jurisdiction. While the remedy remains essentially the same, various options or models 
exist in terms of which the court’s oversight may be structured. This section deals with 
the various models available in principle and how they operate in eviction contexts, in 
particular.  
While not being a fully-fledged legal comparative study it is useful to consider the 
relevant models for supervision that have developed in America. American 
jurisprudence is used because the origin of the structural interdict as a constitutional 
remedy can be traced back to the United States school desegregation cases.261 Since 
the initial use of the structural interdict in the school desegregation cases in the United 
States, the remedy has been utilised to promote constitutional reform in other contexts 
as well.262 It may be insightful to explore the various models constructed by American 
courts in the hope that the utilisation thereof by the South African courts will provide 
effective relief in theory and in practice.263 To the extent that it may be accommodated 
within the South African eviction process specifically, the use of the bargaining, public 
                                            
260 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 106.  
261 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 347 US 483 (1954) (Brown 1) and Brown v Board of Education 
of Topeka 349 US 294 (1955) (Brown 2); C Mbazira “From ambivalence to certainty: Norms and 
principles for the structural interdict in socio-economic rights litigation in South Africa” (2008) 24 SAJHR 
1-28 4 states these cases were “propelled by the need to realise transformation of the dual school 
system based on race, into a unitary and non-racial school system. It required a great deal of 
organisational reform to transform the entrenched racial segregation, which had survived for hundreds 
of years. The courts were required to transform this entrenched status quo and to reconstruct the social 
reality in a radical manner. What was required included establishing new procedures for student 
assignments, new criteria for construction of schools, revision of transport routes, re-assignment of 
facilities, curricular modifications, reallocation of resources, and above all, establishing equity in the 
school system. The question is whether all these objectives would have been achieved through the 
conventional one-stance traditional litigation and remedial procedures. The answer is a definite no; it 
required protracted and unusual methods of litigation and remediation; hence the resort to the structural 
interdict to ensure that the obstinate school and local authorities implemented the desired reforms”; 
Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 374-396 379. 
262 Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 379. See also D Zaring “National rulemaking through trial courts” (2004) 51 
UCLA LR 1015-1077. 
263 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 6.  
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hearing, expert remedial formulation, report back to court and consensual remedial 
formulation models is explored forthwith. 264  
The models alluded to above provide different processes and methods for oversight, 
which is key to the structural interdict’s anatomy. Because the circumstances linked to 
eviction cases are diverse, different models for supervision may be required. 
Depending on the circumstances of each case, different parties with different notions 
of what will constitute effective relief, may become part of the court proceedings. In 
this context different affected parties may provide insight and guidance to the courts 
in determining what will constitute effective relief. In this regard, the particular model 
employed, therefore impacts on the formulation of the relief granted by the court. The 
particular formulation may impact on whether relief is effected within a reasonable 
time. Accordingly, the formulation of the structural interdict and model used for 
oversight must be structured and used in such a way that when combined, it will suit 
the very specific circumstances of each case. Changing circumstances, often present 
in eviction cases, may also justify and require the use of a different model for oversight 
for obtaining effective relief. In this regard, there is room for the South African courts 
to explore other models for oversight apart from the report back to court model, which 
may provide different ways of achieving different outcomes to eviction cases.  
Accordingly, each of these models will be discussed below in the hope that it will 
provide some guidance and insight regarding the methods for executing eviction 
orders, to the extent that these may be accommodated within the South African 
eviction process.  
3 4 2 The bargaining model 
 
In essence, the bargaining model entails a negotiation process whereby the court, 
before making a final order, instructs the parties involved in the case to negotiate with 
one another.265 The parties will only return to court once an agreement is reached.  
                                            
264 Sturm (2001) Georgetown LJ 1365-1377; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 6-8.  
265 Sturm (2001) Georgetown LJ 1367-1370; Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 183; Mbazira 
(2008) SAJHR 6; Grossenbacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2232; A Chayes, The Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation (1976) 89 Harvard LR 1281 1283-1284; Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ; Swanepoel 
(2015) Litnet 380.    
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The use of this model embodies a number of advantages, not only to the parties, but 
to the courts as well. In theory, the negotiation process produces a remedy that is 
acceptable to all the parties.266 Acceptance of the formulated remedy is said to ease 
implementation thereof. The process of negotiation between the parties accords 
legitimacy to the remedy,267 because the remedy is said to become “self-imposed” 
(compared to court-imposed).268 Accordingly, the court will only rule on aspects which 
could not be resolved by way of negotiation.269 Nonetheless, where disagreement 
arises, the threat of a court-imposed remedy (compared to a self-imposed remedy) 
may persuade the parties to break the deadlock and reach an agreement. The notion 
of a “self-imposed” remedy will furthermore shield the court from accusations of 
interfering in the affairs and functions of the legislative and/or executive branch of the 
State.270 Consequently, separation of powers concerns will not deter the courts from 
enforcing the remedy where there has been a subsequent failure to abide by the 
remedy initially agreed to by the parties. The court’s involvement will not only be 
viewed as legitimate, but also as necessary to ensure that effective relief is achieved.  
Additionally, the process of negotiation and agreement between the parties reduces 
the burden on the court to resolve all issues. The process of negotiation between the 
parties may also highlight facts and issues which were either not brought before the 
court, or were ignored by the court, but were relevant to founding or forging an effective 
remedy.271 The concerns raised by the different perspectives of the parties may give 
rise to factors which could affect the implementation of the remedy.  
In the South African context, the possibility exists that the court can instruct the parties 
involved in an eviction case to negotiate a settlement using a structural interdict.272 In 
this regard, the objectives and/or the mechanisms employed resemble “meaningful 
                                            
266 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 418. 
267 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 184.  
268 O’Connell Vindicating Socio-Economic rights 169. 
269 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 184. 
270 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 184. 
271 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 184. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 
7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective 
implementation 5. 
272 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) where the court issued an interim structural interdict directing the 
parties to “engage meaningfully” with each other; Lingwood & Another v The Unlawful Occupiers of R/E 
of Erf 9 Highlands 2008 3 BCLR 325 (W) where the court ordered the parties and the City of 
Johannesburg to engage in mediation to find a suitable solution. 
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engagement”.273 The courts frequently make use of mandatory interdicts requiring the 
parties to engage with each other with a view of exploring mutually acceptable 
solutions to the dispute, including the possibility of securing suitable alternative 
accommodation for the unlawful occupiers.274 An interdict requiring the parties to 
engage meaningfully with one another can either be ordered before the court grants a 
remedy or it can be coupled with a court order in order to facilitate the execution of the 
order granted. Consequently, meaningful engagement plays an important role in 
facilitating effective relief for both the land owner and the unlawful occupier, while 
ensuring that the State adheres to and gives effect to its constitutional obligation to 
provide access to adequate housing on a progressive basis.275 
The case of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg (“Olivia Road”) 276  is regarded as the leading 
case in which an order was made before an eviction order was granted requiring the 
parties to “engage meaningfully” with each other.277 In short, the Constitutional Court 
issued an order compelling the parties to negotiate in an attempt to reach an 
agreement. Active participation from the unlawful occupiers and the State led to an 
agreement regarding the steps that had to be taken to provide the unlawful occupiers 
with accommodation. The agreement reached was subsequently endorsed by the 
court and was made part of the court order.  
However, the fact that the model used in Olivia Road was successful does not 
necessarily mean that it will work in other situations, even where the circumstances 
are similar. If the State is not willing to actively participate and fulfil its obligations, 
                                            
273 See in general Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 257-283 for a discussion of 
“meaningful engagement”. See also Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ 1-29.   
274 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 418. 
275 Section 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. For a comprehensive analysis 
of the housing rights of unlawful occupiers in the post-1994 constitutional dispensation see Muller The 
impact of section 26 of the Constitution 82-93. Furthermore, see in general Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; McLean 
“Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14. 
276 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). See a discussion of the case below at 3 5. See also Chenwi & Liebenberg 
(2008) ESR Review 12-17; Chenwi (2009) CCR 371-393; Chenwi (2011) SAPL 128-156; Muller (2011) 
Stell LR 742-758; Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ 1-29. 
277 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 419.  The court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township 
and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) also cited its judgment 
in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) in which it held that “[an] effective 
mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the different interests involved is to encourage and 
require the parties to engage with each other in a proactive and honest endeavour to find mutually 
acceptable solutions” (para 39).  
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negotiations will be rendered useless. Accordingly, it is evident from Olivia Road that 
the effectiveness of the structural interdict in the form of the bargaining model, is 
dependent upon the willingness of the State (and the other parties) to participate and 
collaborate in finding an equitable solution, given the circumstances of the case.278  
3 4 3 The public hearing model  
 
The public hearing model entails the provision of a legislative committee process 
which provides for “public hearings and direct informal participation by interested 
parties” (my emphasis).279 Unlike the bargaining model, which may be restricted to the 
identified parties involved in the litigation process, the public hearing model allows all 
parties interested in the case, to participate in the formulation of the remedy.280 The 
involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in this regard is necessary to secure the 
collaboration between the different spheres or departments of the State and the 
different stakeholders in the remedial process.281 Mbazira stipulates that this is an 
effective model in responding to the polycentric interests which may be implicated in 
the case.282 In other words, the court conducts a hearing in which all interested parties 
are invited to participate, often with relaxed rules of evidence.283 The court then uses 
the information gathered from the hearings to forge an acceptable and effective 
remedy.  
To date the South African courts have not utilised the public hearing model in the 
context of eviction cases. However, it can be argued that this would be a suitable 
model to follow given the polycentric interests that may be implicated in eviction cases. 
On the other hand, it may complicate eviction matters further and prolong the process 
of providing effective relief. In such cases where there is an unreasonable delay284 in 
finding a suitable remedy, it will render any relief granted ineffective, because it will 
not be executed within a reasonable time.     
                                            
278 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 21; Ling (2015) HKJLS 67-68.   
279 Sturm (1991) Georgetown LJ 1370-1371; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 6; Mbazira Litigating socio-
economic rights 187; Grossenbacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2232; Chayes (1979) Harvard LR 
1283-1284; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 380-381.   
279 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 418. 
280 Chayes (1979) Harvard LR 1281.  
281 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 22.  
282 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 6; 21; Chayes (1987) Harvard LR 1310.  
283 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-180.  
284 See Chapter 1 at 2 3 above for a discussion of what constitutes an unreasonable delay.  
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3 4 4 The expert remedial formulation model  
 
Wherever possible, respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation through a third 
party should replace arm’s-length confrontation by intransigent opponents.285 The 
expert remedial formulation model entails the appointment of either an individual or 
panel of experts responsible for the development of a remedial plan.286 In this regard 
the court may choose the individual or panel unilaterally or may base its selection on 
the recommendation of the parties.287 The individual or panel then develops a 
proposed remedy independently.  
Experts in structural litigation are not restricted to fact-finding mandates.288 Instead, 
the expert’s role is to design and propose a remedial plan that will provide effective 
relief for all those affected.289 Usually, the remedial plan is then submitted to the court 
for approval.290 The expert could even be designated as an administrator with a 
mandate to take over and manage an institution or State department in need of 
reform.291 The court’s role throughout, is to ensure that a plan is reasonable and to 
supervise the execution thereof, within a reasonable time. Like the public hearing 
model, the expert remedial formulation model is intended to ensure that polycentric 
interests are considered and that the remedy is acceptable and effective, not only to 
the parties but also to other members of the community who may play a role in its 
implementation.292 It is contended that this model encourages reasoned decision 
making and fosters the impartiality and independence of the court.293   
This model is not without its disadvantages. The use of an expert may detract from the 
need for participation of all interested parties. It is the expert, as opposed to the 
interested parties, who has the benefit of integrating the range of information and 
perspectives into an effective remedy.294 Due to the limited participation by the parties, 
it may become difficult for the expert to justify particular remedial decisions. If it is 
                                            
285 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 39.   
286 Sturm (1991) Georgetown LJ 1371-1372; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 381. 
287 Sturm (1991) Georgetown LJ 1372.  
288 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 7; Sturm (1991) Georgetown LJ 1419-1420.  
289 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 7; Sturm (1991) Georgetown LJ 1419-1420. 
290 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 7; Sturm (1991) Georgetown LJ 1419-1420. 
291 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 180. 
292 Strum (1991) Georgetown LJ 1419-1420; Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 188.  
293 Strum (1991) Georgetown LJ 1419-1420; Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 188. 
294 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 189. 
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found that the remedial plan was not accepted through consensus or if the plan is not 
executed within a reasonable time, the court will not be bound by the plan developed 
by the expert(s). In this regard, it may be necessary for the court to utilise a different 
model or grant alternative effective relief295 to the parties.  
As mentioned, South African courts have thus far not utilised the expert remedial 
model in the context of eviction cases. In this regard, it may be advisable for the court 
to appoint the South African Human Rights Commission (“SAHRC”)296 or a non-
governmental organisation (“NGO”) as an expert in formulating a remedial plan297 that 
will ensure effective relief for all parties. Liebenberg agrees, but postulates that the 
court may also appoint independent experts or preferably interdisciplinary teams of 
experts, to assist the court with the supervision of its orders.298 Ebadolahi envisages 
the role of the SAHRC to be one that ensures that structural interdicts are executed 
once litigation has ended.299 She argues that the increased use of the structural 
interdict, combined with the collaborative role of the SAHRC as an expert in the 
formulation of a remedial plan will ensure that effective relief is forged for all parties 
involved in the eviction proceedings.300  
If a court finds that the structural interdict will be the appropriate remedy in situations 
where an eviction order was granted but not executed, then it should order the 
SAHRC, together with the relevant State actors responsible for the provision of 
alternative accommodation, to craft an action plan that will adequately remedy the 
rights violations.301 Once the plan has been drafted, it will be the responsibility of the 
SAHRC to provide the court with sufficient and accurate information in relation to the 
                                            
295 Such ‘alternative effective relief’ is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
296 Section 184 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 read with section 13(3)(b) of 
the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 which provides for express litigation 
powers to initiate cases or join pending cases as amicus curiae. For an overview of the role and function 
of the South African Human Rights Commission see J Klaaren South African Human Rights 
Commission in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 1 
2005) 24C-2.  
297 Section 13(1)(a) of the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013; NP Ntlama The 
implementation of court orders in respect of socio-economic rights in South Africa LLM Stellenbosch 
University (2003); K Tissington “Demolishing development at Gabon informal settlement: Public interest 
litigation beyond Modderklip?” (2011) 27 SAJHR 192-205 201.  
298 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 436.  
299 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1568; Klaaren “South African Human Rights Commission” in CLOSA 24C-
10 in which he states that “[A]n enhanced supervisory role for the SAHRC may be necessary to ensure 
effective rights enforcement”. See also Ntlama The implementation of court orders 46-71.  
300 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1565, 1568, 1602-1606.  
301 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1602. 
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steps proposed and/or drafted in the plan. In this regard, the SAHRC can also assist 
the court in identifying potential weaknesses in the State’s proposal, presented for 
evaluation.302  Where the State’s proposed plan is approved by the court, the most 
important responsibility of the SAHRC may be to follow up on the implementation of 
the plan. In this regard, the SAHRC would alleviate the court’s burden of ongoing 
supervision in eviction cases and reduce the costs associated with and necessary to 
execute a court order, while holding the relevant State officials accountable to the 
proposed plans.303 Where the State does not subsequently execute the approved plan 
within a reasonable time, it will be the role and responsibility of the SAHRC to facilitate 
or initiate contempt of court or constitutional damages proceedings.304 
In principle, this methodology will enable the State to ensure that the efficacy of the 
court is upheld305 while consequently safeguarding the court’s fundamental duty to 
provide effective relief.306  
3 4 5 The report back to court model  
 
In essence, the report back to court model “requires the defendant or respondent to 
report back to the court and other parties to the litigation on the implementation of the 
order”.307 This is commonly known as a “reporting order”.308 Only where the court is 
satisfied with the remedial plan, will it become part of the court’s final order.309 The 
court then proceeds to regulate further engagement between the parties and the 
implementation of the plan,310 by way of issuing periodic directives until effective relief 
is obtained.  Subsequently, this process is repeated until the constitutional 
                                            
302 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1603.  
303 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1603.  
304 Ebadolahi (2008) NYLR 1603. See also Chapter 3 and 4 respectively for an analysis on the use of 
constitutional damages and contempt of court proceedings as potential remedies that can provide 
effective relief where the structural interdict cannot.  
305 Section 164(5) read with section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) 
para 39. 
306 Section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 18 and 33. See also Fose v 
Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-65-78; 
Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 377-461  
307 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 424; Hirsch (2007) Oregon Review of International Law 36-27.  
308 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 424; Hirsch (2007) Oregon Review of International Law 21-22.  
309 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 7. 
310 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 424; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199. 
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infringement has been satisfactorily remedied.311 Although the bargaining model is 
similar to the report back to court model, there are small differences between the two.  
The bargaining model only requires the parties to report back to court once an 
agreement is reached. The parties are also only required to report back regarding the 
agreement itself. By comparison, the report back to court model may require the 
parties not only to negotiate a plan which will give effect to the relevant rights but also 
to report back to court on a regular basis,312 regardless of whether they have reached 
an agreement. The report back to court model not only requires periodical reports 
regarding the negotiation progress between the parties, but also requires reports 
regarding the implementation of an agreement, once an agreement is reached.   
The reporting model holds the advantage that it allows the courts to defer to the elected 
branches of the State on the most effective way of eliminating the violation. Deference 
to either the legislature or the executive branch of the State shields the court from 
accusations that it has usurped functions reserved for the other organs of State.  
The report back to court model is the model of the structural interdict most commonly 
utilised by the South African courts to ensure compliance with court orders.313 In 
essence it requires the State to report back to the court with a plan on how the rights 
violation is intended to be remedied.314  
Given the common use of the report back to court model in South African 
jurisprudence, it is possible to identify the composite elements. Firstly, the court 
declares the respects in which State conduct falls short of its constitutional 
obligations.315 Where there has been a failure to execute an eviction order, the court 
will typically point out that the State has failed to adhere to its duty to provide adequate 
alternative accommodation. Secondly, the court orders the State to comply with its 
constitutional obligations.316 In the context of evictions this would entail obliging the 
State to provide adequate alternative accommodation. Thirdly, the court orders the 
State to produce (usually under oath) a report within a specified period of time setting 
                                            
311 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 424; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199. 
312 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 424; Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199. 
313 O’Connell Vindicating Socio-economic Rights 55-66. 
314 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 189; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 7.  
315 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199.  
316 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199; Du Plessis et al Constitutional Litigation 124. 
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out what steps it has taken, and what future steps will be taken317 to remedy the rights 
violations. In the context of evictions, this would entail a report on the provision of 
adequate alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers. Fourthly, the applicant 
is afforded an opportunity to respond to the report.318 The land owner and/or unlawful 
occupiers are given the chance to raise any objections or concerns regarding the 
implementation of the plan submitted to the court at this stage.319 Finally, the matter is 
enrolled for a hearing and, if satisfactory, the report is made an order of the court.320 
Typically, the court will maintain a supervisory role at this stage in order to ensure that 
the order granted, based on the report submitted to it, is executed within a reasonable 
time as determined by the courts or the parties. A situation may result where further 
court orders follow, either confirming compliance with the original order (i.e. the 
execution of the eviction order) or enabling further relief, such as constitutional 
damages or contempt of court proceedings.321 
The use of the report back to court model will, at the very least, ensure a “response” 
from the State in the form of a “report” to the court and thereby “account” for a failure 
to comply with positive obligations imposed by the Bill of Rights.322 
3 4 6 The consensual remedial formulation model  
 
The consensual remedial formulation model can be viewed as a combination of the 
bargaining; the public hearing; and the expert remedial formulation model.323 In 
essence, the court and the parties can develop mechanisms that involve the interested 
actors in a process of developing a consensual remedy through joint fact-finding and 
collaborative decision-making, assisted by a third party.324  
                                            
317 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199; Du Plessis et al Constitutional Litigation 124. 
318 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199; Du Plessis et al Constitutional Litigation 124. 
319 The order of the Constitutional Court in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 
SA 538 (CC) para 53, for example, contained the first of the four listed elements above. See also the 
court’s more limited structural interdict in Occupiers of Mooiplaats v Golden Thread Limited 2012 2 SA 
337 (CC).  
320 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199. 
321 Du Plessis et al Constitutional Litigation 124. See also Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199 which 
states that: “A failure to comply with obligations as set out in the court order will then amount to contempt 
of court”.   
322 Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights 199-200.  
323 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-181.  
324 Sturm (2001) Georgetown LJ 1373-1374; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 7; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 
Akademies 381.  
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Like the bargaining model, this model tries to secure a negotiated agreement between 
all parties regarding the formulation of an effective remedy.325 Furthermore, it enables 
the parties to the litigation, as well as interested third parties, to participate in the 
formulation of an effective remedy through a less formal process.326 The process may 
also entail the appointment of an expert who will assist the parties in finding a 
solution.327 The court’s role in this regard would be to endorse the chosen remedy. 
This would entail determining whether the remedy is appropriate given the 
circumstances of the case. Where the particular result envisaged with the remedy is 
not achieved, it may be necessary to return to the court. The court will then have to 
decide whether to adopt a different model or whether to grant alternative effective 
relief,328 given the circumstances of the case.  
Regardless of the model employed by the court, the structural interdict remains a 
remedy which is used to direct the party responsible for the violation of constitutional 
rights to remedy such a breach under court supervision.  
Having determined the relevant features, functions and possible models for 
supervision linked to the structural interdict, it is necessary to explore the particular 
circumstances that may warrant a structural interdict.  
3 5 When is the use of the structural interdict appropriate? 
3 5 1 Factors to determine whether is it appropriate to award a structural interdict  
 
The Constitutional Court in TAC has held that a structural interdict may be an 
appropriate remedy when a right in the Bill of Rights has been unjustifiably infringed.329 
Therefore, proof of an infringed constitutional right may act as a threshold in 
determining whether or not it is appropriate to utilise the structural interdict. Where 
there has been a failure to execute an eviction order, the respective constitutional 
                                            
325 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 8; Sturm (2001) Georgetown LJ 1373-1377.  
326 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 8; Sturm (2001) Georgetown LJ 1373-1377. 
327 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 8; Sturm (2001) Georgetown LJ 1373-1377. 
328 See Chapters 3 and 4.  
329 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 106; Swanepoel (2015) 
Litnet 287 and 389; G Budlender “Remedying Breaches of the Constitution” in J Klaaren A Delicate 
Balance: The place of the Judiciary in a Constitutional Democracy (2006) 83.   
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rights of the land owner330 and the unlawful occupier(s)331 are violated on a continuous 
basis. A failure by the State to provide mechanisms to execute a court order within a 
reasonable time may result in an arbitrary deprivation of the land owner’s property 
rights.332 The unlawful occupiers are also left without effective relief where the State 
fails to provide access to land and adequate housing.333 As a result the land owner 
and unlawful occupiers’ right to an effective remedy becomes redundant.334 
Consequently, the right to have access to courts335 is also compromised.336  
Furthermore, the court in TAC emphasised that the decision by the court to grant a 
structural interdict will depend on the circumstances of the case.337 Although the court 
in TAC found it unnecessary to order a structural interdict it nevertheless indicated that 
such orders are needed when it is necessary to secure compliance with a previous 
court order.338 The need to secure compliance will be evident where there is a failure 
to heed declaratory order or other relief.339 In determining whether it is necessary to 
secure compliance with a court order by way of a structural interdict, it may be useful 
to determine the cause of the constitutional breach. Roach and Budlender340 also 
argue that the cause of non-compliance may call for a particular remedial technique, 
since what is effective where the State is simply inattentive to constitutional standards, 
                                            
330 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 17-18 and Roux “Property” in CLOSA 41-1-41-37.   
331 Sections 25(6) and 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also J van 
Wyk “The relationship (or not) between the rights of access to land and housing: de-linking land from 
its components” (2005) 16 Stell LR 466-487; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of 
the Constitution 75-82; McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14.   
332 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) which established the test for 
determining whether a deprivation amounts to a procedurally and/or substantively arbitrary deprivation. 
See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 190-333 for a comprehensive discussion of arbitrary 
deprivations property. See also Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-28. J Strydom & S Viljoen (Maass) 
“Unlawful occupation of inner-city buildings: A constitutional analysis of the rights and obligations 
involved” (2014) 17 PELJ 1207 1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235 
333 Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8.  
334 Section 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 8 BCLR 786 (CC). 
335 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
336 Budlender (2004) SALJ 339; Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van 
Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) paras 39-44; President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 8 BCLR 786 (CC).    
337 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) paras 102, 107 and 113. 
338 Budlender “Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A Delicate Balance 83. 
339 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 129. 
340 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345. 
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may not be effective where the State is incompetent.341 Alternative remedies such as 
contempt of court orders may be necessary where the State is simply opposed or 
intransigent to constitutional standards.342 Grossenbacher points out that the use of 
structural interdicts necessarily requires State officials to take affirmative steps.343 
However, these steps can be extremely difficult to implement when relevant officials 
are unwilling to cooperate.  
Therefore, intervention of an intrusive nature is necessary because it is the only 
remedy that will ensure that the constitutional rights of the landowners and unlawful 
occupiers will be vindicated: both in theory and in practice.  
Three primary reasons for State non-compliance with its constitutional obligations 
have been identified: inattentiveness, incompetence and intransigence.344 It is argued 
that the degree of supervision required should be determined in relation to the attitude 
of the State towards executing court orders.345 In other words, the remedy (and the 
specificity of a court’s order) will depend on whether the State’s attitude is of an 
inattentive; incompetent or intransigent nature.346  
Remedies that are merely persuasive in nature may be sufficient to deal with the 
situation where the cause of non-compliance is simply inattention on the part of the 
relevant State actor.347 In such circumstances, a declaratory order accompanied by a 
requirement that the State report to the public on its progress348 may be sufficient to 
remind the defaulter that it has obligations, point out that they have not been fulfilled, 
                                            
341 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345.  
342 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345; Budlender “Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A 
Delicate Balance 83. See also Chapter 4. 
343 Grossenbacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2230-223; See also S Sturm “Resolving Remedial 
Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons” (1990) 138 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 861-910. 
344 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345-357; Ling (2015) HKJLS 56-59. While these reasons shed light 
on the State’s non-compliance of constitutional obligations, the study is not aimed at analysing the 
reasons per se. See, for example, in this regard D Hausman “When and why the South African 
government disobeys Constitutional Court orders” (2012) 48 Stanford Journal of International Law 437-
455 452-453.  
345 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345-351. 
346 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345-347. See also K Roach “The Challenges of Crafting Remedies 
for the Violations of Social, Economic and Cultural Rights” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights 
Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2009) 46; Budlender 
“Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A Delicate Balance 86-90.  
347 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 346-348; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-191-9-192.  
348 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-192. 
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and bring about prompt and competent action.349 Bishop identifies two reasons for the 
reporting requirement.350 Firstly, the reporting order acts as a safeguard against the 
possibility that the State is unwilling or incapable as opposed to being truly inattentive. 
In this regard, the reporting order aims to put continued pressure on the State to 
comply with the order.351 Secondly, it serves as a means to keep the public informed 
of the progress that is being made.352  
It can be argued that the mere fact of having to report requires the defaulting authority 
to apply its mind to the problem at hand and encourages the development and 
implementation of a plan within a reasonable period. However, even in the absence of 
any bad faith, a declaratory order may not be sufficient to ensure that the relief is 
effective. This may be the case where the action required from the State is complex 
and programmatic, or requires reaction by a variety of agencies, some of which may 
not have been directly involved in the litigation.353  
Therefore, mere inattentiveness on the part of the relevant State actor will not 
necessarily warrant using the structural interdict as an appropriate remedy to grant 
effective relief.  
Where the State is aware of its obligations but has nevertheless failed to comply with 
them, as a result of an admitted lack of capacity or proven incompetence, some form 
of mandatory relief with court supervision is required. In this regard, supervision is 
justified because without it the State, even with the best intentions, may not be able to 
meet its constitutional commitments and obligations.354 Supervision serves as a 
means of ensuring that the State will fulfil its constitutional obligations, if it is indeed 
reasonable and possible.355 This warrants a closer and more detailed supervisory 
approach by the court, than would be the case where the State is merely inattentive. 
                                            
349 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 346; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-191-9-192; Budlender 
“Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A Delicate Balance 86-90.    
350 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-192; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 411-417. 
351 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-192; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 411-417. 
352 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-192; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 411-417. 
353 Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 388-389; Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 334. For example in the case of 
socio-economic rights litigation, the provision of housing, health or social security may prove to be 
complex due to resource constraints. There may also be other people in similarly placed positions, such 
as unlawful occupiers who may have an interest in the litigation. Other agencies such as NGO’s or 
public interest activists may also have an indirect social or financial interest in the litigation.  
354 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 350; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-192-9-193.   
355 Section 7(2) read with sections 25(5) and 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996.  
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Supervision in this regard, may also include the use of outside experts to determine 
what the applicable remedy should be.356  
A decade ago already, Froneman J stated: 
“[I]n my personal experience [structural interdicts] have contributed to a better 
understanding on the part of public authorities of their constitutional legal obligations 
in particular areas, whilst it has also assisted the judiciary in gaining a valuable insight 
in the difficulties that these authorities encounter in their efforts to comply with their 
duties”.357  
The applicable remedy will normally be based on an interdict, rather than a declaration. 
However, depending on the facts of the case, including, for example, the level of 
incompetence, a structural interdict may also be necessary.358 While this form of 
structural interdict involves a more in-depth review of the executive by the judiciary 
and may result in more burdens being placed on the court, the choice of plan remains 
squarely within the purview of the executive.359 Issues such as budgetary and policy 
concerns would remain under the control of the executive, while the court’s only role 
would be to evaluate whether the executive’s plan complies with constitutional 
standards.360 The procedural aspects of such an order need not place a significantly 
greater burden on the courts than would otherwise be the case. This course of action 
may in fact be resource-efficient, because it avoids the institution of serial litigation on 
exactly the same issue.361  
The last category of infringers is the intransigent State. The most invasive remedies 
should be reserved for these officials or institutions which have acted mala fides or 
have shown a recalcitrant nature.362  
Remedies in these instances may include detailed supervisory mandatory interdicts 
enforced by contempt proceedings aimed at deterrence, punishment, and if 
                                            
356 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-192; Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 349-350. See also models 
for supervision as discussed at 3 4 above. 
357 Magidimisi v Premier of the Eastern Cape 2006 JOL 17274 (Ck) para 29. 
358 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-193; Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 
5 SA 721 (CC) paras 102, 107 and 113. 
359 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 9, 12; Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 349-350; Bishop “Remedies” in 
CLOSA 9-193.     
360 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 9, 12; Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 349-350. 
361 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 9, 12, 15; Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 349-350. 
362 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 350-351; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-193.     
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necessary, incarceration.363 Where the State’s attitude amounts to intransigence or 
purposeful non-compliance, supervision will be necessary even for the simplest goals 
in order to ensure, through the threat of contempt364 that the State does in fact365 act 
in accordance with its constitutional obligations. The level of supervision will generally 
be extremely intrusive, in order to ensure that the State does not avoid or undermine 
its obligation to comply with the court order.366 The order will also be accompanied by 
the immediate threat of contempt in the case of non-compliance.367 The need to enable 
the State to determine its own plan to progressively fulfil its constitutional obligations, 
will give way here, due to the necessity of ensuring that the rule of law is upheld.  
Therefore, where it has been established that there has been a breach of a 
constitutional right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the State’s attitude may be indicative 
to determine whether the use of the structural interdict will be an appropriate remedy, 
given the circumstances of the case.368 Accordingly, the level of supervision required 
to ensure effective relief is usually aligned with the particular disposition of the State.  
Apart from the specific circumstances of each case and the attitude of the State in 
relation to executing eviction orders there are other factors that can be taken into 
account in determining whether it will be appropriate to issue a structural interdict. In 
this regard, Roach and Budlender also provide some guidelines and principles for the 
use of structural interdicts in constitutional cases in particular.369  
Firstly, a past failure to comply with court orders, or some other reason to believe that 
the State may not comply timeously with a court order, may warrant the use of a 
structural interdict.370 In this regard, it may also be necessary to determine whether 
the State will act in good faith in complying with the court order in a timeous manner.371 
                                            
363 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345, 350. 
364 See Chapter 4 where contempt of court proceedings are discussed comprehensively.  
365 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-193. 
366 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345, 350-351; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-193.     
367 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345, 350-351; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-193.     
368 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345, 350-351; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-193.     
369 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 327; Budlender “Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A 
Delicate Balance 84. 
370 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 
387-388. 
371 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 
387-388; Budlender “Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A Delicate Balance 85.   
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Furthermore, good faith can be determined with reference to the nature of the State’s 
attitude, as discussed above.372  
In Sibiya and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg (“Sibiya 1”),373 
the court ordered a structural interdict in order to enable it to exercise supervisory 
jurisdiction over the process of converting the sentences of those who had been 
sentenced to death prior to the decision in S v Makwanyane.374 The process was finally 
completed by a judgment given on 30 November 2006, in Sibiya and Others v Director 
of Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg (“Sibiya 2”) 375 in which the court noted that it 
had ordered a structural interdict because: 
“The mandamus was…principally aimed at ensuring compliance with the order of this 
court in Makwanyane. [The court felt that] given the delay that had occurred since its 
order in Makwanyane coupled with the pressing need for the sentences to be replaced, 
it was an appropriate case for a supervisory order to be made in addition to the 
mandamus.”376  
However, proven past non-compliance is not a prerequisite for the court to take steps 
to ensure compliance. In this regard, Sibiya 2 makes it clear that it is not only a past 
failure but also an anticipated complete failure to comply with an order which may 
trigger the use of a structural interdict as effective relief. A structural interdict will also 
be suitable where the facts indicate that it is inadvisable for the court to assume that 
the order will be carried out promptly.377 In other words, the use of a structural interdict 
will be warranted where there is reason to believe that the State will not completely 
and promptly comply with an order made by the court.378  
The use of the structural interdict will only be regarded as effective relief where it is 
executed within a reasonable time determined by the courts or by the parties through 
meaningful engagement and where the remedy gives effect to the rights of all parties 
involved in the eviction case.379 In other words, where there is evidence that the 
                                            
372 See 3 4 above.  
373 2005 5 SA 315 (CC). 
374 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).  
375 2007 2 BCLR 293 (CC). 
376 Sibiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg 2007 2 BCLR 293 (CC) paras 5-6.  
377 Sibiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Johannesburg 2007 2 BCLR 293 (CC) para 61. 
378 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189; Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 
387-388; Budlender “Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A Delicate Balance 85. See 3 4 above.  
379 See Chapter 1 at 2 3 above.  
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structural interdict will not be executed timeously to give effect to the eviction order, 
the use thereof will not be appropriate. In these circumstances other remedies may be 
more suitable.  
Secondly, the consequences of non-compliance with the court’s order (i.e. the 
execution of the eviction order granted in terms of PIE) should be taken into account 
in deciding whether or not to issue a structural interdict.380 Factors such as the 
importance of the respective rights at issue and the practical concerns, such as the 
number of people who will be affected, can be taken into account in determining the 
severity of the consequences.  The likelihood that the court will issue a structural 
interdict will increase given the severity of the consequences to follow where there is 
non-compliance with a court order.381 If, for example, a delay in the execution of a 
court order is likely to increase the harm suffered by the parties, there would be a 
stronger case for supervision in the form of a structural interdict.382  
Thirdly, a structural interdict may be necessary to ensure compliance where the order 
in question is so general that it is not possible to define with any precision what the 
State is required to do.383 General orders may be made either because of the nature 
of the duty involved or because the court is anxious to leave the State with as much 
latitude as possible to decide precisely how it will comply with its constitutional 
obligations.384 Phrased differently, if there is clarity on the steps that need to be taken 
to remedy the constitutional violation, then a simple mandamus may be sufficient. 
However, where there is a lack of clarity regarding the steps that have to be taken or 
where there is a failure to take the steps formulated, either before or after an eviction 
order was granted, further supervision may be necessary.385 In such a situation, it is 
in the interests of all that the State is required to place its plan before the court or at 
least to make its plan known to the public within a certain time period.386  
                                            
380 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333-334; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189.   
381 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333-334; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189; MEC Department 
of Welfare v Kate 2000 4 SA 478 (SCA); Budlender “Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A 
Delicate Balance 85.   
382 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ  334-335; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189; MEC Department 
of Welfare v Kate 2000 4 SA 478 (SCA); Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 388.  
383 Budlender “Remedying breaches of the Constitution” in A Delicate Balance 85-86. 
384 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 334; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189; MEC Department of 
Welfare v Kate 2000 4 SA 478 (SCA); Swanepoel (2015) Litnet 388.   
385 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 334-335; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189.  
386 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 334; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189. 
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In such circumstances, a structural interdict may be beneficial to all parties involved. 
The approval of a plan (and timeline) by the court can allow the State to move forward 
with the implementation of its plan, secure in the knowledge that implementation will 
constitute compliance with its obligations. This provides the State with some flexibility 
to select the precise means to achieve compliance with the Constitution, within a finite 
and reasonable period of time. Although there may be cases where it is perfectly clear 
what steps need to be taken, supervision may still be needed to ensure compliance 
with such steps as set out in the court’s order.387  
Fourthly, a structural interdict may be suitable where it is desirable that members of 
the public or unlawful occupiers in a similar situation, and particularly the parties to the 
dispute who will be directly affected, are informed of what steps are likely to be taken. 
This is so because of the inherent desirability of their knowing what is likely to happen, 
and because it creates the opportunity for them to engage in dialogue and debate with 
those in authority. A reporting order therefore opens up the policy-making process and 
the implementation process to democratic dialogue. This furthers the constitutional 
goal of achieving a participatory democracy.388  
These factors can be used to determine whether it is appropriate to award a structural 
interdict in eviction cases and have to be considered in alignment with the discussion 
above.389   
4 The use of the structural interdict in South African eviction case law 
4 1 Introduction 
 
A remedy must be appropriate and effective given the circumstances of each case.390 
In this regard a determination of whether it will be appropriate to award a structural 
interdict precedes a determination of whether it will constitute effective relief. However, 
                                            
387 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189 where he states: “If it is clear, then a simple mandamus may 
be sufficient. If it is unclear, then supervision may be necessary to determine in consultation with all 
stakeholders what the appropriate relief is. This was the primary motivator of the supervision ordered 
by the High Court in Grootboom and was probably also part of the reasoning in Kiliko”. Accordingly see 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) and Kiliko v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2006 4 SA 114 (C); EN v the Government of the RSA 2006 JOL 18038 (D) in this regard.    
388 Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ 1-30.  
389 See Chapter 2 at 3 4 above. 
390 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 
9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
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a finding that a structural interdict will be appropriate does not necessarily guarantee 
a finding that it will also provide effective relief. The following cases illustrate this point: 
Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 
(“Modderklip HC”);391 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa 
Homes (“Joe Slovo 1”);392 and Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 
(“Pheko 1”).393 Although a structural interdict would have been appropriate in each of 
these cases, it did not provide effective relief to the parties, for various reasons. In this 
regard, subsequent follow up cases were necessary, ultimately providing for 
alternative effective relief.  
In Modderklip HC the court ordered the State to report on the measures it planned to 
undertake to remedy the rights violations of the land owner while providing adequate 
alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers.394 However, there was a failure 
by the State to execute the structural interdict. Subsequently, in President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (“Modderklip CC”)395 the 
court held that the remedy of constitutional damages constituted the most effective 
and expeditious way of vindicating the rights of both the land owner and the occupiers 
in the circumstances of the case. 
In Joe Slovo 1, an extremely detailed structural interdict was ordered regarding the 
relocation of and the provision of alternative accommodation to the unlawful occupiers. 
However, in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 
(“Joe Slovo 2”)396 the order was rescinded due to non-compliance.  Arguably, the 
detailed structural interdict was ineffective precisely because it was too detailed.397 
Perhaps if the court had only instructed the parties to engage meaningfully with each 
other and report back to it, then the structural interdict would have been effective. 
                                            
391 2003 1 All SA 465 (T). See a detailed discussion of this case below at 4 2.  
392 2010 3 SA 454 (CC). See a detailed discussion of this case below at 4 3. 
393 2012 2 SA 598 (CC). See a detailed discussion of this case below at 4 4. 
394 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Africa 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52.   
395 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See below at 4 2 4. Furthermore see Chapter 3 at 4 2 for a comprehensive 
discussion of President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 
(CC). 
396 2011 7 BCLR (CC). See 4 3 4 below.  
397 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-189; Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 334-335; Pienaar Land 
Reform 779.    
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Ironically through, relief in the form of an in situ upgrading of the informal settlement 
constituted effective relief for the parties.  
In Pheko 1, the Constitutional Court issued a vague structural interdict instructing the 
State to file a report regarding the steps it had taken to identify land for the relocation 
of the unlawful occupiers. The State disregarded this order. Subsequently, in Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) (“Pheko 2”)398 the State officials 
responsible for executing the court’s order in Pheko 1 were joined to the proceedings.  
However, in light of the difficulties associated with finding viable land within the 
immediate vicinity of Bapsfontein as required by Pheko 1,399 the Constitutional Court 
in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (“Pheko 3”),400 had to 
determine whether to discharge its supervisory jurisdiction and whether the matter 
should be referred to the High Court.401 The court found that it would be in the best 
interests of justice to afford the High Court authority in regard to issues relating to the 
identification of suitable alternative land in the vicinity402 of Bapsfontein for the unlawful 
occupiers and to supervise the relocation of the unlawful occupiers.403 While the rights 
of the unlawful occupiers have not been realised in this regard, it appears that the 
court, together with the responsible State officials, will ensure the realisation of 
effective relief in due course. In this regard, the Pheko cases illustrate that a 
combination of remedies, may ensure the realisation of effective relief over time.  
The outcome in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg (“Olivia Road”)404 illustrates that the use of the 
structural interdict constituted appropriate and effective relief.  Although the structural 
interdict in Olivia Road was not ordered after an eviction order was already 
                                            
398 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). For a discussion of Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 
2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). See Chapter 4 below at 3 1.   
399 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 14.  
400 (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016).  
401 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 22. Interestingly, the State opposed the application for the court to discharge the structural 
interdict. The State’s reasoning for this is based on the complexity and practical difficulties associated 
with implementing the structural interdict in Pheko 1.  
402 Note that the word “immediate”, as used by the court in Pheko 1, has been omitted.  
403 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 46. 
404 2008 3 SA 208 (CC).  
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awarded,405 it highlights that issuing a structural interdict before considering and 
awarding an eviction order in terms of PIE may provide effective relief. The court, 
before granting an eviction order, directed the parties to engage meaningfully with 
each other in an effort to resolve the differences and difficulties aired in the eviction 
application.406 The parties were instructed to report back at a later date regarding 
these deliberations. After two months of intensive negotiations which were effectively 
overseen by the Constitutional Court, the matter was finally resolved with the 
occupiers being offered and accepting accommodation in a building yet to be 
refurbished nearby in the inner city where the residents remain today. 
What follows is an evaluation of the use of the structural interdict in these eviction 
cases. The evaluation requires that the following two questions be answered: Firstly, 
was it necessary (appropriate) to grant a structural interdict? Secondly, did the 
structural interdict provide effective relief to the affected parties? 
A determination with regard to whether it was appropriate to issue a structural interdict 
given the facts of each case discussed below requires one to determine whether it 
was necessary to do so.407 A determination of whether it was appropriate and 
necessary to grant a structural interdict in casu can be established with regard to the 
factors and circumstances discussed above.408 In order to determine whether or not 
the structural interdict provided effective relief in each case, it is necessary to assert 
whether or not the rights of the respective parties were realised, through State 
compliance with its constitutional duties.  
Depending on the circumstances, continuous non-compliance with the directives of 
the court to report back to it or failure to implement plans or reports (submitted and 
approved by the court) within a reasonable time, may render the use of the structural 
interdict ineffective.  Alternative relief, such as constitutional damages409 or contempt 
of court proceedings,410 elaborated on in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, 
                                            
405 All the other cases analysed further in Chapter 2 discuss the structural interdict as a remedy after 
an eviction order was already granted by the court.   
406 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 5.  
407 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 102.  
408 See above at 3 5.  
409 See Chapter 3 in general.  
410 See Chapter 4 in general.  
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could consequently become necessary where rights were not realised within a 
reasonable time.  
4 2 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die RSA  
4 2 1 Introduction  
 
The key issue in Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republic van 
Suid-Afrika (“Modderklip HC”)411 was the effective execution of the eviction order 
obtained in Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters.412  
4 2 2 Background and facts of the case 
 
During the 1990s, due to overcrowding, residents of the Daveyton Township began 
settling on a strip of land between Daveyton and the Modder East farm owned by the 
applicant. This came to be known as the Chris Hani informal settlement. During the 
beginning of May 2000 some 400 persons, who had been evicted by the municipality 
from Chris Hani, moved onto a portion of the privately owned Modder East farm and 
erected about 50 shacks. By October 2000 there were about 4 000 residential units 
inhabited by some 18 000 persons.413 The land owner, Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, 
consequently approached the High Court in October 2000 for an eviction order under 
PIE. Having successfully obtained an eviction order in April 2001,414 the unlawful 
occupiers were required and ordered to vacate the land within two months, failure of 
which the Sheriff was authorised to evict them. However, whilst the eviction 
proceedings were pending and even after the granting of the eviction order, the 
number of unlawful occupiers occupying the land owner’s property kept growing 
exponentially.415  
On the date set for eviction as determined by the court,416 the unlawful occupants 
refused to vacate the land as ordered. The execution of the eviction order was 
                                            
411 2003 1 All SA 465 (T). See in general A Christmas “The Modderklip cases: evictions and the right of 
access to adequate housing: case review” (2003) 6 ESR Review 4-7. 
412 2001 4 SA 385 (W).  
413 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 2; Tissington (2011) SAJHR 193.  
414 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters 2001 4 SA 385 (W). 
415 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 3. It was later estimated that there were 40 000 
persons of whom a third were illegal immigrants all residing on 50 hectares of the property.  
416 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters 2001 4 SA 385 (W). 
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accordingly left to the Sheriff. Due to the large number of unlawful occupiers occupying 
the land in question, the execution of the eviction order (i.e. the removal of the unlawful 
occupiers) necessitated the assistance of private contractors.417 Subsequently, the 
land owner was informed by the Sheriff that a deposit of R1.8 million (which later 
increased to R2.2 million) had to be made to facilitate the eviction.418 Given that the 
amount required to enlist the help of private contractors exceeded the value of the 
property being unlawfully occupied, the land owner was not prepared to incur the 
expense.419 In this regard, the State adopted the stance that unless the land owner 
paid the Sheriff the required amount nothing further could be done. The State 
contended that the land owner seemed to adopt the attitude that in principle he should 
not bear such costs and that an owner who was serious about urgently vindicating its 
property would act differently.420  
Upon a failure by the State to execute the eviction order obtained in Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters421 the land owner instituted further 
proceedings, arguing that the authorities were obliged to protect his property by 
evicting and removing the unlawful occupiers from his land. The judgment of the High 
Court422 directing the State to act in accordance with its duty - not only to execute the 
court order but also to provide alternative land to the occupants - is accordingly 
discussed below.  
4 2 3 The judgment and order of the court  
Having regard to the facts of the case, the court found that the land owner had 
complied with all the necessary procedural and substantive requirements of PIE. 423 
Although the land owner complied with all the requirements in PIE, the relief promised 
                                            
417 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 4. 
418 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) paras 4 and 7; Tissington (2011) SAJHR 193. 
419 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 4. 
420 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 34.  
421 2001 4 SA 385 (W). 
422 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T). 
423 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 51 read with Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic 
of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 9. 
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by the legislation was not obtained. In this regard, the court in Modderklip HC stated 
that a balance between the conflicting rights of the land owner and the unlawful 
occupiers can only be struck if the court’s eviction order can be effectively enforced.424 
The Constitution imposes a mandatory obligation on the State to ensure that the rule 
of law will be upheld. This is evidenced by section 165(4) which provides that “organs 
of State, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to 
ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the 
court”.425 Other measures also referred to include policy measures and concrete action 
calculated to achieve an intended result.426   
Mohamed highlights the paradox of the power of the court in a democratic state as 
follow:  
“There can be no doubt that the depth of the judicial power in the modern [democratic] 
state is formidable, and in [South Africa] it is arguably even awesome. Independence 
in the exercise of that power is crucial to the legitimacy of the power…There is an 
inherent paradox about all this power. Unlike the [legislative] or executive [branch of 
the State] the court does not have the power of the purse or the army or the police to 
execute its [orders]. The…courts and the Constitutional Court do not have a single 
soldier. [The courts] would be impotent to protect the Constitution if the agencies of 
the [S]tate which controls the…physical and financial resources of the [S]tate refuses 
to command those resources to enforce the orders of the courts. The courts would be 
reduced to paper tigers with a ferocious capacity to roar and to snarl but no teeth to 
bite and no sinews to execute what may then become a piece of sterile scholarship”.427  
The role of section 165(4) is precisely to overcome this paradox.428 The effectiveness 
of the courts is dependent on the State’s ability to give effect to section 165(4). A failure 
to assist the court in the effective implementation of its court orders, threatens the rule 
                                            
424 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 42. 
425 Section 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Tissington (2011) SAJHR 
194. 
426 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 2003 1 All SA 
465 (T) para 43.  
427 I Mohamed “The Role of the Judiciary in a Constitutional State” (1998) SALJ 111, 112. See also 
Chayes (1976) Harvard LR 1283; Chenwi (2009) ESR Review 17-19.  
428 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 43. 
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of law.429 The obligation set out in section 165(4) of the Constitution can therefore be 
described as the most important and fundamental obligation imposed on the State by 
the Constitution.430  
The role and obligations of the relevant organs of State are of paramount importance 
in order to ensure that the eviction order is executed.  Where there is non-compliance 
with the eviction order granted, it is the duty of the State to ensure the effective 
execution thereof.431 The court reiterated that section 7(2), (read with section 165(4)),  
which requires the State “to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights”,432 places an obligation on the State to ensure that an effective remedy will 
exist for the protection of rights.433 Therefore, the execution of the eviction order by 
the relevant organs of State requires the State to act in accordance with its positive 
obligations encapsulated in section 26(1) of the Constitution.434  This will ensure that 
the rule of law435 is upheld while simultaneously guaranteeing the realisation of the 
land owner’s right not to be deprived of his property arbitrarily and the unlawful 
occupier’s right to access to housing.436  
Furthermore, the court held that it must not and cannot tolerate or allow a situation 
where, due to a failure by the State to act in accordance with its constitutional functions 
and obligations, the court’s orders are not effectively carried out.437  
“The constitutional right to access to courts would remain an illusion unless orders 
made by the courts are capable of being enforced by those in whose favour such 
orders were made. The process of adjudication and resolution of disputes in courts of 
                                            
429 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 43. 
430 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Pty v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 43. 
431 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Pty v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 41. 
432 Section 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Tissington (2011) SAJHR 194-
195.  
433 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Pty v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 44.  
434 Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 reads “Everyone has the right 
to have access to adequate housing”. 
435 Section 1(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
436 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Pty v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 44; Euijen & Plasket (2005) ASSAL 429 430-431. 
437 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Pty v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 45 read with paras 41 and 51.  
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law is not an end itself but only a means thereto; the end being the enforcement of 
rights [and/] or obligations defined in the court order”.438  
For organs of State to stand by passively was not only contrary to public policy but in 
conflict with the foundational values and the provisions of the Constitution. In these 
circumstances the court has a responsibility to forge an effective remedy and make an 
appropriate order.439  
The court made an order inter alia declaring that the land owner’s right to property440 
had been infringed. The court also stated that the State had an obligation to take 
reasonable measures to realise the right of the unlawful occupiers to have access to 
adequate housing and land441 and that the State had an obligation in terms of section 
165(4) of the Constitution to assist in maintaining the efficacy of the precedent court 
order.442 Apart from the declaratory order, the court also issued a structural interdict. 
The structural interdict directed the State to submit a comprehensive plan, under oath 
and within a specified time period to the court and to the parties, on the measures it 
planned to undertake.443  
The court instructed the State to specifically provide for the following in its report. 
Firstly, the State must facilitate the termination of the infringement of the land owner’s 
right to property within a reasonable time frame, whether by means of expropriation or 
other measures.444 Secondly, the State must comply with its commitment in terms of 
section 165(4) of the Constitution.445 Thirdly, the State must comply with its obligations 
                                            
438 Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 (4) SA 446 (Tk) at 453C-D. 
439 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Pty v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 50. 
440 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 17-18 and Roux “Property” in CLOSA 41-1-37.  
441 Section 26(1) read with sections 26(2) and 25(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. See in general Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-93; 
McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-66-14; Van Wyk (2005) Stell LR 466-487.  
442 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52; Euijen & Plasket (2005) ASSAL 429 430-431. See Christmas (2003) ESR Review 4-7 for 
a discussion of the Modderklip HC case in general.   
443 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52. The deadline was set for 28 February 2003. 
444 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52 for the order of the court, specifically 52.2.1 of the order.  
445 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52 for the order of the court, specifically 52.2.2 of the order.  
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in terms of section 25(5), read with sections 26(1) and (2) of the Constitution.446 
Fourthly, the State must prioritise a scheme or schemes for the provision of housing 
to the unlawful occupiers.447 Fifthly, the State must provide alternative accommodation 
to the unlawful occupiers;448 and lastly, the State must monitor, implement and 
maintain the proposed plan.449  
4 2 4 Evaluation of the order granted 
 
4 2 4 1 Was it appropriate to grant a structural interdict? 
 
In casu, the failure to execute an eviction order amounted to a continuous infringement 
of the land owner’s and unlawful occupiers’ constitutional rights.450 In this regard, it is 
necessary to emphasise that the land owner must have “a [reasonable] degree of 
patience”451 pending the execution of the eviction order. However, it cannot be 
expected of the land owner to be burdened with providing accommodation to unlawful 
occupiers indefinitely,452 nor can it be expected of the land owner to execute the order 
by him or herself.453 Such obligations rest on the State.454  
However, De Villiers J accepted that the unconditional removal of the unlawful 
occupiers was not a viable option.455 Instead, the court proposed an order in two parts: 
the first was a declaratory order relating to the State’s constitutional obligations 
                                            
446 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52 for the order of the court, specifically 52.2.3 of the order. 
447 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52 for the order of the court, specifically 52.2.4 of the order. 
448 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52 for the order of the court, specifically 52.2.5 of the order. 
449 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T) para 52 for the order of the court, specifically 52.2.6 of the order. 
450 Sections 26(1) and 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Van der Walt 
(2005) SAJHR 114. See also S Wilson “Breaking the tie: Evictions from private land, homelessness and 
a new normality” (2009) 126 SALJ 270-290; JM Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-
Afrikaanse grondwet: die verhouding tussen artikel 25(1), artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (slot)” 
(2006) 3 TSAR 522-536.    
451 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) 
para 100.  
452 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 
104 (CC) para 100. 
453L Chenwi “Government’s obligation to unlawful occupiers and private landowners” (2010) 11 ESR 
Review 9-11. See also Wilson (2009) SALJ 270-290; Pienaar & Mostert “(2006) TSAR 522-536.    
454 Section 26(2) read with section 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
Chenwi (2010) 11 ESR Review 11; Van der Walt (2005) SAJHR 114; J van Wyk “The role of Local 
Government in evictions” (2011) 14 PELJ 50.  
455 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 18. 
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towards not only land owners but also the unlawful occupiers, and the second part 
was a mandamus requiring of the state to submit to court a comprehensive plan to 
solve the problems of the land owner and the unlawful occupiers.456  
The past failure by the State to execute the eviction order granted in Modderklip HC, 
is another factor indicative, but not determinative, of the fact that the use of the 
structural interdict may be regarded as appropriate relief. It is accordingly necessary 
to determine the cause of the failure to execute the eviction order. The cause of the 
breach can be attributed to the reluctance on the part of the State to act in accordance 
with its constitutional obligations. In this regard it is accordingly necessary to determine 
whether the failure was due to the State’s inattentiveness, incompetence or 
intransigence.457 The State’s attitude towards executing the eviction order in favour of 
the land owner in Modderklip HC was arguably of an incompetent or intransigent 
nature, because the State effectively placed the duty on the land owner by requiring 
him to pay a deposit of R2.2 million. Arguably, this indicates that the State may be 
unappreciative and/or lacks the knowledge of what and how it is supposed to address 
its constitutional duties. The State’s attitude towards its constitutional obligations to 
provide access to adequate housing and ensure the execution of court orders, in this 
regard, acts as a contributing factor towards the court’s decision to issue a structural 
interdict.  
The factors or circumstances of the case dictate that it was appropriate for the court 
to grant a structural interdict. Consequently, the court utilised the report back to court 
model as means to provide eventual effective relief to the parties.  
Although the court provided guidelines with regard to what the report should address, 
it did not instruct the State on how to achieve the plan to be submitted to the court. 
Furthermore, the court only required of the State to identify land for the eventual 
relocation of the unlawful occupiers. The generality and simplicity of the order indicate 
that the court still had reason to believe that the State would adhere to its orders in a 
timeous manner, even after it had failed to do so previously.  
                                            
456 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 18.  
457 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345. 
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If it is accepted that the State’s attitude was of an intransigent nature, it can be argued 
that the court should have acted more intrusively by putting into place specific 
guidelines on not only what the report should have addressed, but also how it should 
have been implemented.  
4 2 4 2 Did the structural interdict provide effective relief?  
 
Had the State complied with the supervisory order of the court, the rights of the land 
owner and unlawful occupiers would have been realised and effective relief would 
have been achieved within a reasonable time. However, instead of submitting a 
comprehensive plan as directed by the High Court, the State appealed against the 
decision. Despite the High Court’s willingness to grant a structural interdict, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (“Modderklip SCA”)458 
and the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (“Modderklip CC”)459 did not comment on the structural interdict 
granted by the High Court and found instead that constitutional damages would 
provide adequate alternative relief. These cases are discussed thoroughly in Chapter 
3 where the use of constitutional damages, as alternative effective relief, is elaborated 
on in more detail.  
Although the use of the structural interdict may have been appropriate, it may not have 
been effective. However, the alternative relief in the form of constitutional damages 
awarded by the court in Modderklip SCA, and confirmed by the court in Modderklip 
CC, constituted appropriate and effective relief.  
4 3 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes  
4 3 1 Introduction  
 
                                            
458 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA). See in general Christmas (2004) ESR Review 11-13; Van der Walt (2005) 
SAJHR 144-161.   
459 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See in general A Christmas “The Modderklip case: the state’s obligations in 
evictions instituted by private landowners: case review” (2005) 4 ESR Review 6-10; S Khoza 
“Questioning the wisdom of moving 40 000 people: the Modderklip saga continues: case review” (2005) 
6 ESR Review 10-11; Van der Walt (2005) SAJHR 144-161 and Tissington (2011) SAJHR 192-205. 
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The case of Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
(“Joe Slovo 1”)460 concerned the eviction of 20 000 people (approximately 4386 
households),461 from their homes in order to facilitate housing development under the 
N2 Gateway Housing Project.462 The Constitutional Court, upon finding that the 
eviction order was just and equitable given the circumstances of the case, granted an 
extensive mandatory structural interdict relating to the provision of housing to persons 
who were to be evicted from an informal settlement.463  
4 3 2 Background and facts of the case  
 
The Joe Slovo Informal Settlement situated alongside the N2 highway in Cape Town, 
on land owned by the City of Cape Town, was first occupied in the 1990s.464 It was 
rife with fire hazards, and living conditions were unsanitary.465 Initially the settlement 
had no running water and no toilets, roads or electricity. The Municipality, over time, 
began to provide the settlement with some basic services such as water, container 
toilets and rudimentary cleaning. After a devastating fire in 2000,466 and after some 
pressure, negotiations and demands,467 the City had, in terms of its constitutional and 
                                            
460 2010 3 SA 454 (CC). See in general Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 13-18; Chenwi & Tissington (2009) 
ESR Review 18-24; McLean (2010) CCR 223-242.   
461 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C); Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 13-18.  
462 LB Juta, KB Moeti & NS Matsiliza “Community participation in South Africa: an assessment of the 
N2 Gateway Housing Project in Langa/Joe Slovo Township” (2014) 49 Journal of Public Administration 
1113-1125. The N2 Gateway Housing Project forms part of the national housing policy Breaking New 
Ground: A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements (BNG), 
introduced in 2004.462 The aim of the policy is to give effect to the right of access to adequate housing 
in a manner that promotes sustainable development, wealth creation, poverty alleviation and equity. 
Properly implemented, the sustainable human settlements so created would provide for a safe and 
secure environment, with adequate access to economic opportunities, a mix of safe and secure housing 
and tenure types, reliable and affordable basic services, educational, entertainment and cultural 
activities, social amenities and health, welfare and police services. An integral part of BNG is the 
informal settlement upgrading programme, under which the State seeks to eradicate informal 
settlements through structured in-situ upgrading which does not necessarily require relocation and 
involves minimal disruption to the affected parties, required that the residents be relocated to the 
temporary relocation areas (TRAs)  in order to facilitate the programme. See Chenwi (2008) ESR 
Review 15.  
463 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
24; Pienaar Land Reform 776; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 13-18; Chenwi & Tissington (2009) ESR 
Review 18-24; McLean (2010) 3 CCR 223-242.   
464 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 7; Pienaar Land Reform 601.  
465 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 8; Residents of Joe Slovo 
Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 24; Chenwi (2008) ESR 
Review 15-16.  
466 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
21. 
467 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
22.  
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legislative obligations, made further provision for substantial services of a more 
permanent nature,468 including the provision of tap water, toilets, refuse removal, the 
lay-out of streets, drainage, connection to the electricity grid and house numbers.469 
These basic municipal services were carried out in an ongoing, long-term fashion.470 
At some point during their subsequent occupation, each of the residents was handed 
a “red card” by the City, indicating that the holder had applied for housing with the 
Municipality.471 Apparently, the question was never raised during the ten years of the 
settlement’s existence, whether the residents had a right to occupy the State-owned 
land.472 There was certainly no evidence of the City ever having tried to remove the 
occupiers. In conclusion, no rights of occupation were formalised and recognised.473  
Thubelisa Homes was charged with the responsibility to transform the Joe Slovo 
informal settlement in terms of the national housing policy and to develop formal 
housing in the area.474 Consequently, Thubelisa Homes instituted action for the 
eviction of the occupiers under PIE475 in the High Court on the grounds that the 
property in question was being occupied unlawfully as no consent was given for such 
occupation and that the property was required for development.476 The occupants 
argued that they were not unlawful occupiers477 because they had obtained the 
necessary consent of the City of Cape Town to occupy the land,478 and that they 
should therefore not be evicted. They argued that the supply of basic services and the 
reconstruction work that had been done by the City after the fire479 ostensibly indicated 
                                            
468 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelihsa Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
151.  
469 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) paras 
21 and 151. 
470 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
151.  
471 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
35. 
472 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
22; Pienaar Land Reform 691-692.  
473 Pienaar Land Reform 692.  
474 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C); para 5; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16.  
475 Section 6 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.  
476 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 1.  
477 Section 1 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
478 Section 6(1)(a) and section 1(ii) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation 
of Land Act 19 of 1998 state that consent may be “express or tacit […] in writing or otherwise”. 
479 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 43; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
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that the City had given its consent to occupy the land.480 The occupants also depended 
on the provision of the “red cards”. They argued that the cards entitled them to remain 
in undisturbed possession of their houses.481 Nomaindia Mfeketo, the previous mayor 
of Cape Town, denied that consent had been given to occupy the State-owned land. 
It was argued that the services had been provided for “basic humanitarian reasons”482 
and that the provision thereof should not be construed as consent on the part of the 
City. It was also contended that the municipality had not granted the residents any 
enforceable right to remain in the area. It had always been the intention of the State in 
general to upgrade, move or redevelop informal settlements in conformity with the 
State’s constitutional imperative to provide access to adequate housing on a 
progressive basis.483  
In 2008, the High Court found that it would be just and equitable to grant an eviction 
order, given the fact that the residents were occupying the land unlawfully and without 
the consent of the owner; that alternative accommodation and transport were provided 
for and arrangements made by the State to meet the safety, educational and pension 
needs.484 The eviction of the occupants was regarded as a strategic move in order to 
facilitate the State’s housing development programme.485 Interestingly, at this point 
already Thubelisa Homes, out of their own accord, subjected themselves to what can 
only be described as a self-imposed structural interdict. They specified that they will 
subject themselves to judicial supervision and stated that they would report back on 
the progress and difficulties experienced during the execution and fulfilment of this 
pilot project.486 It seems that the applicants wished to keep the court informed of their 
progress in light of the inevitable envisaged mistakes and consequent corrections 
thereof associated with launching the pilot project of this kind.487 Consequently, the 
                                            
480 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 38; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
481 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 40; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.    
482 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 40; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
483 Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
484 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 82; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.    
485 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 81; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.    
486 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 81; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
487 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 81; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
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court directed Thubelisa Homes to report back (under oath) to the court at intervals of 
no less than 8 weeks (but at more frequent intervals should Thubelisa Homes deem it 
necessary) with regard to the implementation of its order and the allocation of 
permanent housing opportunities to those affected by the eviction process. The court 
correspondingly directed the applicants to furnish copies of the affidavits comprising 
its reporting. The occupiers were also interdicted from returning to Joe Slovo for the 
purposes of erecting or taking up residence in the informal dwellings, once they had 
been vacated or evicted.488 
Subsequently, the residents of Joe Slovo appealed against the decision of the High 
Court.  
4 3 3 The judgment and order of the court 
 
The Constitutional Court in Joe Slovo 1 handed down 5 separate judgements in 
support of the final relocation order.489 The court found that eviction of the occupiers 
of the Joe Slovo Informal Settlement would be a reasonable measure to facilitate 
housing development and ensure the progressive realisation of the right to access to 
adequate housing.490  
Subsequently, the court granted a detailed and complex structural interdict, regarding 
the relocation of the unlawful occupiers.491 In particular, the order stipulated that the 
unlawful occupiers were to vacate the Joe Slovo Informal Settlement in accordance 
with the timetable set out by the court. The order to vacate was conditional upon and 
                                            
488 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 85; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 
16; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.    
489 The court in Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 81 noted that “This 
case is not about normal eviction”, but rather about the relocation of the unlawful occupiers. However, 
the relocation of the unlawful occupiers effectively amounts to an eviction. Accordingly, although the 
term “relocation” is used by the court the case can still be regarded as an eviction case. See also 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) discussed 
below.  
490 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
7; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 13-18; Chenwi & Tissington (2009) ESR Review 18-24; McLean (2010) 
CCR 223-242; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
491 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 1 
where the Constitutional Court described it as a “supervised eviction order”. See also Pienaar Land 
Reform 776 and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311. See further Government of the Republic 
of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 35 where the court sets out what is expected of 
the State when providing adequate alternative accommodation. The expectations pertaining to the 
content of section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 also apply to relocation 
orders such as in the case of Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 
2011 7 BCLR (CC); Viljoen (2015) SAPL 47.  
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subject to the unlawful occupiers being relocated to temporary residential units.492 
Additionally, the court order specified in detail the location and  quality of the temporary 
housing units to be provided, including the provision of services and facilities.493 To 
further mitigate the eviction it was ordered that the parties engage meaningfully with 
one another on the details of the relocation of the unlawful occupiers.494 The court also 
ordered the State to ensure that 70% of the new homes to be built at Joe Slovo were 
allocated to current Joe Slovo residents or former residents who had been relocated 
to make way for the N2 Gateway Project.495  
To ensure the effective implementation of the order, the court also placed a reporting 
obligation on the parties. The court required the parties to report back, within a 
specified time frame on the implementation of the order and the allocation of 
permanent housing opportunities to those affected by the order.496 The court also 
showed some flexibility in its order by allowing any party to approach the court for an 
amendment, supplementation or variation of the order should the order not be 
complied with or otherwise give rise to unforeseen difficulties.497  
  
                                            
492 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
7.4; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 13-18; Chenwi & Tissington (2009) ESR Review 18-24; McLean (2010) 
CCR 223-242; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
493 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
7.8, 7.9, 7.10;  Chenwi & Tissington (2009) ESR Review 18-23; Pienaar Land Reform 777; Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.  
494 See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) 
para 7.11 for a comprehensive list of points set out by the court for engagement by the parties. 
495 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
7.17; Chenwi  (2008) ESR Review 13-18; Chenwi & Tissington (2009) ESR Review 18-24; McLean 
(2010) CCR 223-242; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
496 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
7.16; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 13-18; Chenwi &  Tissington (2009) ESR Review 18-24; McLean 
(2010) CCR 223-242; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.   
497 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
7.21; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 13-18; Chenwi & Tissington (2009) ESR Review 18-24; McLean 
(2010) CCR 223-242; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.  
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4 3 4 Evaluation of the order granted 
 
4 3 4 1 Was it appropriate to grant a structural interdict? 
 
It is clear from the facts that the unlawful occupiers had a right to access to adequate 
housing498 and the right not to be evicted without a court order.499  
As explained, the particular disposition or attitude of the State can also be indicative 
or a guiding factor of whether it is necessary to issue a structural interdict.500 At first, 
the attitude of the State in this regard pointed to a willingness to engage with the 
unlawful occupiers in providing temporary housing units while upgrading the informal 
settlement for their benefit.501 At first glance, there was reason to believe that the State 
would comply with the eviction and relocation process.502  
However, other factors also need to be considered, including the consequences of 
non-compliance of the court order; the importance of the rights at hand and the 
practical concerns posed by the circumstances of the case.503 Non-compliance with 
the systematic relocation process would render the unlawful occupiers homeless.504 
Not only will this infringe their right to access to adequate housing, but their right to 
dignity505 will also be infringed. Practical concerns, such as the number of affected 
persons were also pertinent in this case. An unreasonable delay in the provision of 
temporary housing units and a failure to relocate the unlawful occupiers gradually and 
systematically would have rendered over 20 000 people (approximately 4386 
households) homeless.506  
                                            
498 Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-82; McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-
55-14.  
499 Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 read with the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. See Muller The impact of section 
26 of the Constitution 82-93. Furthermore, see in general Government of the Republic of South Africa 
v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; McLean “Housing” in 
CLOSA 55-8-55-14. 
500 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 345. 
501 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
31; Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 13. 
502 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333.  
503 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 334.  
504 Wilson (2009) SALJ 270, 273.  
505 Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.   
506 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333. 
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Moreover, given the fact that there was a clear indication that the majority of residents 
would not relocate without a court order507 and the Programme would better the lives 
of those residing in the Joe Slovo settlement, a structural interdict was necessary to 
facilitate the systematic and gradual relocation process.  
4 3 4 2 Did the structural interdict provide effective relief?  
 
Although it is evident that the structural interdict was intended to provide structured 
and comprehensive effective relief to the unlawful occupiers of the Joe Slovo Informal 
Settlement, it is still to be determined whether substantive effective relief was the 
actual outcome.  
“[I]nstrumental to the execution of the order was a detailed process for the systematic 
transfer of all the people occupying the settlement to certain temporary 
accommodation. In order…[for the execution of the structural interdict]…to be 
successful, it was imperative that all role players cooperated and stuck to the timetable. 
Although amendments to the timetable were possible…[parties had to engage and 
reach] agreements to that effect”.508  
Failure by the State to set the relocation process in motion and unforeseen cost 
implications regarding the relocation of unlawful occupiers and provision of temporary 
alternative accommodation509 were precisely what hampered the execution of the 
court order from the outset.510 This led to a subsequent order by the Constitutional 
Court suspending the evictions until further notice.  
In this regard Western Cape provincial Minister of Housing, Bonginkosi Madikizela, 
submitted a report to the court stating that the costs of the relocation of the unlawful 
occupiers might exceed the upgrading costs and therefore a suspension of the eviction 
order previously granted was warranted.511 The Minister also raised concerns about 
the absence of a plan regarding those who would not be accommodated in the new 
housing in Joe Slovo, since the number of unlawful occupiers exceeded the number 
                                            
507 Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 13. 
508 Pienaar Land Reform 777. 
509 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 5-
15. 
510 Pienaar Land Reform 778. 
511 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 
32; Chenwi (2008) ESR Review 13-18; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311. 
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of available houses.512 In effect, the entire structural interdict stood to be suspended 
in light of the concerns raised by the Minister. 
Furthermore, immediately after the detailed structural interdict was granted, the parties 
apparently had second thoughts about whether the relocation order513 was appropriate 
and effective.514  
In this regard, Pienaar notes that: 
“A miscommunication was evident: the court sought feedback on negotiations 
amending relocation timetables whereas the reports furnished information about 
whether the relocation ought to take place at all”.515  
Increasingly, the reports submitted to the court favoured in situ upgrading over the 
supervisory relocation order granted by the court. The scope and objectives of the 
structural interdict were seemingly completely ignored by the parties. 
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court in Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v Thubelisa Homes (“Joe Slovo 2”)516 had to determine whether the relocation 
order, coupled with a supervisory order concerning the execution of that order, could 
be or should be rescinded or discharged in light of the changed circumstances.517  
The court found that it had some leeway to discharge an order where the 
circumstances that gave rise to the grant of the eviction order changed before the 
eviction order originally issued has been executed and/or the order is no longer 
competent.518 The court found that it will only have a discretion to discharge its orders 
where the change is necessitated by exceptional circumstances and considerations of 
justice and equity.519 Consequently, the court had to determine whether there were 
                                            
512 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 
10. 
513 The court in Thubelisha Homes v Various Occupants 2008 JOL 21559 (C) para 81 noted that the 
case centred on the relocation of the unlawful occupiers and that this case did not amount to a normal 
eviction. Although the term “relocation” is used by the court, the court order amounts to an eviction.  
Therefore, the case can still be regarded as an eviction case for purposes of this study.  
514 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 6; 
Pienaar Land Reform 778; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.  
515 Pienaar Land Reform 778; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311. 
516 2011 7 BCLR (CC).  
517 Pienaar Land Reform 777; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311. 
518 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 
28.  
519 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) paras 
23 and28.  
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exceptional circumstances and/or considerations of justice and equity present to 
warrant the rescindment of the structural interdict granted in Joe Slovo 1. In this regard, 
the court found that it was indeed just and equitable to discharge said order given the 
following exceptional circumstances.520 Firstly, as stated above, no adequate steps 
were taken by the State to carry out the structural interdict set out by the court. 
Secondly, there was no intention to proceed with the structural interdict as granted by 
the court. Thirdly, the order could not be executed absent an agreement between the 
parties or a complex amendment to the order. In this regard, there had been little or 
no engagement regarding the relocation process as set out in the structural interdict. 
It was also unlikely that there would be any engagement concerning relocation in the 
future.521 Fourthly, the order relates to thousands of people. Fifthly, the circumstances 
that motivated the court to grant the structural interdict in the first place had ceased to 
exist. Absent the relocation to the temporary accommodation units and engagement, 
the only part of the order that would remain is the bare, unconditional order requiring 
all the unlawful occupants to vacate the Joe Slovo area. It cannot be said to be just 
and equitable if such an order was to be left in place, particularly because the order 
has been in suspension for a long period of time.522  
The court held that it was common cause that the most likely course for the 
redevelopment of the Joe Slovo settlement amounted to an in situ development. 
However, as pointed out by Pienaar, the court did not indicate how and when an in 
situ strategy became “common cause”.523 Due to the “new strategy” there was no 
intention to relocate the occupiers to temporary residential units, which meant that the 
timetable set out to effectively implement the supervised relocation order had become 
irrelevant. Overall, no adequate steps were taken by the State to carry out the 
supervised eviction order made by this court. The order has therefore for all intents 
and purposes been left in abeyance.524 It was evident from these circumstances that 
the execution of the order would not have occurred within a reasonable time. The 
relocation process was scheduled to commence about two months after the order was 
                                            
520 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) paras 
30-31.  
521 McLean (2010) CCR 223; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 303-311.  
522 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 
31. 
523 Pienaar Land Reform 779.  
524 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 
37.  
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handed down and any agreement concerning amendments to the timetable was to be 
placed before the court less than a month after the date of its order.525 The structural 
interdict did not contemplate the commencement of execution to exceed a year and a 
half after the order was made.526 Therefore, implementation of the order cannot be 
said to have been executed within a reasonable time, which means that the structural 
interdict did not constitute effective relief.  
Strictly speaking, the parties disregarded the order of the court in Joe Slovo 1. In 
principle this raises the question whether the parties should have been held in 
contempt of court. Raising contempt of court seems to be redundant in light of the fact 
that the parties obtained effective relief.527  
Even though the structural interdict did not provide effective relief, it can be argued 
that the in situ development and the subsequent provision of adequate housing to the 
former Joe Slovo residents, constituted effective relief. The in situ development in this 
regard amounted to a realisation of the unlawful occupiers’ rights under section 25(6) 
and section 26 of the Constitution. These actions also ensure that the State fulfils its 
constitutional obligations to provide housing on a progressive basis.528  
The question arises as to whether the means to realise the rights of the unlawful 
occupiers could or would have been different had there been a private owner involved. 
Had the owner of the land in question been a private owner, instead of the State, the 
in situ upgrading of the informal settlement would not have been enough to constitute 
effective relief for the landowner and the unlawful occupiers respectively. Where there 
is a private owner involved, such as in Modderklip HC, the rights of the landowner will 
remain infringed for as long as the land is occupied by the unlawful occupiers. 
Depending on the nature and the extent of the infringement, alternative effective relief, 
                                            
525 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) para 
37. 
526 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) paras 
37-38.  
527 Also note that the order was rescinded. See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC) in this regard.  
528 Section 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See Muller The impact of 
section 26 of the Constitution 82-93. Furthermore, see Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; McLean “Housing” in 
CLOSA 55-8-55-14 in general. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
 
such as constitutional damages, may then be necessary to vindicate the private land 
owner’s rights.529 
Apart from issues pertaining to the complexity of the order granted in Joe Slovo 1,530 
one can only speculate whether the use of the structural interdict would have been 
effective if all the parties complied with the order granted by the court from the outset. 
The fact that the parties ignored the court order in Joe Slovo 1 not only raises concern 
in terms of the rule of law principle, but it is also worrisome in light of the wasted legal 
costs and the time associated with obtaining a court order in the first place. Arguably, 
an in situ upgrading would have been a better approach and could have resulted in 
relief at a much earlier stage of litigation. In this regard, litigation costs and time could 
have been spared had the parties and court opted for an in situ upgrading from the 
outset. Arguably, the parties could have submitted a formulated plan for an in situ 
upgrading to the court at any time during the eviction process and the court could have 
retained jurisdiction over the case to ensure that progress in terms of the in situ 
development was effected.  
4 4 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1)  
4 4 1 Introduction 
 
More recently, the court in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (“Pheko 1”)531 
ordered the municipality to file a report (confirmed on affidavit) regarding the steps that 
it proposed to take to identify land for the relocation of the applicants whose homes 
had been unlawfully demolished by the Municipality. The order gave the applicants 15 
days to respond to the report. 
4 4 2 Background and facts of the case 
 
The Bapsfontein informal settlement is a well-established community, with no secure 
land tenure, which has resided informally on public land for more than a decade. The 
case of Pheko 1 concerns the Ekurhuleni Municipality’s efforts to remove residents 
                                            
529 Section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
530 See 4 3 4 1 in this regard.  
531 2012 2 SA 598 (CC). A du Plessis & A van den Berg “Some perspectives on constitutional conflict 
in local disaster management through the lens of Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 2 
SA 598 (CC): case note” (2013) 28 SAPL 448-468; G Muller “Evicting unlawful occupiers for health and 
safety reasons in post-apartheid South Africa” (2015) 132 SALJ 616-638.  
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from land it had deemed to be a “local state of disaster” pursuant to the Disaster 
Management Act 57 of 2002 (“DMA”), which was intended to provide municipalities 
with flexibility in urgently responding to disaster-stricken areas when such action is 
necessary for the preservation of life.532  
The Municipality had commissioned a number of reports regarding the formation of 
sinkholes in the Bapsfontein area as early as 2004.533 Having been aware of the 
development of sinkholes in the area since at least 2004, the Municipality finally 
declared Bapsfontein a disaster area in terms of the DMA in December 2010, after the 
report of 2009 concluded that the residents of the settlement should be evacuated and 
relocated to a safe area as the land was dolomitic.534 Subsequently, the Municipality 
issued a notice535 declaring Bapsfontein “a local state of disaster” due to the dolomite 
instability of the area in terms of the DMA, on 10 December 2010. Two months later, 
after declaring the land in question as unsafe, the Municipality issued a directive 
advising that all residents of the Bapsfontein Informal settlement were to be evacuated  
and relocated to temporary shelter for the preservation of life.536 Because of the 
resistance to the relocation, the Municipality enlisted the services of the “Red-Ants”537 
to demolish the homes of the applicants on 5 March 2011.   
Due to the impending removal and demolition of the residents’ homes, the residents 
challenged the evacuation. An urgent interdict was sought to stop the forced removals 
and demolition of the residents’ homes.538 In the High Court, the residents sought 
                                            
532 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 1. See also Muller 
(2015) SALJ 616-638 where he determines which statute (the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, 
the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1997 or the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998) should be used to evict unlawful 
occupiers for health and safety reasons in post-apartheid South Africa.  
533 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 5.  
534 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) paras 6-7.  
535 The notice read in relevant part: “Notice is hereby served in terms of the Disaster Management Act 
that the Bapsfontein Informal Settlement of 25 hectares, bordered by the R25 Provincial Road to the 
East and approximately 300 metres to the North of the R25 Provincial Road within the Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipal Area has been declared a Local Disaster Area in terms of section 55 of the 
Disaster Management Act due to dolomite instability. Further be advised that persons residing in the 
above mentioned area will be moved to a suitable alternative area as the current area in Bapsfontein 
they occupy is highly unstable and not safe for human settlement.” This notice was published in part in 
the Provincial Gazette Extraordinary No 220 Local Authority Notice 1643, 10 December 2010. 
536 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 11.  
537 The “Red-Ants” is a colloquial term for a private security company contracted by the South African 
government to help with evictions and forced removals.  They wear red uniforms, hence their name 
“Red-Ants”. 
538 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 11. 
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urgent relief restraining the Municipality from demolishing their homes which would 
render them homeless, and from unlawfully evicting and intimidating them to vacate 
Bapsfontein without a court order. They also asked the court to order the Municipality 
to provide them with alternative accommodation.539 The residents contended that the 
forcible eviction and demolition of their homes without an order of court not only 
violated their constitutional rights in relation to housing,540 but also their right to have 
their dignity respected and protected.541   
The High Court, however, found that the residents’ removal from the land in question 
was lawful because the action was taken pursuant to the DMA provisions. 
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the application. An application to appeal 
directly to the Constitutional Court was subsequently launched by the residents. The 
key issue in Pheko 1 was whether the removal of the unlawful occupiers amounted to 
an evacuation under the DMA, as contended by the Municipality.542 The question of 
appropriate relief in casu is related to this.543  
4 4 3 The judgment and order of the court 
 
Upon finding that the evacuation of the unlawful occupiers in terms of the DMA 
amounted to an eviction without a court order, the Constitutional Court in Pheko 1 set 
aside the order of the High Court.544 The court provided two reasons for this decision.   
First, the court found that the actions of the Municipality, in forcibly removing the 
residents of Bapsfontein Informal Settlement and demolishing their homes without a 
court order, allegedly as a result of the imminent danger created by sinkholes in the 
area, were unauthorised in law and contrary to section 26(3) of the Constitution which 
provides that “no one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, 
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No 
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions”. In this regard, the Municipality relied on City 
                                            
539 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 12. 
540 Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Muller The 
impact of section 26 of the Constitution 93-99; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-347.  
541 Section 10 of the Constitution provides: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected.” 
542 For purposes of the thesis the determination of the issue whether section 55 of the Disaster 
Management Act 57 of 2002 authorises eviction and demolition without a court order is not important. 
Only the consequent order of the court is relevant.  
543 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 24.  
544 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 53. 
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of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (Rand Properties)545 to justify 
the eviction of the occupiers without having complied with the relevant factors 
contemplated in section 26(3) of the Constitution.546 The Municipality argued that 
section 26(3) contains two independent elements: a prohibition on evictions without 
court orders and a prohibition on legislation permitting arbitrary evictions. It argued 
that these elements had to be approached separately, meaning that legislation could 
permit evictions without court orders if doing so did not amount to an arbitrary eviction. 
The Municipality argued that the DMA constituted legislation that permitted 
“evacuations” to temporary shelters without a court order where a state of disaster was 
properly declared. The Municipality contended that an eviction in these circumstances 
was not “arbitrary,” and was permitted by the DMA without a court order, consistent 
with the second sentence of section 26(3), as long as that provision was read 
disjunctively.547 However, Nkabinde J, writing for an unanimous court, held that the 
interpretation advanced by the Municipality “turns section 26(3) on its head”.548 Section 
26(3) must be read conjunctively, thereby prohibiting evictions from homes without 
court orders, even if authorised by statute. 
Second, the Constitutional Court found that the residents’ removal was not authorised 
by the DMA.549 The DMA applies only when evacuation is necessary for the immediate 
preservation of life, which the court found was not the goal of the Municipality in 
evicting these residents.550 The area had been labelled a hazardous area as early as 
1986 and its first sinkhole appeared in 2004, yet evictions did not begin until 
2010.  Furthermore, the court found that the term “evacuation” does not contemplate 
eviction, but only covers temporary relocation.  With regard to the Bapsfontein 
settlement the Municipality intended to permanently evict the residents. The court also 
found that the High Court did not sufficiently consider the relevant circumstances, such 
                                            
545 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA). In this case the appellant relied on section 12(4)(b) of the National Building 
Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (“NBRA”). It sought the eviction of the respondents. 
The respondents resisted the evictions on the ground that the appellant had failed to follow the 
procedures prescribed by PIE and that the eviction would not be just and equitable.  The Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that the occupiers were in an emergency situation and that fire and health hazards 
existed in the occupied buildings.  It held further that the provisions under PIE did not apply in the 
context of that case (i.e. to the evacuation under the provisions of the NBRA).  
546 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 21.  
547 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 21. 
548 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 35.  
549 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 45.  
550 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 39.  
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as whether alternative land could be made available to the residents and whether the 
disaster was sufficiently imminent as to warrant such a speedy relocation of the 
residents. Finally, the court issued an order requiring the Municipality to engage with 
the residents to identify settlement in the immediate vicinity of the land in question for 
relocation.551  
As a point of departure in deciding on the appropriate remedy in casu, the court 
reiterated and cited the judgment in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security552 which 
held that “[a]ppropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and 
enforce the Constitution”.553   
In this context the court declared the removal of the unlawful occupiers of Bapsfontein 
to be unlawful and held that the Municipality had an obligation to provide the unlawful 
occupiers with suitable temporary accommodation.554 The fact that the land in question 
is owned by another State department does not absolve the Municipality from this 
obligation. This also includes the duty to identify and designate land for housing 
development for the residents of Bapsfontein. The court held that the unlawful 
occupiers are entitled to effective relief555 and subsequently ordered the State to report 
to it about, amongst other things, whether land has been identified and designated to 
develop housing for the unlawful occupiers.556  
The court found that the relief proposed by the unlawful occupiers (and to which the 
Municipality partly consented to in oral argument) in the relevant circumstances, 
subject to necessary modification, would constitute just and equitable relief and by 
definition, also effective relief for the parties.557  
Consequently, the court issued a structural interdict which required the Municipality to 
identify land in the immediate vicinity of Bapsfontein for the relocation of the unlawful 
occupiers; to engage meaningfully with them on the identification of land and to 
subsequently file a report, confirmed on affidavit by no later than 1 December 2012 
                                            
551 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 43. 
552 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) para 19.   
553 Fose v Minister of Safety 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) para 19 cited at Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 48.  
554 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 49.  
555 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 50.  
556 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 50. 
557 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 51. 
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regarding the steps it has taken in compliance with the court order to provide access 
to adequate housing for the unlawful occupiers.558  
4 4 4 Evaluation of the order granted 
 
4 4 4 1 Was it appropriate to grant a structural interdict? 
 
It would seem that the only factor the court took into account in determining whether it 
was necessary to issue a structural interdict, was the uncertainty of knowing how long 
it will take the Municipality to identify relevant land. Although the contemplated delay 
in providing access to land and housing is important, it is not the only factor that has 
to be taken into consideration in determining whether the use of a structural interdict 
was necessary.559  
Another factor which justifies the use of structural interdicts is the large number of 
people who would be adversely affected where housing is not provided for within a 
reasonable time.  
In line with the other cases discussed above, the unlawful occupiers of Bapsfontein 
have the right to land; the right to access to adequate housing560 and the right not to 
be evicted without a court order.561 An eviction without a court order will lead to the 
violation of these rights. Moreover, a failure by the State to provide alternative 
accommodation, where it is a condition of an eviction order, will also violate the section 
26 rights of the unlawful occupiers. In these circumstances it became clear that the 
State intended to “evacuate” the unlawful occupiers from the land in terms of the DMA 
rather than to “evict” them under PIE.  
It is conceivable that the intention of the State to circumvent the provisions of PIE, by 
relying on the provisions of the DMA, can be linked to bad faith. In this light it is 
questionable whether the State will comply timeously with the eviction and relocation 
order handed down in Pheko 1.562 The State’s conduct indicates a certain lack of 
appreciation for its constitutional obligations in terms of section 26(3) of the 
                                            
558 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 53.  
559 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333.  
560 Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
561 Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
562 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
93 
 
Constitution. State departments and officials cannot be allowed to operate outside the 
ambit of the law.  Therefore, supervision is necessary to ensure that the State complies 
with all of its constitutional duties,563 so that the State acts within the ambit of their 
authority.564   
4 4 4 2 Did the structural interdict provide effective relief?  
 
Where litigants obtain a court order vindicating their right but there is a failure to 
execute the order it cannot be said that the rights violations have been effectively 
remedied.  
Following the continuous failure by the State to execute the order obtained in Pheko 
1, the unlawful occupiers instituted further action. In the subsequent case of Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) (“Pheko 2”),565 it was found that the State 
repeatedly failed to comply with the previous order (i.e. the structural interdict issued 
in Pheko 1). Consequently, the Constitutional Court in Pheko 2 opted for alternative 
effective relief in the form of contempt of court proceedings, to remedy the failed 
execution of the structural interdict ordered in Pheko 1.566  
Although contempt of court could not be proven, it did not detract from the fact that the 
State had been in breach of their constitutional567 and statutory obligations.568 The 
court found that these obligations continue to form part of the State’s ongoing 
responsibility to provide the unlawful occupiers of Bapsfontein with land and adequate 
housing.569 Accordingly, for the purpose of implementing the court’s supervisory order 
in Pheko 1, and in light of the constitutional and statutory obligations of the relevant 
State officials, the court ordered that the Executive Mayor, Municipal Manager and 
Head of the Department for Human Settlements as well as the Member of the 
                                            
563 Section 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
564 Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 read with the provisions of 
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998; Wilson  (2009) 
SALJ 270-290; Pienaar & Mostert (2006) TSAR 522-536.     
565 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). See in general Muller (2015) SALJ 616-638.   
566 For a detailed discussion on contempt of court proceedings as a potential form of alternative effective 
relief, where the structural interdict does not provide such relief see Chapter 4 where Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) is discussed and analysed in detail.  
567 Sections 152; 26 and 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 44. 
568 Section 73 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, read with section 9(1) of 
the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
569 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 46 read with the 
order in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) para 49-50. 
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Executive Council for Gauteng Department for Human Settlements,570 be joined to the 
proceedings.571  
Following the Pheko 1 and Pheko 2 orders, several expert reports and affidavits 
regarding the identification of land in the immediate vicinity of Bapsfontein for the 
relocation of the unlawful occupiers have been filed by the parties.572 On examination 
of the reports the problem appears to be this: The Municipality has identified three 
viable portions of land for the relocation of the unlawful occupiers as required by the 
order in Pheko 1. This land is approximately 20 to 30 km away from the Bapsfontein 
settlement. The unlawful occupiers assert that the parcels of land are not within the 
immediate vicinity of Bapsfontein. Accordingly, they view the assertion by the 
Municipality that it is impossible to identify viable land in the immediate vicinity of 
Bapsfontein as a refusal to comply with the order in Pheko 1.573 Accordingly, in light 
of the difficulties associated with the execution of the structural interdict granted in 
Pheko 1, the Constitutional Court in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 
3) (“Pheko 3”)574 had to determine whether to discharge its supervisory jurisdiction and 
whether the matter should be referred to the High Court.575  
Due to the factual disputes that emerged from the expert reports regarding viable 
relocation options,576 the parties agreed that the matter should be referred to the High 
Court.577 Accordingly, the Constitutional Court discharged the order in Pheko 1, but 
transferred the matter to the High Court.578 Furthermore, the court in Pheko 3 held that 
the High Court will have the authority to determine issues relating to the identification 
                                            
570 Together, these State officials are responsible for the execution of eviction orders. It is precisely 
because of the leadership entrusted to these State officials that they have a duty to undertake 
responsibility by implementing court orders. See Chapter 4, 3 1 3 in this regard.  
571 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 58-60.  
572 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 19.  
573 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 20.  
574 (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016).  
575 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 22. Interestingly, the State opposed the application for the court to discharge the structural 
interdict. The State’s reasoning for this is based on the complexity and practical difficulties associated 
with implementing the structural interdict in Pheko 1.  
576 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 14.  
577 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
paras 34 and 37.  
578 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 46.  
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of suitable alternative land in the vicinity579 of Bapsfontein for the unlawful occupiers. 
In this regard, the High Court will also supervise the relocation of the unlawful 
occupiers.580  
In this regard, Nkabinde J notes that:  
“Supervisory orders arising from structural interdicts ensure that courts play an active 
monitoring role in the enforcement of orders…By granting the structural interdict a 
court secures a response in the form of reports and thereby prevents a failure to 
comply with the positive obligations imposed by its order. Generally, the court’s role 
continues until the remedy it has ordered in a matter has been fulfilled”.581  
Although the rights of the unlawful occupiers still remain in limbo, it seems as if the 
State is working progressively and within its budgetary constraints to provide land and 
adequate housing to them. In this regard, effective relief may not yet have been 
realised, but it a step in the right direction. In this regard, the Pheko cases illustrate 
that a combination of remedies and the court’s continuous supervision, coupled with 
the participation of the responsible State officials, may potentially or ultimately ensure 
the realisation of effective relief over time. 
4 5 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg  
4 5 1 Introduction  
 
The Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg (“Olivia Road”)582 case has 
highlighted the benefits which could be derived from issuing structural interdicts 583 
before granting eviction orders.   
Strictly speaking, this case falls outside the focus of this thesis, because the court in 
Olivia Road never granted an eviction order.584 Although the court did not grant an 
eviction order, eviction proceedings where instituted nevertheless. Arguably, an 
                                            
579 Note that the word “immediate”, as used by the court in Pheko 1, has been omitted.  
580 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 46. 
581 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 3) (CCT 19/11) [2016] ZACC 20 (26 July 2016) 
para 1.  
582 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). See in general Ray (2008) HRLR 703-713; Chenwi & Liebenberg (2008) ESR 
Review 12-17; Chenwi (2009) CCR 371-393; Chenwi (2011) SAPL 128-156; Muller (2011) Stell LR 742-
758; Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ 1-29; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 293-303.  
583 Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights 210; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 293-303.  
584 This thesis assumes that an eviction order has been granted. See Chapter 1 at 6.  
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eviction order would have been inevitable had the court not issued a structural interdict 
- or an interim structural interdict to be more specific. While the case, strictly speaking, 
may not fall within the scope of this thesis, the remedy does. Ultimately, this thesis 
explores whether the remedies discussed may provide effective relief to those involved 
in the eviction process. It may be helpful and insightful to identify the elements of the 
structural interdict in Olivia Road which led to the realisation of the parties’ rights. The 
structural interdict used in Olivia Road highlights that issuing a structural interdict 
before considering and awarding an eviction order in terms of PIE may provide 
effective relief.  For these reasons, the case is accordingly discussed.  
4 5 2 Background and facts of the case  
 
In 2003 the State embarked upon an ambitious regeneration programme in the inner 
city of South Africa’s biggest metropolitan municipality, Johannesburg Municipality, 
premised entirely on encouraging commercial property developers to take control of 
urban slum properties; evict the occupiers there from and refurbish them for 
occupation at much higher rents.585 Approximately 10 000 people were evicted by the 
City under the auspices of this strategy. 586   
In Olivia Road the City of Johannesburg sought to evict approximately 400 people 
from six buildings situated in the inner city of Johannesburg. 587 Rather than rely on 
the PIE, with its injunction to consider the equity of eviction from homes, the City 
elected instead to rely on the National Building Standards and Building Regulations 
Act 103 of 1977 (“NBRA”). This enabled the City to circumvent a number of the 
supposedly onerous provisions set out in PIE. Section 12(4)(b) of the NBRA permitted 
a municipal official, if she was of the opinion that it was necessary “for the safety of 
any person” to order the “vacation” of a property, merely by issuing a notice to that 
effect. The use of the NBRA in this way assisted the City to characterize the slum 
properties in the inner city as health and safety nuisances rather than housing sites in 
dire need for urgent attention.  
 
                                            
585 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 293-303; S Wilson “Litigating Housing Rights in Johannesburg’s 
Inner City: 2004-2008” (2010) 27 SAJHR 134 134.  
586 Wilson (2010) SAJHR 137. 
587 Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 257; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 17; Mbazira Litigating 
socio-economic rights 210; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 293-303. 
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The High Court dismissed the eviction application on the basis that the City had failed 
to adopt a policy through which the occupiers could access affordable alternative 
accommodation.588 The High Court declared that the City’s strategy fell short of the 
requirement to provide suitable relief for the people in the City who were in crisis or in 
desperate need of housing and found that the absence of such a policy was in breach 
of the City’s constitutional obligations.589 Consequently, the court interdicted the City 
from evicting the occupiers until alternative accommodation was made available.590  
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, Harms JA in City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties591 set aside most of the High Court’s order, holding that the City’s right to 
seek the “evacuation” of buildings it considered unsafe was not conditional on it being 
able to provide alternative accommodation.592 The eviction order was consequently 
reinstated.593 Nonetheless, Harms JA ordered that alternative accommodation, in the 
form of temporary shelter, be provided for those in desperate need of housing. He 
accordingly directed the City to open a register upon which the occupiers could register 
themselves for the provision of emergency accommodation once they were evicted.594 
Fearing that they would be left homeless while the City compiled its register and 
identified emergency accommodation, the occupiers applied for leave to appeal to the 
Constitutional Court. 
  
                                            
588 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W); C Mbazira “An overview of the 
Constitutional Court hearing of inner-city evictions case: Case review 1” (2007) 8 ESR Review 12-16; 
Strydom & Viljoen (2014) PELJ 1224-1225; S Wilson “A new dimension to the right to housing: case 
review” (2006) 7 ESR Review 9-13.  
589 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) paras 65-67; Mbazira (2007) 
ESR Review 12-16; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014)  PELJ 1224-1225; Wilson (2006) ESR Review 
9-13. 
590 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W) para 67; Mbazira (2007) ESR 
Review 12-16; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1224-1225; Wilson (2006) ESR Review 9-13. 
591 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA); Mbazira (2007) ESR Review 12-16; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 
1224-1225; Wilson (2006) ESR Review 9-13. 
592 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) paras 68-69; Mbazira (2007) ESR 
Review 12-16; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1224-1225; Wilson (2006) ESR Review 9-13. 
593 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 78; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 18; 
Mbazira (2007) ESR Review 12-16; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1224-1225; Wilson (2006) 
ESR Review 9-13.  
594 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 78; Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 18; 
Mbazira (2007) ESR Review 12-16; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1224-1225; Wilson (2006) 
ESR Review 9-13. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
4 5 3 The judgment and order of the court 
 
The Constitutional Court introduced a new approach to the structural interdict which 
promoted dialogue among the parties. Inevitably this may result in the execution of 
court orders where the degree of involvement by the court, by way of supervision, is 
minimised.595  Reluctant to delve into the deeper questions of whether the City had an 
obligation to adopt a policy in terms of which the occupiers should be afforded 
alternative accommodation, the Constitutional Court instead focussed on the absence 
of “meaningful engagement” with the occupiers prior to eviction.596 During the course 
of the hearing, the court ordered what can be described as an interim structural 
interdict.597 The court directed that the parties engage with each other meaningfully in 
an effort to resolve the differences and difficulties aired in the eviction application, 
having regard to the constitutional and statutory obligations of the municipality and the 
rights and duties of the unlawful occupiers concerned598 and to report back at a later 
date regarding these deliberations. It was required of parties to submit affidavits to the 
court, within 2 months, which reported on the results reached between the unlawful 
occupiers and the State.599  
The court held that: 
 
“[T]he City has shown a willingness to engage. As a result, the desperate situation of 
the occupiers has been alleviated by the reasonable response of the City to the 
engagement process. There is no reason to think that future engagement will not be 
meaningful and will not lead to a reasonable result. In any event this court should not 
be the court of first and last instance on whether the City has acted reasonably in the 
process. Nor should it be the only determinant of whether the plan is reasonable in the 
sense of being sufficiently concrete and clear. It is the duty of both parties to continue 
                                            
595 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 19.  
596 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights (2010) 293-303. 419; Ray (2008) HRLR 703-713; Chenwi & 
Liebenberg (2008) ESR Review 12-17; Chenwi (2009) CCR 371-393; Chenwi (2011) SAPL 128-156; 
Muller (2011) 22 Stell LR 742-758; Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ 1-29.  
597 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 18. 
598 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 5; Ray (2008) HRLR 
703-713; Chenwi & Liebenberg (2008) ESR Review 12-17; Chenwi (2009) CCR 371-393; Chenwi 
(2011) SAPL 128-156; Muller (2011) 22 Stell LR 742-758; Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ 1-29. 
599 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 5; Mbazira (2008) 
SAJHR 18; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 293-303, 419. 
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with the process of negotiation and for the occupiers of the City to approach the High 
Court if this course becomes necessary”.600  
 
After two months of intensive negotiations which were effectively overseen by the 
Constitutional Court, the matter was finally resolved with the occupiers being offered 
and accepting accommodation in a building yet to be refurbished nearby in the inner 
city where the residents remain today.601 
4 5 4 Evaluation of the order granted 
4 5 4 1 Was it appropriate to grant a structural interdict? 
 
Where an eviction order is granted, but there is no alternative accommodation 
available upon executing the eviction order, the unlawful occupiers’ constitutional right 
to have access to adequate housing will be infringed.602  
Where a delay in the provision of housing to those in desperate need thereof is likely 
to increase the harm or discomfort suffered, the use of the structural interdict will be 
necessary to avoid such a delay.603 At the institution of proceedings in the 
Constitutional Court there had been no fundamental breach of the unlawful occupiers’ 
right to be provided with temporary emergency housing, though a fear existed that 
such accommodation would not be provided timeously. The court attributed this fear 
to the fact that there had been no meaningful engagement between the parties.604 
Arguably, the lack of meaningful engagement was indicative thereof that the State 
would not comply with its constitutional duties in a timeous manner,605 which 
necessitated the use of the structural interdict.  
                                            
600 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 34.  
601 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 293-303, 419. 
602 Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1207; Swart (2005) SAJHR 217. See in general Van der 
Walt Constitutional Property Law 17-18 and Roux “Property” in CLOSA 41-1-41-37; Pienaar Land 
Reform 378-509 and Pienaar & Brickhill “Land” in CLOSA 48-25-48-52; Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; Muller The 
impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-82 and McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14. 
Furthermore, see Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” 
in CLOSA 9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
603 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 293-303, 419. 
604 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 22 and 35. 
605 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333 and 350.  
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Other factors, such as the practical concerns regarding the provision of temporary and 
suitable housing to approximately 400 people606 were also indicative thereof that the 
use of the (interim) structural interdict was appropriate and necessary, given the 
circumstances of the case.  
4 5 4 2 Did the structural interdict provide effective relief?  
 
The fact that the court issued an interim structural interdict before determining whether 
to grant an eviction order, led to an outcome that constituted effective relief for all 
parties. Liebenberg states that the case illustrates how a mandatory structural interdict 
ordered by a court instructing the parties to engage meaningfully with each other 
before an eviction order is granted can stimulate a dialogic process of engagement 
leading to the provision of concrete benefits to a particular group.607  
Again, the question arises as to how effective the engagement process would have 
been and whether the rights of all the parties would have been realised if the private 
land owner instituted eviction proceedings as opposed to the State. Depending on the 
nature and extent of the deprivation, compensation of some kind would arguably have 
been necessary to vindicate the land owner’s property rights. This matter is dealt with 
further in Chapter 3 below.  
5 Reflection 
 
A comparison between Olivia Road and the abovementioned cases may provide 
insight regarding the successful use of the structural interdict in eviction cases. Active 
participation by all parties and the stage at which the structural interdict is utilised can 
be identified as factors that will ensure the successful and effective use of the structural 
interdict in eviction cases. The effective use of the structural interdict during the 
procedural and/or execution phase608 plays a central role in the realisation of 
constitutional rights and the provision of effective relief accordingly.  
                                            
606 Roach & Budlender (2005) SALJ 333. 
607 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 420; See also K Tissington “Challenging inner city evictions 
before the Constitutional Court of South Africa: the Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road case in Johannesburg, 
South Africa” (2008) 5 Housing and ESC Rights Law Quarterly 1; Ling (2015) HKJLS 60; Lawrence The 
impact of supervisory orders and structural interdicts 44-45. 
608 See Chapter 1 above at 1.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
Where there is a willingness on the part of all the parties to engage meaningfully and 
in good faith with each other in order to reach effective relief, the possibility of 
achieving such relief should, in theory, be possible.609 In this regard, Olivia Road 
illustrates that participation by all parties is key for achieving effective relief.610  
By comparison, in Modderklip HC, the lack of participation by the State to execute the 
eviction order and abide by the structural interdict resulted in the ineffective use 
thereof. Although the State consented to the relief proposed by the unlawful occupiers 
in Pheko 1, it failed to engage meaningfully with the residents regarding the 
identification of land. In Joe Slovo 1 the court requested that the parties engage 
meaningfully with one another regarding when and how the relocation of the unlawful 
occupiers would take place.  Although the parties engaged actively with one another, 
the parties completely ignored the scope and objectives of the structural interdict. 
Instead, the reports questioned whether the relocation process should take place at 
all.611 It became abundantly clear from reports submitted after the Joe Slovo 1 
judgement was handed down, that the parties favoured an in situ upgrading. Arguably, 
the court should have left the formulation of a remedial plan to the parties from the 
outset, but with some oversight by the court. In this regard, the court could have issued 
a structural interdict requiring the parties to engage meaningfully with one another on 
finding a suitable remedy, linked to a particular time line.  
The precise stage when a structural interdict is issued may also be indicative of 
whether the use thereof will constitute effective relief.  In Olivia Road the structural 
interdict was ordered before an eviction order was granted and implemented. The 
court in Modderklip HC, Joe Slovo 1 and Pheko 1 issued a structural interdict only 
after an eviction order was granted.  
  
                                            
609 Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 261; Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western 
Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 244; Ling (2015) HKJLS 60.  
610 Mbazira (2008) SAJHR 21-23; Lawrence The impact of supervisory orders and structural interdicts 
44-48 
611 Lawrence The impact of supervisory orders and structural interdicts 47 and 49-52 where she states 
that Joe Slovo is a good illustration of how meaningful engagement should not take place. See also 
Mclean (2010) CCR 232; Liebenberg (2012) AHRLJ in general.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
From the exposition above, it is clear that constitutional rights require remedies. 
Indeed, in accordance with a remedy-based approach “a right without a[n effective] 
remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope or a wish”.612 The courts should be 
guided by this fundamental, but often forgotten, constitutional principle. This is 
especially pertinent when State officials fail to execute court orders in a reasonable 
and timely manner.613 In reality, the road to achieving compliance with such an order 
is invariably impacted on by delay or failure by State officials to uphold their 
constitutional obligations.614  
If there is disregard of court orders, such as in the cases of Modderklip HC, Joe Slovo 
and Pheko 1, judicial action taken to achieve effective relief within a reasonable time 
in the form of a structural interdict will constitute an appropriate exercise of judicial 
power.  
A discussion of the use of the structural interdict by the South African courts in eviction 
case law has shown that the structural interdict may provide effective relief to the 
parties in principle. However, it is not likely to do so where the State is not willing to 
engage with and fulfil their constitutional obligations. The judgments above indicate 
that the common denominator for the successful use of the structural interdict in 
providing effective relief is when active State participation is present. State 
participation is determined by and impacted on by various factors, including capacity, 
available resources, budgetary considerations, good governance and sustainability. It 
is also necessary to ensure that communication channels are open and that the court 
and the parties involved in the eviction process have a clear and collective objective 
in mind. A common objective between the court and the parties and an agreement on 
the steps to achieve effective relief may help avoid situations such as the outcome in 
                                            
612 Ziegler (1987) Hastings Law LJ 678; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 
69.  
613 Grossenbacher (1991-1992) Georgetown LJ 2257-2258.  
614 See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA); 
Modderfontein East Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President 
of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) and President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) as examples of 
continuous failures by the State to realise housing rights.  
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the Joe Slovo 1 case.615 The particular disposition of the relevant State official or 
officials within a particular State department may also emerge at this point, ultimately 
impacting negatively on active participation. Peculiarly, the very circumstance that 
triggers the employ of a structural interdict is also the determining factor linked to the 
successful implementation thereof.  
As is evident from the successful use of the interdict in Olivia Road, the structural 
interdict has the potential to provide effective relief. Despite this potential, in most 
cases a structural interdict may not result in effective relief without close supervision 
by and scrutiny of the court, coupled with the willingness of the parties to engage 
meaningfully with one another and the State’s fulfilment of its constitutional duties.  
Where this is not the case, the right to a remedy does not simply wither away. Parties 
are still entitled to effective relief regardless of whether the use of the structural 
interdict was successful or not.  
It is within this context that other possible alternative remedies emerge. Such 
alternative effective relief constitutes various forms, including constitutional 
damages616 and contempt of court orders,617 discussed in more detail below.  
 
 
  
                                            
615 From the outset of the case the parties and the court were at cross-purposes. The parties (the 
unlawful occupiers and the State) opted for in situ upgrading of the settlement, whereas the court issued 
a relocation order that amounted to an eviction. See 4 3 above where the case is analysed in detail.  
616 See Chapter 3. 
617 See Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3: Constiutional Damages 
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1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 set out to explore whether the use of a structural interdict may provide 
effective relief. In theory, a structural interdict appears to be the ideal solution where 
there has been a failure to execute an eviction order. However, case law has illustrated 
that it may not always be true. The structural interdict is often not an ideal solution 
because of a lack of willingness on the part of the parties to engage meaningfully and 
in good faith with each other and/or due to inattentiveness, incompetence or 
intransigence on the part of the State generally or at different levels of government. 
Accordingly the rights violations remain unaddressed and the need for effective relief 
continuous to exist. In the context of evictions, this means that the rights of the land 
owner and the unlawful occupiers remain in limbo. Accordingly, where the use of the 
structural interdict would not be appropriate given the circumstances of the case or 
where the use thereof has proven to be ineffective, alternative effective relief must be 
explored in order to redress the rights violation.618 One option available is the payment 
of indirect or direct constitutional damages, which forms the focus of Chapter 3.  
Compensation in the form of indirect or direct constitutional damages may be regarded 
as an effective remedy for the infringement of a right.619 Indirect or direct constitutional 
damages not only reimburse the person who has suffered a loss, but it also highlights 
and emphasises State accountability to an extent.620  Whereas indirect constitutional 
damages have been utilised in a number of cases in the South African context,621 the 
                                            
618 M Bishop “Remedies” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 
6 2014) 9-65-9-78. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; C 
Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation of court orders in South Africa: You are the “weakest 
link” in realising socio-economic right: Goodbye (2008) 5.  See Chapter 1 at 2 3 and Chapter 2 in 
general.   
619 M Loubser, R Midgley, A Mukheibir, L Niesing, D Perumal The Law of Delict in South Africa 2ed 
(2012)  4, 8;  I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 200-201 where the authors 
provide  reasons why damages is a necessary remedy. 
620 RJ de Beer & S Vettori “The Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” (2007) 10 PELJ 17. 
Constitutional damages only contribute to State accountability to a certain extent. While it may be the 
State who is held accountable by a court, it is the taxpayer who effectively pays the damages awarded. 
See BL Batchelor Constitutional Damages for the Infringements of a Social Assistance Right in South 
Africa: Are monetary damages in the form of interest a just and equitable remedy for the breach of a 
social right? LLM University of Fort Hare (2011) 128.  
621 See for example, M v Minister of Police of the Government of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 
SA 622 (GNP); Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC); Minister of Safety 
and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 
2003 1 SA 389 (SCA); Zealand v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 4 SA 458 
(CC). 
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courts have seldom granted direct constitutional damages to remedy a constitutional 
right infringement,622 let alone in the context of eviction cases.623  
Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of indirect and direct constitutional damages, in 
light of the single-system-of-law concept and subsidiarity principles, respectively. In 
terms of the discussion of indirect constitutional damages, it is questioned whether a 
statute or the common law may provide effective relief to a land owner and unlawful 
occupiers. Having established that indirect constitutional damages may not always 
provide or constitute effective relief, the use of direct constitutional damages is 
explored. Absent an overarching framework for determining whether direct 
constitutional damages may be appropriate in a particular eviction case in South 
Africa, the study sets out to discuss the four step framework established in Canadian 
case law.  
Absent a statutory mechanism,624 common law remedy or general framework for 
granting constitutional damages625 it seems that, in general, constitutional damages 
will only be awarded where no other form of relief constitutes appropriate and effective 
relief.626 In this regard, President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (“Modderklip CC”)627 is discussed and analysed. Modderklip CC 
serves as an example where constitutional damages constituted the only appropriate 
relief given the circumstances of the case.628 However, it is questioned whether the 
                                            
622 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a transformative Constitution (2010) 439, 
442 identifies two primary areas where direct constitutional damages have been awarded in the context 
of socio-economic rights cases: To reconcile the protection of property and housing rights and to 
compensate for the maladministration of social grants; Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights 201.  
623 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See in 
general A Christmas “The Modderklip case: the state’s obligations in evictions instituted by private 
landowners: case review” (2005) 4 ESR Review 6-10; S Khoza “Questioning the wisdom of moving 
40 000 people: the Modderklip saga continues: case review” (2005) 6 ESR Review 10-11; AJ van der 
Walt “The state’s duty to protect property owners v the State’s duty to provide housing: Thoughts on 
Modderklip case: notes and comments” (2005) 21 SAJHR 144-161.   
624  M Kruger “Arbitrary deprivation of property: An argument for the payment of compensation by the 
state in certain cases of unlawful occupation” (2014) 131 SALJ 329. See in general AJ van der Walt 
Property and Constitution (2012) 81-91; J Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders: A 
constitutional analysis LLD Stellenbosch University (2012) 362. 
625 S Barns “Constitutional Damages: A call for the development of a framework in South Africa” (2013) 
Responsa Meridiana 22. See also 3 below.  
626 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights 201; Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders 351-352. 
See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in 
CLOSA 9-65-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5.   
627 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See in general Christmas (2005) ESR Review 6-10; Khoza (2005) ESR Review 
10-11; Van der Walt (2005) SAJHR 144-161.    
628 See 4 2 below. 
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relief provided actually constituted effective relief. In this regard alternative forms of 
relief, such as expropriation, Ausgleich (known as equalisation measures in German 
law)629 and sharing (a concept found in American property law),630 are explored in 
order to find an outcome that may constitute effective relief.  
Thereafter, and by way of comparison, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd (“Blue Moonlight SCA”)631 illustrates when 
constitutional damages will not be regarded as appropriate relief.  
In light of the developments set out in Chapter 2 regarding the often ineffective use of 
structural interdicts, coupled with the absence of direct constitutional damages in the 
context of evictions, glaring shortcomings emerge. By way of reflection, Chapter 3 
concludes and finds that it is pertinent that no compensatory provision prevails in its 
current formulation of PIE. Accordingly, either an amendment to PIE, by way of 
providing for an equalisation measure,632 or a general framework for direct 
constitutional damages stands to be developed.633 The latter will potentially increase 
the use of constitutional damages as a remedy to vindicate fundamental rights and 
deter future infringements.634 
  
                                            
629 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 366-367 and 277-280; Strydom A hundred 
years of demolition orders 350. 
630 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the Cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut LR 647-723 647. 
631 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA). See in general K Tissington & S Wilson “SCA upholds rights of urban poor in 
Blue Moonlight judgment: case review” (2011) 12 ESR Review 3-6; GS Dickinson “Blue Moonlight 
Rising: evictions, alternative accommodation and a comparative perspective on affordable housing 
solutions in Johannesburg” (2011) 27 SAJHR 466-495; H Kruuse “The art of the possible in realising 
socio-economic rights: the SCA decision in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties (Pty) Ltd: notes” (2011) 128 SALJ 620-632; and GS Dickinson “The Blue Moonlight 
remedy: formulating the voucher scheme into a new emergency housing remedy in South Africa” (2013) 
130 SALJ 554-596.   
632 Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders 351-352; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
366-367 and 277-280. 
633 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 SCC. This case has provided Canada with an authoritative 
interpretation of “appropriate and just relief” in section 24(1) of the Charter in respect of constitutional 
damages. See also C Okpaluba “The development of Charter Damages Jurisprudence in Canada: 
Guidelines from the Supreme Court” (2012) 55 Stell LR 55-75 55-56; CDL Hunt “Case Note: 
Constitutional Damages in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 115 Cambridge Student LR 115-
120 115. See 3 below and Chapter 5 at 3 5 3.   
634 See in general Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 1-22.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
2 Indirect and direct constitutional damages 
2 1 Introduction  
 
Constitutional damages can be regarded as a remedy available for the violation of an 
individual’s constitutional rights.635 Whether a court should award constitutional 
damages in general, should be determined on the facts of each case, for what is 
ultimately at stake is the effective vindication of a constitutional right.  
Bishop identifies two broad types of damages in constitutional matters: Indirect 
constitutional damages636 and direct constitutional damages.637 According to Bishop, 
indirect constitutional damages constitute damages that are awarded in terms of a 
statute or the common law that gives effect to a constitutional right,638 whereas direct 
constitutional damages flows directly from the Constitution.639  
Whether indirect or direct constitutional damages are applicable to a set of facts should 
be determined in accordance with the single-system-of-law concept640 and subsidiarity 
principles.641 Where a litigant seeks to vindicate the infringement of a constitutionally 
protected right, that person must rely on the legislation enacted to protect that right 
and may not rely on the common law or on the constitutional provision directly.642 
Accordingly, if PIE provided for a compensatory remedy to address instances where 
there is a disproportionate and continued violation of the land owner’s property rights, 
then the land owner instituting a claim for the eviction of the unlawful occupiers, would 
                                            
635 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-150; Loubser et al The Law of Delict 33-35. 
636 See 2 2 below.  
637 See 2 3 below. See also Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151; Loubser et al The Law of Delict 33-
35. 
638 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151.  
639 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151. 
640 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of South Africa 
2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44 where the court held that: “There is only one system of law. It is shaped 
by the Constitution which is the supreme law and all law, including the common law, derives its force 
from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.” See also AJ van der Walt Property and 
Constitution (2012) 20, where the author explains that the common law and legislation do not exist 
separately or independently from the Constitution. See further E van der Sijde Reconsidering the 
relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD Stellenbosch 
University (2015) 181, 184.  
641 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 23-24, 35. These principles provide guidance when dealing 
with more than one potentially applicable source of law and ensure selection of the source of law that 
will contribute to the development of a single system of law. See also Van der Walt Property and 
Constitution. See Chapter 2 in general. 
642 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
109 
 
have to rely on the provisions of PIE to protect his or her property rights.643 While PIE 
provides for the protection of immovable property in principle by setting out various 
application procedures under sections 4,644 5645 and 6,646 it does not provide for 
compensatory mechanisms.  
In the absence of applicable legislation pertaining to an award for constitutional 
damages in general, courts should rely on the common law (indirect constitutional 
damages), instead of making a direct appeal to constitutional provisions, whenever it 
is possible.647 In this regard, most cases can be adequately addressed through indirect 
constitutional damages. Only where the common law is “unconstitutional or incapable 
of serving the relevant constitutional goals”, 648 such as providing effective relief, 
should reliance be placed directly on the Constitution. Accordingly, if indirect 
constitutional damages fail to provide effective relief given the facts of the case, then 
reliance can be placed directly on the Constitution.  
2 2 Indirect constitutional damages 
 
Indirect constitutional damages are monetary damages that are awarded in terms of 
the common law or a statute that gives effect to a constitutional right.649 In this regard, 
Bishop views every award of delictual damages where the right asserted is also a 
constitutional right as a constitutional remedy, because the indirect constitutional 
remedy serves to cure the violation of the constitutional right.650 The Constitutional 
                                            
643 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36; Kruger (2014) SALJ 329; Strydom A hundred years of 
demolition orders 350. 
644 Section 4 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
sets out the procedures and requirements an owner or person in charge of land must follow to institute 
eviction proceedings against unlawful occupiers of his or her property.  
645 Section 5 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
allows an owner or person in charge of land to institute urgent proceedings for the eviction of unlawful 
occupiers.  
646 Section 6 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
allows organs of State to institute eviction proceedings against unlawful occupiers.  
647 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 81-82. 
648 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 82. See also Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-157.   
649 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151. 
650 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151; Loubser et al The Law of Delict 33 where the authors state 
that “this is possible where there is an overlap between a fundamental [constitutional] right and a 
private-law (subjective) right that the law of delict recognises…One can easily find a delictual 
counterpart for the following fundamental right: human dignity (section 10), life (section 11), freedom 
and security of the person (section 12), privacy (section 14)…and property (section 25)…[However] 
some fundamental rights simply do not lend themselves to actions in delict….[A] person is unlikely to 
have a n action in delict if, for example, that person’s right to housing (section 26)…is infringed” 
(emphasis added).   
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Court first enunciated this proposition in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 
(“Fose”)651 when it provided that  there will be  many cases where the common law will 
be broad enough to provide all the relief that would be appropriate for breach of 
constitutional rights.652 The claim for constitutional damages in this regard was adjunct 
to a claim for delictual damages arising out of alleged assault and torture of the plaintiff 
by members of the police force.653 The cause of action was based on the infringement 
of the plaintiff’s constitutional right to dignity and the right not to be unlawfully 
tortured.654   
The court per Ackermann J held that:  
 “[T]here can, in my view, be no place for further constitutional damages in order to 
vindicate the rights in question. Should the plaintiff succeed in proving the allegations 
pleaded he will no doubt, in addition to a judgment finding that he was indeed assaulted 
by members of the police force in the manner alleged, be awarded substantial 
damages. This, in itself, will be a powerful vindication of the constitutional rights in 
question requiring no further vindication by way of an additional award of constitutional 
damages.”655  
Ackermann J accordingly found that delictual damages constituted an adequate 
vindication of the plaintiff’s right, and refused the additional claim for constitutional 
damages.  
Generally, direct constitutional damages will be inappropriate where the existing law 
provides a remedy that fully vindicates the constitutional right.656 In such cases there 
is no need to rely on the Constitution to create a new self-standing remedy.657 Bishop 
                                            
651 1997 3 SA 786 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 438.  
652 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 58. Nugent JA in MEC Department 
of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 30 similarly expressed the view that the 
common law of delict is capable of being extended to encompass state liability for the breach of 
constitutional obligations. In Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) 
para 74 Moseneke DCJ points out that “it seems that in an appropriate case a private-law delictual 
remedy may serve to protect and enforce a constitutionally entrenched fundamental right. Thus a 
claimant seeking appropriate relief to which it is entitled, may properly resort to a common law remedy 
in order to vindicate a constitutional right.” 
653 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 438. 
654 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 1; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 438.  
655 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 67.  
656 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 67; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 
9-152; Loubser et al The Law of Delict 33. 
657 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-152. See also Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36, 40-43, 
81-91.  
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remarks that Ackermann J in Fose did not set this principle as an absolute rule.658 
However, it is seemingly difficult to think of a scenario where another form of relief 
(damages or otherwise) is available through the common law or statute and direct 
constitutional damages would still be justified as a remedy.659 It is accordingly 
advisable that litigants first determine whether they have a common law660 or statutory 
claim, before relying on a claim for direct constitutional damages. This is in line with 
the single-system-of-law and subsidiarity principles briefly mentioned above.661 
In subsequent judgments, the law of delict has been developed to recognise claims 
based on constitutional values and rights.662 While courts in this regard have been 
very eager to develop the common law to provide remedies for those who have 
suffered physical injury as a result of State negligence or abuse663 it has been less 
sympathetic to those persons who have only incurred financial loss as a result of the 
State’s negligence.664 Accordingly, courts may be less inclined to award delictual 
damages to a land owner suffering financial loss of his or her property.  
Bishop further points out that the Constitution is not just a source of direct constitutional 
remedies, but it also underwrites the creation and the award of indirect constitutional 
                                            
658 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36, 40-43, 81-91. 
659 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-156. 
660 Loubser et al The Law of Delict 22 where the authors explain that a litigant will have to prove that all 
five elements (harm, conduct, causation, fault and wrongfulness) of liability found in delict are present 
in order to be successful for a claim for damages.   
661 See 2 above. Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 19-
20; AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 1 CCR 
77.  
662 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 439. See for example Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC); Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); 
Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA); Zealand v Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2008 4 SA 458 (CC).  
663 See Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 398 (SCA) para 19 where the court 
stated: “An important consideration in favour of recognising delictual liability for damages on the part of 
the State in circumstances such as the present is that there is no other practical and effective remedy 
available to a victim of violent crime. Conventional remedies such as review and mandamus or interdict 
do not afford the victim of the crime any relief at all. The only effective remedy is a private law delictual 
action for damages” (my emphasis). Similarly, in Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 
2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) para 22 it was held that “there is no effective way to hold the state to account in 
the present case other than by way of an action for damages”; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC).  
664 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-154. See Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 
SA 1247 (SCA); Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v Fair Cape Property Developers (Pty) 
Ltd 2003 6 SA 13 (SCA); Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape 2007 3 BCLR 300 
(CC) where courts have refused to develop common law administrative principles to provide for 
compensation where the constitutional right to administrative justice has been infringed. 
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damages.665 Generally, indirect constitutional damages occur where the Constitution 
is used to develop the common law (or interpret a statute) in order to provide a 
damages claim where no such claim was previously recognised.666 In this regard, 
Kruger argues that the existing legal scheme regarding evictions, without more, fails 
to strike a proper balance among the rights and interests of owners, occupiers and 
society.667 He argues that this institutional failure arbitrarily deprives landowners of 
property and that to remedy this constitutional defect such owners must, as a rule, be 
afforded a compensatory remedy against the State.668 Furthermore, he states that the 
South African law on property and housing rights is incomplete, because of the 
absence of an effective right of financial redress for persons affected by the unlawful 
occupation of land in which they have rights.669 He proposes that the court must either 
declare the PIE unconstitutional to the extent that it fails to afford affected parties a 
compensatory remedy against the State for loss incurred in these types of eviction 
cases; or the courts must forge a novel constitutional remedy affording parties a right 
to claim some measure of damage from the State.670  
Accordingly, a land owner, before instituting a claim for constitutional damages, should 
consider whether it has a claim for damages arising out of delict which will adequately 
vindicate his or her property rights.671 The owner did not rely on the common law and 
neither did the Constitutional Court. However, the court in Modderklip CC nevertheless 
stated that “it could even be open to Modderklip to bring a separate delictual action 
against the State.”672 However, even if the facts showed that the land owner had been 
deprived of his right to property that did not necessarily establish a right to claim 
delictual damages.673 A further issue is whether the actions, or more accurately, 
                                            
665 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-152.  
666 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-152. See for example Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 
2001 4 SA 938 (CC).  
667 Kruger (2014) SALJ 329; Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders 350-351, 362; A Walters “A 
balancing act between owners and occupants: Is PIE unconstitutional?” (2013) De Rebus 22-25.  
668 Kruger (2014) SALJ 329.  
669 Kruger (2014) SALJ 329. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 
69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5. 
670 Kruger (2014) SALJ 329-330; 350-351, 362. 
671 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Laubser et al The law of 
delict 34-35, 39. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 17-18 and T Roux “Property” in S 
Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 12 2003) 41-1-41-37.  
672 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
60. See 4 2 below. See also in general Christmas (2005) ESR Review 6-10; Khoza (2005) ESR Review 
10-11; Van der Walt (2005) SAJHR 144-161.   
673 Minister of Police v Mboweni 2014 6 SA 356 (SCA) para 18.  
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inaction, of the State in failing to execute the eviction order constituted a wrongful act 
in relation to the land owner and the unlawful occupiers. This requires the court to 
decide whether the State had a legal duty to protect the constitutional rights of the land 
owner and the unlawful occupiers. Not every breach of constitutional duty is equivalent 
to unlawfulness in the delictual sense and therefore not every breach of a 
constitutional obligation constitutes unlawful conduct.674 It follows that where neither 
the common law nor statute provides for full adequate and effective relief to remedy a 
constitutional right infringement, a land owner may rely on a claim for direct 
constitutional damages to vindicate the rights675 in question.676 Furthermore, in the 
absence of an amendment to PIE as proposed by Kruger, it is necessary to develop a 
general framework for constitutional damages. Arguably, the establishment of a 
general framework for constitutional damages may better serve the South Africa 
constitutional dispensation by vindicating rights infringed by the State effectively and 
directly.677  
2 3 Direct constitutional damages 
 
Despite the court’s cautious approach to awards of constitutional damages in Fose, 
the court nevertheless affirmed that: 
“[T]here is no reason in principle why “appropriate relief” should not include an award 
of [direct constitutional] damages, where such an award is necessary to protect and 
enforce [the Bill of Rights]”.678 
                                            
674 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 BCLR 300 (CC) paras 37-40. In 
Steenkamp Moseneke DCJ summarised the position as follows: whether a legal duty to prevent loss 
occurring exists, calls for a value judgment embracing all the relevant facts and involving what is 
reasonable and, in view of the court, consistent with the common convictions of society. However, 
where there is a legal duty, not every breach of a constitutional or statutory duty is wrongful in the 
delictual sense for that reason alone. In addition, it must be reasonable to compensate the plaintiff i.e. 
where State action was taken in bad faith or under corrupt circumstances or completely outside the 
legitimate scope of the empowering provision.  
675 Section 25(1) and section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Currie & De 
Waal The Bill of Rights 200. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 17-18 and Roux 
“Property” in CLOSA 41-1-41-37.  
676 MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA). See also De Beer & Vettori 
(2007) PELJ 2-26 in general. 
677 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 22. See furthermore Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 
SCC; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 55-75 55-56 and Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 115. 
678 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 60. 
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Direct constitutional damages flow from the Constitution alone.679 It can be regarded 
as damages that arise from a provision or a principle in the Constitution rather than 
from the common law or a statute which protects a constitutional right.680 In this regard, 
Bishop identifies three types of direct constitutional damages which have been at least 
recognised notionally.681 Such types include: damages to compensate for loss;682 
punitive damages in addition to damages already claimed;683 and nominal or symbolic 
damages.684  
As was highlighted in Chapter 2, existing remedies, including a structural interdict, do 
not provide effective relief in all instances. It is within this context that the discussion 
of damages takes place, specifically the necessity of developing a general framework 
for direct constitutional damages in South Africa. Accordingly, the scope of the 
following discussion is restricted to direct constitutional damages so as to compensate 
for loss in the context of evictions.685 In this regard, it is postulated that the proposed 
                                            
679 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151.  
680 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-156.  
681 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-157. Interestingly, American jurisprudence has also recognised and 
distinguished between three types of damages: compensatory damages; punitive damages and 
nominal or symbolic damages. For a comparative perspective on the different types of constitutional 
damages see JC Love “Damages: A remedy for the violation of constitutional rights” (1979) 67 California 
LR 1242-1285 and JC Love “Presumed general compensatory damages in constitutional tort litigation: 
A corrective justice perspective” (1992) 49 Washington and Lee LR 67-91. 
682 See a discussion of President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 
5 SA 3 (CC) at 4 2 below. See also Christmas (2005) ESR Review 6-10; Khoza (2005) ESR Review 
10-11 and Van der Walt (2005) SAJHR 144-161.   
683 For a discussion on punitive damages see Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-160-9-161 where the 
author accurately describes Fose as creating a presumption against punitive damages; Fose v Minister 
of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 65 read with para 71 where the court rejected an award 
for punitive constitutional damages. In this regard, the majority set out twelve points of criticism against 
the use of punitive constitutional damages: (a) Punitive damages run counter to the tradition of “carefully 
calculated compensatory damages”; (b) an expanded notion of the type of damages available for 
individual damages can achieve the same goal without shifting the focus from the individual; (c) there 
is no empirical evidence that punitive damages have any deterrent effect; (d) even if punitive damages 
can lead to systemic change, other relief can achieve the same goal faster; (e) punitive damages are 
too forward looking, detracting from the wrong actually suffered by the claimant; (f) it provides an 
unjustifiable windfall; (g) funds can be better spent on directly improving the problems; (h) there is no 
warrant for punitive damages where the problem cannot be solved by deterrence; (i) the symbolic 
importance of the right can be demonstrated just as well through non-pecuniary relief; (j) punitive 
damages are inappropriate in class actions; (k) they exact punishment without the safeguards of the 
criminal process; and (l) such awards against the State will ultimately be borne by the taxpayers. 
However, the majority made it clear that this decision was limited to the facts of the specific case, which 
left the door open for the possibility of punitive damages in future matters. See also AK Funnah & O 
Sibanda “Towards a selective awarding of punitive damages awards in South Africa? A comment on 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security” (2008) 48 Codicillus 36-49. See Love (1979) California LR 1247, 
1274-1282 for an American jurisprudence perspective on punitive constitutional damages. 
684 For a discussion on nominal or symbolic damages see Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-162.  
685 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 439-442. In this regard, Liebenberg states that constitutional 
damages have been awarded in the context of evictions in order to reconcile the protection of property 
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development of a general framework for awarding direct constitutional damages may 
potentially increase the use thereof by the South African courts and consequently 
remedy constitutional rights infringements and deter future infringements.  
3 A general framework for direct constitutional damages 
3 1 Introduction  
 
Section 38 of the Constitution provides that a court may grant appropriate relief where 
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened. In this regard, appropriate 
relief may include an award for constitutional damages.686  
The court in Fose stated in this regard that:  
“[Constitutional damages] are made to compensate persons who have suffered 
loss…When it would be necessary to do so, and what the measure of damages should 
be will depend on the circumstances of each case and the particular right which has 
been infringed” (my emphasis).687 
Although courts have recognised that constitutional damages may be an appropriate 
remedy to vindicate rights effectively,688 such cases are uncommon and it seems that 
the appropriateness of constitutional damages will only arise where no alternative 
remedy is available. The rare use of direct constitutional damages689 indicates that the 
doctrine of constitutional damages remains vague in South African law. Accordingly, 
a general framework for constitutional damages should be developed in order to 
maximise the use of constitutional damages as an effective remedy for the violation of 
constitutional rights.690  
 
                                            
and housing rights. See a discussion of President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) at 4 2 below.  
686 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 60; Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 
2 SCR 28 (SCC). 
687 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 60. 
688 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 60.  
689 MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) and President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). These are the only two 
cases to date, where constitutional damages were awarded.  
690 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 22.  
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In this regard, Barns states that:  
“The establishment of a general framework for constitutional damages will better serve 
the South African constitutional dispensation by vindicating the rights infringed by the 
State effectively and directly…A defined doctrine of constitutional damages will provide 
a step forward in realising the constitutional vision of SA by ensuring the state plays 
the role the constitution evinced”.691 
3 2 Exploration of the Canadian approach to direct constitutional damages 
 
While a development of a framework for direct constitutional damages is necessary in 
general, it may prove particularly valuable within the eviction context. That is the case 
as more conventional remedies, like a structural interdict, may not provide effective 
relief in all instances. As mentioned above, because a framework is lacking in South 
Africa, it is prudent to explore other jurisdictions for insight and guidance. In the 
absence of an in-depth legal comparative study, a possible framework that may 
provide such guidance is that of the Canadian Charter damages, as developed by way 
of case law.  
Similar to section 38 of the Constitution, section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”) provides that “[a]nyone whose rights or 
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to 
a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances”. Furthermore, the differences between the 
Canadian law of tort and the South African law of delict, will not affect the usefulness 
of the comparison, because the framework can be developed or adopted to suit the 
South African remedial process specifically.692  
In Vancouver (City) v Ward (“Ward”),693 a local attorney was wrongfully arrested for 
the breach of peace during a ceremony in Vancouver and taken into custody.694 While 
in custody of the police he was subjected to a strip search. His car was also impounded 
for the purposes of a search, pending the obtainment of a warrant. Accordingly, the 
                                            
691 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 22.  
692 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 21-22.   
693 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 40. See also Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 55-75 55-56; Hunt (2011) 
Cambridge Student LR 115. 
694 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2007 BCSC 3; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 115. 
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plaintiff sued the police for violating his right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure, guaranteed by sections 8 and 9 of the Charter. Notwithstanding the absence 
of bad faith by the police, the court a quo found that the rights of the plaintiff were 
indeed violated and awarded constitutional damages.695  
The Supreme Court had to determine when it would be appropriate to award direct 
constitutional damages as a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter.696 
Consequently, the court in Ward laid down a four step approach to determine when 
constitutional damages may be awarded.697 However, the court also warned that 
granting direct constitutional damages is a new endeavour and “an approach to when 
[direct constitutional] damages are appropriate and just should develop 
incrementally.”698  This approach could serve as an example of how South Africa could 
establish a framework for constitutional damages for State liability under section 38 of 
the Constitution.699 Each of these steps are apposite to South African law and will 
accordingly be discussed.700  
Firstly, the court has to determine whether there has been a breach of one or more of 
the fundamental rights listed in the Charter.701 In this regard, the plaintiff must prove 
that one or more of their Charter rights were breached by the State.702 In South African 
law it would be articulated as whether the State has breached one or more of the 
plaintiff’s rights contained in the Bill of Rights.703 Although there are similar rights in 
the Charter to those listed in the Bill of Rights704 the Charter does not expressly protect 
property rights as a fundamental right, similar to section 25 of the South African  
Constitution. However, this should not impede the South African courts from following 
                                            
695 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2007 BCSC 3 which was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Vancouver (City) 
v Ward 2009 BCCA 23; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student Law Review 115. 
696 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) paras 1 and 3; Okpaluba (2012) 55 Stell LR 64.   
697 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) paras 4, 15 and 74; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student 
LR 115-116.  
698 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 21.  
699 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 17.  
700 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 17. 
701 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 23; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 115. 
In this regard, it was found that the plaintiff’s rights under sections 8 and 9, which are similar to section 
35 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, were violated.  
702 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 (SCC) 27 paras 50-53 and 61, Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 66. 
703 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 17-18. 
704 Compare section 9 of the Constitution with section 15 of the Charter; sections 11 and 12 of the 
Constitution with section  7 of the Charter; sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Constitution with section 2 of 
the Charter; section 19 of the Constitution with section 3 of the Charter; sections 20 and 21 of the 
Constitution with section 6 of the Charter; sections 34 and 38 of the Constitution with section 24 of the 
Charter; section 35 of the Constitution with sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Charter. 
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the four step approach to determine when constitutional damages may be awarded.705 
Accordingly, in the context of evictions, the land owner would have to prove that his or 
her section 25706 and/or section 34 enshrined rights have been infringed due to State 
non-compliance.707 
Secondly, the damages sought must serve a useful function or purpose – the damages 
must be “functionally justified”.708 This entails either promoting the general objects of 
the Charter by remedying the personal loss caused by the rights violation; the 
vindication of Charter rights to affirm constitutional values; and/or deterring future 
violations by the State.709 Essentially, these steps require that it must be proved that 
constitutional damages will be “appropriate and just”.710 According to Fose awarding 
constitutional damages for the breach of a constitutional right will primarily depend on 
the circumstances of each case.711 However, whether relief in the form of constitutional 
damages is appropriate in a particular case must necessarily be determined 
casuistically with due regard to, amongst other things, the nature and relative 
importance of the rights that are in issue, the alternative remedies that might be 
available to assert and vindicate them, and the consequences of the breach for the 
claimant concerned.712 Furthermore, in assessing the appropriateness of 
constitutional damages the court must conduct a context-sensitive analysis.713 
Therefore, courts generally have to consider the particular facts of the case having 
regard to the following factors: the nature and relative importance of the rights, the 
position of the applicant and others similarly placed,714 the availability of alternative 
remedies and whether constitutional damages will constitute the most effective means 
                                            
705 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 17. 
706 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA). See also A Christmas “Property rights of land owners v 
socio-economic rights of occupiers: case review” (2004) 5 ESR Review 11-13; Van der Walt (2005) 
SAJHR 144-161.    
707 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) where 
it was held that section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 was infringed.    
708 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) paras 24-31 where the court held that direct 
constitutional damages will be functionally justified if it promotes the objects of the Charter. See also 
Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 115-116; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 68. This is known as the 
“functional justification of damages”. 
709 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 18; Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 (SCC) 27 paras 41-44.  
710 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 44; A Linden “Charter Damages Claims: New 
Dawn or Mirage” (2012) Advocates’ QR 431-432. 
711 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 60. 
712 Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 25.  
713 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 446.  
714 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
45.  
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of securing State compliance with its constitutional obligations and the consequences 
of the infringement in question.715  Other case-specific factors may also be considered 
in determining whether it will be appropriate to grant constitutional damages.716 If the 
plaintiff is successful in proving that there was a breach of his or her constitutionally 
enshrined rights and that it would be appropriate to award constitutional damages, 
then a prima facie case is established against the State.717 
Thirdly, the State then has the opportunity to refute the prima facie case.718 The State 
must show that there are countervailing factors that indicate that constitutional 
damages are inappropriate.719 The court in Ward only established two considerations 
in this regard. These are the existence of alternative remedies720 and “concerns for 
good governance”.721 The first consideration is where the State can prove that there 
is an alternative remedy which serves the same function as constitutional damages.722 
In this regard, the court held that the mere existence of a potential tort claim does not 
bar a claimant from obtaining direct constitutional damages.723 However, where the 
State can show that a tort claim would result in an award of damages that adequately 
addresses the Charter breach, then the claimant will not be able to claim direct 
constitutional damages.724 Similarly, no separate award for direct constitutional 
damages will be made by the South African courts where there is a delictual or 
statutory mechanism for the claimant to receive compensation for a rights violation.725  
While this consideration seeks to avoid double compensation, it must still be clear that 
the proposed alternative remedy provides effective relief.726 This step is in line with the 
approach followed in Fose.727 As mentioned above, the second consideration is “good 
                                            
715 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 25. These factors are discussed 
below in order to establish whether constitutional damages constituted an appropriate and effective 
remedy in President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC).  
716 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 25. 
717 Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 70; (2012) Advocates’ QR 432. 
718 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) paras 31-43; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 
115; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 70; Linden (2012) Advocates’ QR 432. 
719 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 33; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 116; 
Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 70.  
720 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 35; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 116.   
721 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 33; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 117.  
722 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 33; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 70. 
723 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 35.  
724 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 35. Similarly, the court in Fose v Minister of 
Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 67.  
725 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 67. 
726 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) paras 35-36, 44-46; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 70. 
727 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69 where the court stated that “an 
appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy”. 
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governance”.728 An award for constitutional damages inevitably has an impact on the 
financial resources of the State. However, the argument that an award for 
constitutional damages will effectively impede the day-to-day administration and 
functions of the State, cannot be raised as the only ground to avoid liability.729 Instead, 
an award of constitutional damages against the State arguably has the potential to 
promote good governance, because it improves or ensures compliance with 
constitutional obligations and court orders.   
Although only two considerations were mentioned in Ward, the court recognised that 
the law in this regard must be left open for further development.730 Where the State’s 
failure in the South African context occurs in circumstances that offer no effective 
remedy other than an action for constitutional damages, the norm of accountability will 
ordinarily demand the recognition of a legal duty unless there are other considerations 
affecting the public interest that outweigh that norm.731 In South Africa, constitutional 
damages accordingly test whether the State has lived up to the requirements of 
section 7 of the Constitution, or the norm of accountability.732 Countervailing factors, 
that could possibly outweigh the legal and constitutional duties imposed on the State, 
are likely to be raised if this framework were applied in South Africa.733 Such restraints 
may include limited capacities and available resources.  However, the South African 
Constitutional Court held that it is the role of the court to require that the State take 
measures to meet its constitutional obligations.734 Even simple declaratory orders 
against the State may have budgetary implications for the State.735 However, the State 
is constitutionally bound to give effect to such orders and it has to find the resources 
to do so.736  
                                            
728 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 38; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 70.  
729 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) paras 44-46; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 70. 
730 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 44; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 70. 
731 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) para 21.  
732 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) para 21. 
733 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 19; McIntosh v Premiere, Kwa-Zulu Natal 2008 6 SA 1 (SCA) is 
indicative of this where the municipality sought to avoid being held accountable. The State argued that, 
having regard to its resource restraints, it did not act unreasonably or negligently. 
734 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 38.  
735 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 99. 
736 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 99. 
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Finally, if it is found that constitutional damages are appropriate, all that is left to 
determine is the quantum of damages.737 The quantum needs to be determined with 
due regard to the circumstances of the case.738 The court should consider the 
seriousness of the violation; the impact thereof on the claimant and the seriousness 
of the State’s misconduct, when determining the quantum for direct constitutional 
damages.739 According to the Canadian court, the quantum of damages must also be 
fair to both the claimant and the State.740 In this regard, the court held that: 
“[T]he court may take into account the public interest in good governance, the danger 
of deterring governments from undertaking beneficial new policies and programs, and 
the need to avoid diverting large sums of funds from public programs to private 
interests”.741  
The Canadian court’s insistence that awards for direct constitutional damages must 
be fair to both the claimant and the defendant and that the courts should consider 
issues of the State’s budget is worrisome, in principle.742 Effectively, special exception 
is made where the State is the defendant “whereby [direct constitutional] damages 
awarded against the [S]tate may be assessed at a lower tariff than those against 
private defendants in similar circumstances”.743 Accordingly, State officials and private 
defendants should not be treated differently by the courts, in relation to the amount of 
compensation payable to the claimant.744 
The quantification of direct constitutional damages may be difficult to determine, given 
the particular circumstances of the case. However, in light of the specific and unique 
circumstances of each eviction case, the court should arguably be given a wide 
                                            
737 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) paras 45-57, specifically para 55; Hunt (2011) 
Cambridge Student LR 115-116; Okpaluba (2012) Stell LR 72.  
738 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) paras 48, 51-53; Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student 
LR 117-118. See Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) and President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) where the quantification 
of damages was determined with regard to the specific facts of the case. Quantification of damages for 
rights violations is a complex area of law and falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
739 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 52.  
740 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 54.  
741 Vancouver (City) v Ward 2010 2 SCR 28 (SCC) para 53.  
742 Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 119.  
743 Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 119. 
744 Hunt (2011) Cambridge Student LR 119. This may amount to an a contravention of section 9(1) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 which states that everyone is equal before the 
law.  
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discretion in relation to the quantification of damages in cases where the State has 
failed to execute an eviction order.   
Ultimately, the framework proposed in Ward can serve as a general guide to the South 
African courts to determine whether it is appropriate to award direct constitutional 
damages. As such a framework is not extant at the moment, the case law available is 
analysed with reference to the general framework established in Ward instead.  
4 The use of direct constitutional damages in South African eviction case law 
4 1 Introduction  
 
Thus far, in the context of evictions, there have only been two cases where the court 
had to determine whether constitutional damages would constitute appropriate and 
effective relief.745 However, the Constitutional Court has only awarded direct 
constitutional damages in one, very unusual case,746 as a remedy to vindicate the land 
owner’s right to property in eviction cases: President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (“Modderklip CC”).747 Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
determine whether an award for damages was appropriate and whether it provided 
effective relief. Thereafter a discussion of Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v The 
Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue (“Blue Moonlight”)748 follows to illustrate when 
constitutional damages would not constitute appropriate relief.  
The determination of whether it was appropriate to award constitutional damages in 
the abovementioned cases will be discussed with reference to the general framework 
for direct constitutional damages set out in Ward, as elaborated on above.  
  
                                            
745 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) and 
Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W).   
746 JM Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 772.  
747 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See also Christmas (2005) ESR Review 6-10; Khoza (2005) ESR Review 10-11; 
Van der Walt (2005) 21 SAJHR 144-161.   
748 2009 1 SA 470 (W).  
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4 2 President of Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
4 2 1 Background and facts of the case 
 
The background and facts of the “Modderklip case scenario”749 were discussed 
above.750 In short, the High Court found that the failure to execute the eviction order 
resulted in an infringement of the land owner’s right to property.751 The court also held 
that the State had not complied with its constitutional responsibilities.752 Consequently, 
the High Court issued a structural interdict requiring the State to indicate which steps 
it proposed to take to execute the eviction order granted.753 However, the State 
appealed against the order of the High Court. 
Essentially, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Modder East Squatters v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 
(“Modderklip SCA”)754 confirmed the order of the High Court, emphasising that the 
owner’s property rights had been infringed and similarly, that the State had breached 
its section 26(1) and (2) obligations.755 The court emphasised that it had a duty to 
mould appropriate orders that would provide effective relief to those affected by a 
constitutional breach.756  
 
                                            
749 Pienaar Land Reform 772; Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters 2001 4 SA 385 
(W); Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T); Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa 
v Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC).  
750 See Chapter 2 at 4 2 2.  
751 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T). See also Christmas (2003) ESR Review 4-7. 
752 Section 26(1) and (2) read with section 25(5) of the Constitution, 1996; Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) 
Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 (T) paras 46, 52; Pienaar Land 
Reform 772. See also J van Wyk “The relationship (or not) between the rights of access to land and 
housing: de-linking land from its components” (2005) 16 Stell LR 466-487.  
753 Modderklip Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v President van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 2003 1 All SA 465 
(T). See Chapter 2 above at 4 2 3.  
754 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA). See also Christmas (2004) ESR Review 11-13; Van der Walt (2005) 21 
SAJHR 144-161.   
755 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 52; Pienaar Land Reform 772. 
756 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 44 citing Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 
1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 94 and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 
721 (CC) para 102. 
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In this regard, the court reasoned that: 
“[E]ffective relief…will obviously differ from case to case…[and that] constitutional 
remedies will differ by circumstance. The only appropriate [and effective] relief that, in 
the particular circumstances of the case, would appear to be justified is that of [direct] 
‘constitutional damages’ i.e. damages due to the breach of a constitutionally 
entrenched right. No other remedy is apparent. Return of the land is not feasible. There 
is in any event no indication that the land, which was being used for cultivating hay, 
was otherwise occupied by the lessees or inhabited by anyone else. Ordering the State 
to pay damages to [the land owner] has the advantage that the…[unlawful] occupiers 
can remain where they are while [the land owner] will be recompensed for that which 
it has lost and the State has gained by not having to provide alternative land…[and] 
Modderklip will not receive more that what it has lost…”.757  
Accordingly, the court ordered that constitutional damages be paid to the landowner 
to compensate him for what he had lost and what the State had gained by not having 
to provide alternative land for settlement.758 However, once more the State appealed 
to the Constitutional Court against the abovementioned order.  
4 2 2 The judgment and order of the court  
 
In Modderklip CC the State averred that the land owner’s right to property and the 
occupier’s rights to have access to adequate housing had not been breached.759 In 
this regard, the Constitutional Court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether 
the land owner’s right to property and the rights of the unlawful occupiers had been 
breached.760 Instead, it decided that the basis for granting constitutional damages 
rested upon an infringement of section 34 of the Constitution and the rule of law.761  
The Constitutional Court reasoned as follow. As a point of departure, the court referred 
to section 1(c) of the Constitution which enshrines the supremacy of the Constitution 
                                            
757 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 43. 
758 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 52. 
759 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
22. 
760 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
26.  
761 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 
48, 51 read with para 68.  
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and the rule of law.762 These values are foundational to the constitutional order. The 
obligation of the State to provide the necessary mechanisms for citizens to resolve 
disputes that arise between them flows from the rule of law.763 The court held that this 
obligation has its corollary in the right or entitlement of every person to have access 
to the courts.764 The court furthermore held that the State “holds the key”765  to 
executing the eviction order and that there is no possibility that the eviction order will 
be executed without effective participation by the State. The State is not only obligated 
to provide necessary mechanisms for citizens to resolve their disputes, but it is also 
obliged to take reasonable steps, where possible, to ensure that large-scale 
disruptions in the social fabric do not occur in the wake of the execution of court 
orders.766 Failure to take such reasonable steps will undermine the rule of law.767  
Returning to the facts of the case, the court held that the land owner’s position, as a 
victim of unlawful occupation of its property on a large scale, was aggravated by the 
failure to execute the eviction order within a reasonable time.768 The failure by the 
State to act in an appropriate manner in the circumstances means that the land owner, 
and others similarly placed, will not be able to rely on the State and its organs to protect 
them from invasions of their property.769 Accordingly, court orders must be executed 
in a manner that prevents social upheaval.770 The purpose of the rule of law would 
otherwise be subverted by the very execution process that ought to be upheld by it.771  
                                            
762 Section 1(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
763 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
39. 
764 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 
24, 41 read with sections 34 and 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
765 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
42.  
766 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
43. 
767 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
43.  
768 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
44. 
769 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
45. 
770President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 46. 
771 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
46. 
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However, the court rightly held that the circumstances of the “Modderklip case 
scenario”772 were so extraordinary that it was not possible to rely on the mechanism 
that would normally be employed to execute eviction orders.773 That being said, the 
court found that it was unreasonable of the State to stand by and do nothing in 
circumstances where it was impossible for the land owner to evict the unlawful 
occupiers because of the magnitude of the invasion of the particular circumstances of 
the occupiers.774 The State was nevertheless required to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the land owner was provided with effective relief.775 The court suggested 
in this regard that the State could have either expropriated the property or provided 
other land.776 Either one of these options available to the State would have alleviated 
the continuing burden on the land owner to provide the unlawful occupiers with 
accommodation.777 Consequently, the State’s failure to take any form of steps to assist 
the land owner, resulted in a breach of the land owner’s constitutional right to an 
effective remedy as required by the rule of law and entrenched in section 34 of the 
Constitution.778   
The court, in finding a corresponding appropriate remedy, held that an “appropriate 
remedy must necessarily be effective”.779 Langa ACJ specifically referred to the 
findings in Fose that sometimes constitutional damages would be the only appropriate 
                                            
772 Pienaar Land Reform 772; Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters 2001 4 SA 385 
(W); Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters 2003 6 BCLR 638 (T); Modder East 
Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). 
773 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
47. 
774 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
48. 
775 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
51; section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
776 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
51. 
777 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
51. 
778 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
51.  
779 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
58. 
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relief780 and stated that the need for an effective remedy in casu supported an award 
of constitutional damages.781  
The advantages of granting constitutional damages as an appropriate remedy, given 
the extraordinary circumstances of the case, are threefold. Firstly, it compensates the 
land owner for the unlawful occupation and deprivation of his property. On the facts of 
the case it is clear that the land owner was effectively deprived of his right to use and 
enjoy his property on a permanent or indefinite basis. In other words, the severity and 
extent of the deprivation justified the award of constitutional damages. Secondly, it 
ensures that the unlawful occupiers will continue to have accommodation until suitable 
alternatives are found. Lastly, it relieves the State of the urgent task of having to find 
such alternatives.782 Accordingly, the court held that the remedy of constitutional 
damages constituted the most effective and expeditious way of vindicating the rights 
of both the land owner and the unlawful occupiers in the circumstances.  
4 2 3 Evaluation of the order granted 
4 2 3 1 Was it appropriate to award constitutional damages? 
 
The general framework laid down in Ward, can be used as guide to determine whether 
it was appropriate to award direct constitutional damages in Modderklip CC. The four 
step approach, coupled with the listed factors in Kate,783 will accordingly be utilised to 
determine whether it was appropriate for the Constitutional Court to award direct 
constitutional damages.  
4 2 3 1 1 Step one: Was there a breach of constitutional rights? 
 
The first step of the approach in Ward requires that the plaintiff must prove that one or 
more of his constitutional rights have been breached. In this regard, the land owner 
must prove that his property rights have been violated. This furthermore requires a 
determination of the nature of the relevant rights impacted on.  
                                            
780 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
58. 
781 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) 2005 5 
SA 3 (CC) para 58. 
782 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
59.  
783 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 25. 
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The courts have emphasised the importance of the right to property and the right not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of property enshrined in section 25 of the Constitution.784 
However, property rights are not absolute in nature.785 Therefore, certain unavoidable 
and burdensome limits may be placed on a land owner’s right to use and enjoy his 
property. Although the landowner cannot be expected to be burdened with providing 
accommodation to the unlawful occupiers indefinitely, “a [reasonable] degree of 
patience should be expected”786 pending the fulfilment of the State’s obligation to 
provide alternative accommodation. In other words, landowners must have a 
reasonable degree of patience pending the execution of an eviction order.787 However, 
it is not expected, nor required that landowners provide land and housing indefinitely 
without compensation.788  
It is not only the land owner’s rights that have to be taken into account in determining 
whether an award for constitutional damages is appropriate. The Constitution affords 
unlawful occupiers a right of access to housing and the right not to be evicted without 
a court order.789 The conflicting rights of the land owner and the unlawful occupiers 
must accordingly be considered with reference to the circumstances of the case and 
be weighed against each other in order to find an equitable outcome for both parties. 
It was clear from the facts in Modderklip CC, that the land owner was effectively 
deprived of his right to use and enjoy his property on a permanent or indefinite basis. 
                                            
784 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) 
paras 93-94; L Chenwi “Government’s obligation to unlawful occupiers and private landowners” (2010) 
11 ESR Review 10. See furthermore Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 17-18 and Roux 
“Property” in CLOSA 41-1-41-37.   
785 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 2 ed (RS 1 2014) para 153-
156; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) para 106; 
Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-71; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit 
landowners’ right to exclude LLD Stellenbosch University (2015) 89-100; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 311-316.   
786 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 
45 and 50-51; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 2012 2 
SA 104 (CC) para 100.  
787 Kruger (2014) SALJ 329. 
788 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) 
para 97. 
789 Sections 26(1) and (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, read with Prevention 
of Illegal from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998; President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 54. See in general Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-
351; G Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the Eviction Squatters in South African 
Law LLD Stellenbosch University (2011) 75-82; K McLean “Housing” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 3 2007) 55-8-55-14.  
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Moreover, the unlawful occupiers had built homes and established themselves as a 
community on the property of Modderklip over a long period of time.790 The unlawful 
occupiers furthermore had no other option but to remain on the Modderklip property.  
Having regard to all the facts and circumstances it would seem as if there was indeed 
a breach of rights.  
4 2 3 1 2 Step two: Will the damages sought serve a “useful function or purpose”? 
 
Essentially, this step requires that it must be proved that an award for direct 
constitutional damages will be appropriate and just. Importantly, the onus rests on the 
plaintiff (the land owner) who will have to provide reasons why it would be appropriate 
to award direct constitutional damages. In this regard, the listed factors in Kate, as well 
as the circumstances of the case, will enable a court to determine whether the 
damages sought will be appropriate. These factors include: the nature of the relevant 
rights impacted on, the consequences of the infringement and the availability of 
alternative remedies. 791 
The first factor listed in Kate, the nature of the relevant rights impacted on, has already 
been discussed in step one above and is therefore not repeated here again.  
Concerning the second factor, the consequences of the infringement, the land owner 
is dispossessed of most (if not all) of the rights of use, benefit and exploitation, where 
the land continues to be occupied following a failure to execute an eviction order 
already obtained. Given the long history of the case and the State’s continuous failure 
to execute the eviction order,792 the unlawful occupation of the land in effect amounted 
to an indefinite and permanent deprivation of property.793 The courts have noted that 
the State’s obligation under section 26(2) to adopt reasonable measures did not 
envisage laws that would indefinitely require the private land owner to be deprived of 
his or her rights altogether.794 An indefinite deprivation of the rights of the land owner 
                                            
790 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
54. 
791 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 25.  
792 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters 2001 4 SA 385 (W). 
793 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
51; J Strydom & S Viljoen (Maass) “Unlawful occupation of inner-city buildings: A constitutional analysis 
of the rights and obligations involved” (2014) 17 PELJ 1230 and 1234. 
794 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) 
paras 98, 127.  
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not only constitutes a contravention of section 25(1) of the Constitution,795 but may 
also amount to an expropriation of the land owner’s property, where the land or 
property is used to serve a public purpose or interest.796  
Although alternative remedies were available, the history of the case illustrates that all 
other remedies were already exhausted by the time the case reached the 
Constitutional Court. The High Court initially issued a structural interdict which proved 
to be ineffective.797 One remedy had already failed and there was no indication 
retrospectively, that the State would be willing to implement the structural interdict. 
Yet, the land owners’ as well as the unlawful occupiers’ rights remained unvindicated, 
thereby warranting further relief.  
There are also certain case-specific circumstances that indicate that the most 
appropriate remedy in Modderklip CC was indeed constitutional damages. Firstly, it 
had become practically impossible to enforce the eviction order and structural interdict 
granted in the High Court, due to the large number of unlawful occupiers occupying 
the land.798 This necessitated using alternative relief, such as constitutional damages, 
to vindicate the land owner’s right to property. Secondly, the action taken by the land 
owner was reasonable and lawful. Despite taking all reasonable steps expeditiously 
to vindicate his rights and interests, the land owner still experienced a burdensome 
land invasion of indefinite duration. It follows that the large number of people 
occupying a private owner’s land; the impracticality of implementing other remedies 
and the steps already taken by the land owner may be indicative of whether 
constitutional damages may be regarded as appropriate relief.  
A prima facie case against the State is established once the plaintiff has proved that 
there has been a breach of his or her constitutional rights and has shown why it would 
be appropriate and just to award direct constitutional damages. 
                                            
795 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
51; Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W) 
para 194; Chenwi (2010) ESR Review 10.  
796 Section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 51.  
797 See Chapter 2 at 4 2 3 and 4 2 4 above in this regard.  
798 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-72; Pienaar Land Reform 774.  
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4 2 3 1 3 Step three: Are there any countervailing factors? 
 
At this point, the State will have the opportunity to refute the prima facie case, by 
showing that there are countervailing factors that indicate that direct constitutional 
damages are inappropriate. In this regard, the State may refute the absence of the 
availability of alternative remedies or show that an award for direct constitutional 
damages will be inappropriate, due to resource and/or capacity restraints. Although 
the State suggested that a declaratory order would have been sufficient to vindicate 
the land owner’s rights, the court found that something more effective than the 
suggested clarification of rights was needed.799 The State did not present any other 
countervailing factors to this effect.  
Accordingly, the court found that it would be appropriate to award constitutional 
damages. All that was left to determine was the quantum of the damages.  
4 2 3 1 4 Step four: The determination of the quantum 
 
If the court finds that it will be appropriate to award constitutional damages, then the 
quantum of damages needs to be determined. Although there is no set formula for the 
determination of the quantum for constitutional damages, it is clear that is has to be 
determined with due regard to the specific circumstances of the case. 800   
Although expropriation was raised as an option during argument, the court held that it 
did not have the power to grant such an order.801 Ordering the State to expropriate the 
land from the owner would result in the court ordering the State not only to fulfil its 
obligations but also instructing the State how to do so. This would be in breach of the 
doctrine of separation of powers.802  
                                            
799 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
60.  
800 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 
56-58 where the court refers to Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19. 
801 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 
41 and 61-62. See also Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1207-1261 1228. 
802 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 
61-62. Section 2 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 reserves the decision to expropriate for the Minister 
of Public Works; and the New Expropriation Bill B4D-2015 in GN 63 GG 38418 of 26-01-2015. 
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The court held that the measure of damages will depend on the circumstances of each 
case, as well as the particular right which was infringed.803 Accordingly, the court in 
Modderklip CC, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, found that the 
difficulty of quantifying the compensation can be met by resorting to the mechanism 
provided for in section 12 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (“Expropriation Act”). 
Therefore, the court ordered that the compensation must be calculated in terms of the 
Expropriation Act. Although the courts do not have the power to order the expropriation 
of private or State property, the courts can indirectly compel the State to consider the 
possibility of expropriation when it orders the payment of constitutional damages.804 
Arguably, the court, by awarding compensation on the basis of a fair market value as 
envisaged by section 12 of the Expropriation Act, indirectly set out to achieve a 
purchase of the land in question by the State.805  
  
                                            
803 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 
56-58 where the court refers to Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 19. 
804 Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders 351-352. 
805 Once the the New Expropriation Bill B4D-2015 in GN 63 GG 38418 of 26-01-2015 is signed into law 
compensation for an expropriation of property will be determined in accordance with section 12 of the 
Bill. Section 12(1) of the Bill provides that “[t]he amount of compensation to be paid to an expropriated 
owner or expropriated holder must be just and equitable reflecting an equitable balance between the 
public interest and the interests of the expropriated owner or expropriated holder, having regard to all 
relevant circumstances, including [but not limited to] (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history 
of the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct 
State investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and 
(e) the purpose of the expropriation”. These listed factors for the determination of compensation for an 
expropriation are in line with and identical to those factors listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Furthermore section 12(2) of the Bill provides that “the expropriating 
authority must not, unless there are special circumstances in which it would be just and equitable to do 
so, take account of - (a) the fact that the property has been taken without the consent of the expropriated 
owner or expropriated holder; (b) the special suitability or usefulness of the property for the purpose for 
which it is required by the expropriating authority, if it is unlikely that the property would have been 
purchased for that purpose in the open market; (c) any enhancement in the value of the property, if 
such enhancement is a consequence of the use of the property in a manner which is unlawful; (d) 
improvements made to the property in question after the date on which the notice of expropriation was 
served upon the expropriated owner and expropriated holder, as the case may be, except where the 
improvements were in advance agreed to by the expropriating authority or where they were undertaken 
in pursuance of obligations entered into before the date of expropriation; (e) anything done with the 
object of obtaining compensation therefor; and (f) any enhancement or depreciation, before or after the 
date of service of the notice of expropriation, in the value of the property in question, which can be 
directly attributed to the purpose in connection with which the property was expropriated.” 
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4 2 3 2 Did constitutional damages provide effective relief? 
 
In order to determine whether constitutional damages provided effective relief in casu, 
it is necessary to assert whether the rights of the respective parties were realised.  
Given the long history of the case, the Constitutional Court found that constitutional 
damages would be the most effective and expeditious way of vindicating the rights of 
the land owner and the unlawful occupiers simultaneously.806 The land owner was 
compensated by the State for having to bear the ongoing and indefinite burden of the 
unlawful occupiers of his property.807  
The order entitling the residents to remain on the land until alternative land was made 
available to them ensured that their housing rights were protected.808 Effectively, the 
order also ensured the fulfilment of the State’s constitutional obligations.809 Viljoen 
remarks that the advantage of this order was that the court circumvented “the eviction 
and allocation of land issue, which solved the immediate access to land problem…”.810 
Accordingly, the rights of the respective parties were realised prima facie.   
However, upon further evaluation, it would appear as if the Constitutional Court 
sanctioned the continued unlawful occupation of land which, according to Viljoen, most 
likely amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of property.811 Viljoen furthermore remarks 
that the State’s constitutional obligation to  provide access to adequate housing was 
ignored by the court, because the court did not place a positive duty on the State to 
provide services or devise legally secure tenure to the unlawful occupiers.812 The 
                                            
806 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) para 58; Pienaar Land Reform 
773; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 441. 
807 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
48. 
808 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
68. 
809 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 
59.  
810 S Viljoen “The systemic violation of section 26(1): An appeal for structural relief by the judiciary” 
(2015) 30 SAPL 42-70 46; JM Pienaar “Land reform and housing: Reaching for the rafters or struggling 
with foundations?” (2015) 30 SAPL 1-25 7-8. See also First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) which established the test for determining whether 
a deprivation amounts to a procedurally and/or substantively arbitrary deprivation. See in general Van 
der Walt Constitutional Property Law 190-333 where he comprehensively discusses the definition of an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. See also Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-28; Strydom & Viljoen 
(Maass) (2014) PELJ 1207 1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235 
811 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 46; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1234. 
812 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 46-47; Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8.  
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unlawful occupation of Modderklip’s property is regarded as “incongruent with legally 
secure tenure and therefore unacceptable”813 and courts cannot be allowed to support 
such a position.   
Furthermore, constitutional damages are paid out of state funds comprised out of the 
taxpayer’s money. Accordingly, while it may be the State who is held accountable by 
the court, it is the taxpayer who effectively pays the bill and rights the constitutional 
infringement.814 Therefore, it can be argued that the State effectively escapes and 
delegates its liability onto the taxpayer, without addressing the real problem – the 
provision of tenure security and adequate housing as envisaged by the Constitution.815 
Moreover, state funds can be otherwise utilised more effectively to cater for the 
provision of land and adequate housing.  In this regard, it would seem as if the money 
used to compensate one person, can be used more efficiently to accommodate the 
poor.  
Therefore, at first glance, it may seem as if the outcome in Modderklip CC realised the 
rights of both the land owner and the unlawful occupiers. However, the outcome did 
not guarantee long term secure tenure for the unlawful occupiers.816 Therefore, upon 
further evaluation of the order given in Modderklip CC, it cannot be said that the 
unlawful occupiers’ rights to land and adequate housing were effectively realised,817 
because their tenure remains illegal and uncertain.818 In this regard, Strydom and 
Viljoen argue that the expropriation of the property for housing purposes would have 
constituted a more suitable remedy in the circumstances.819 An expropriation would 
have enabled the State to acquire the land and provide permanent land and adequate 
housing to the unlawful occupiers which in turn, would have provided for greater tenure 
security and certainty.820 Furthermore, it is evident from Modderklip CC that some 
State expenditure would have been inevitable, regardless of whether an eviction order 
was executed or not. If the eviction order that was granted in Modderklip HC was 
executed, State expenditure would have been required to relocate and provide 
                                            
813 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 69-70.  
814 Batchelor Constitutional Damages for the Infringement of a Social Assistance Right in South Africa 
128.  
815 Sections 25(6) and 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
816 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 69-70; Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8.  
817 Sections 25(5) and 26(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 respectively.  
818 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 69-70; Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8.  
819 Strydom and Viljoen (2014) PELJ 1234; Viljoen (2015) SAPL 67. 
820 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 67. 
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alternative accommodation to the evictees in due course.821 However, if the court had 
declined to order an eviction order, the State could have expropriated the property 
which would require the State to pay compensation to the land owner for the 
continuous and unlawful occupation of his land in terms of the Expropriation Act.  
In light of monetary considerations, it may also be beneficial to consider whether 
German equalisation measures, known as Ausgleich, would have constituted a more 
suitable and effective remedy in Modderklip CC. In this regard, Van der Walt explains 
that the constitutional damages order in Modderklip CC can be compared to 
Ausgleich.822 However, these equalisation measures are neither compensation orders 
for the expropriation of property, nor are they delictual damages. Instead, Ausgleich 
can be regarded as a payment of money to lessen the disproportionate burden 
imposed by legislation on ownership rights.823 Essentially, the equalisation payment 
seeks to alleviate the burden imposed by statutory regulations. This prevents an 
otherwise legitimate and lawful regulation of property from being excessive, 
unconstitutional or invalid.824 Importantly, equalisation payments differ from 
constitutional damages. Equalisation payments are awarded in terms of specific 
authorising legislation825 whereas constitutional damages are awarded in terms of the 
common law or by relying on the Constitution, as explained above.826  
Although constitutional damages or Ausgleich may provide a quick solution to the land 
owner without uprooting the unlawful occupiers, neither solution ensures long term 
secure tenure for the unlawful occupiers. Accordingly, it cannot be said that either 
option would have ensured the realisation of effective relief in Modderklip CC.  
4 2 4 Modderklip: An example of sharing?  
 
In light of the discussion of constitutional damages above and the concern whether 
effective relief was or could have been granted, the particular facts and circumstances 
                                            
821 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 67. 
822 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 366-367 and 277-280; Strydom A hundred years of 
demolition orders 350. 
823 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 366-367; Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders 
350-351.  
824 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 277-280; Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders 
329. 
825 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 277-280, 367; Stydom A hundred years of demolition 
orders 329, 350-351. 
826 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151.  
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of the Modderklip scenario also warrants a further possible perspective. In this regard, 
the work of Dyal-Chand becomes relevant. Having regard to the issue of effective relief 
within the context of damages and possible compensation, Dyal-Chand promotes the 
concept of “sharing”.827 It is set out here briefly because it relays to the current South 
African approach where constitutional damages are concerned.  
Dyal-Chand proposes that the concept of “sharing”828 could form the basis for a more 
just and appropriate outcome in property law disputes.829 In this regard, she considers 
sharing in light of the interest-outcome approach which she describes as:  
“…a means of resolving property law disputes where more than one legitimate interest 
exists, concerning use, possession, or access to a piece of property and where such 
interests are represented in the form of conflicting positions concerning the 
property.”830  
Practically, the approach proposes three steps for courts to follow in the resolution of 
property disputes.  
Firstly, the court has to determine the “legitimate interests on both sides of the 
dispute”.831 In this regard the court has to establish each party’s interests pertaining to 
the property.832 Accordingly, at this stage of the approach, the court should refrain 
from taking into account who has ownership of the property or land in question. 833 
Instead, the court should consider the actual and intended use of the property.834 
Considerations such as the subjective needs of the parties and the moral ties to the 
property or land in question should be regarded as factors in determining the legitimate 
interests of the parties.835 This step enables the court to gather the necessary 
information pertaining to the needs and intentions of the parties and guides the court 
in finding a just and appropriate outcome.836  
                                            
827 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 647-723 647. 
828 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 647. 
829 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 655-656. 
830 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 677. 
831 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 677. 
832 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 677. 
833 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 677. 
834 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 707-708.  
835 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 707-708. 
836 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 708.  
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Secondly, the court would be required to consider outcomes that could best serve 
each party’s legitimate interests.837 In this regard, the court will try to find an outcome 
that will realise the needs of the parties. At this stage of the three step approach Dyal-
Chand emphasises that use, should not only be regarded as one of the factors to be 
considered in finding a just an appropriate outcome, but also as an outcome in and of 
itself.838 Ideally, solutions should be created which encompass shared use of the 
property that could satisfy the needs and interests of the parties involved in the 
dispute.839 
Thirdly and lastly, ownership and other formal entitlements should be considered and 
evaluated to “the extent to which they are relevant to a given dispute”.840 In this regard, 
Dyal-Chand highlights that the most important feature of “sharing” under the interest-
outcome approach, is that it “results in outcomes that represent compromises of some 
sort between the parties’ varying interests”.841  
Although the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court in Modderklip SCA 
and Modderklip CC did not expressly follow the interest-outcome approach, the 
outcome of the cases can be viewed as an example of property sharing. The court in 
Modderklip SCA and Modderklip CC, in line with the PE Municipality case,842 took into 
consideration the competing interests of the land owner and the unlawful occupiers 
respectively.843 This is in line with step one and three of the interest-outcome 
approach, because the court not only considers the subjective needs and interests of 
the unlawful occupiers but also takes the ownership of the land or property into 
consideration. Furthermore, the fact that the court alluded to expropriation as an 
outcome that could best serve the rights and interests of both parties, is in line with 
step two of the interest-outcome approach. However, because the court does not have 
the authority to order the State to expropriate the property it ordered that direct 
constitutional damages should be paid to the land owner. This outcome had the 
advantage of compensating the land owner for the indefinite occupation of his 
                                            
837 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 677.  
838 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 711.  
839 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 647-723. 
840 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 677. 
841 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 648. 
842 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) paras 37, 43. 
843 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 52. 
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property, while enabling the unlawful occupiers to remain on the property until the 
State could provide alternative accommodation and legally secure tenure to the 
unlawful occupiers. In this regard, the court also considered use of the property by the 
unlawful occupiers as an outcome to the case and not only as a factor for determining 
whether it would be just and equitable for the unlawful occupiers to remain on the 
property.  
Accordingly, the interest-outcome approach, in line with the concept of sharing, may 
provide a different approach to solving property disputes and finding an effective 
remedy in the context of evictions in general. At this point in time, this particular 
approach has not yet been followed in South Africa in the eviction context. However, 
it can be envisaged that the interest-outcome approach may be a viable method of 
finding or forging effective relief.844 
4 2 5 Comparing the Modderklip scenario to the Blue Moonlight saga 
 
The question whether constitutional damages would be appropriate and effective relief 
emerged again in the Blue Moonlight saga.845 In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue (“Blue Moonlight HC”),846 the High Court ordered 
the State to pay the property owner an amount equivalent to the fair and reasonable 
monthly rental for the use of the premises by the unlawful occupiers.847 In this regard, 
the payment of rent can arguably be viewed as constitutional damages.848 The court 
also found that the State’s housing policy was unconstitutional, thereby ordering the 
State to remedy its housing policy and report back to it accordingly.849  
However, an appeal was lodged by the State against the abovementioned order. In 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd (“Blue Moonlight SCA”),850 the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the order for 
                                            
844 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-
65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5 read with Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut 
LR 677. 
845 Pienaar Land Reform 773.  
846 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v The Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W). 
847 Pienaar Land Reform 744; Chenwi (2010) ESR Review 9.  
848 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd (2011) 4 SA 
337 (SCA) para 70. 
849 Pienaar Land Reform 774-775.  
850 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA); Tissington & Wilson (2011) ESR Review 3-6; Dickinson (2011) SAJHR 466-
495; Kruuse (2011) SALJ 620-632; and Dickinson (2013) SALJ 554-596.   
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constitutional damages in the form of a monthly rental, on the basis of the 
distinguishing facts of the present case and the Modderklip CC case. The court 
distinguished the present case from that of the Modderklip CC case on four grounds.851  
Firstly, in the Modderklip CC case the compensation order was made only after an 
eviction order was granted but not executed, whereas the compensation order in Blue 
Moonlight SCA was ancillary to an eviction order. Secondly, the award in Modderklip 
CC was made because the State had violated the land owner’s right by not assisting 
in the execution of the court order. However, in Blue Moonlight SCA there was no 
eviction order that needed to be executed. Accordingly, the State in Blue Moonlight 
SCA did not infringe the property owner’s constitutional right to have access to courts. 
Thirdly, due to the large number of unlawful occupiers on Modderklip’s farm, it was 
practically impossible to execute the eviction order. In Blue Moonlight however, the 
number of unlawful occupiers did not even amount to a hundred at the time of applying 
to the High Court. It would have been impractical to evict the people and provide 
alternative accommodation had an eviction order been granted, regardless of whether 
the State’s housing policy was indeed reasonable.852 Lastly, the land owner in 
Modderklip CC experienced an unlawful land invasion despite taking all reasonable 
steps expeditiously to safeguard his interests. By way of contrast, Blue Moonlight 
purchased the property knowing that it had to evict the occupiers before redeveloping 
the land. There was also a delay on the part of Blue Moonlight in instituting eviction 
proceedings.  
On the facts, these two cases were thus clearly distinguishable. In terms of the general 
approach for determining whether constitutional damages would be appropriate relief, 
the plaintiff could not establish that it would be “appropriate and just” to award direct 
constitutional damages in this case. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Blue Moonlight 
accordingly held that constitutional damages would not constitute appropriate relief.   
The Constitutional Court in City of Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd (“Blue Moonlight CC”) 853 essentially confirmed the order of the 
                                            
851 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 
337 (SCA) paras 70-71. 
852 Chenwi (2010) ESR Review 9.    
853 2012 2 SA 104 (CC). See also Tissington & Wilson (2011) ESR Review 3-6; Dickinson (2011) SAJHR 
466-495; Kruuse (2011) SALJ 620-632; and Dickinson (2013) SALJ 554-596.   
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Supreme Court of Appeal, while highlighting the unconstitutionality of the State’s 
Housing Policy.854  However, more than a year later it became abundantly clear that 
the State had not progressed at all with respect to the housing crisis of the unlawful 
occupiers.  
Given these conditions, the land owner averred that it could not wait indefinitely to 
regain possession of its property.855 This led to the subsequent judgment Hlophe v 
The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality.856 The court held that the State 
had not absorbed the import of the various judgments;857 that it did not comprehend 
its role concerning the provision of alternative accommodation to the occupiers and 
that it had consequently disregarded the order of the Constitutional Court.858 In this 
regard the court stipulated a fixed period of time for the State to take the necessary 
administrative and other steps necessary to ensure that it complied with the previous 
order handed down.859 Importantly, in the event of further non-compliance the land 
owner would be able to bring an application for contempt of court or claim constitutional 
damages from the State.860 While the matter of constitutional damages was dealt with 
in this Chapter, contempt of court proceedings is explored in the next Chapter.  
5 Reflection  
 
The single-system-of-law concept861 and subsidiarity principles862 dictate that a 
claimant seeking to vindicate his/her constitutional rights, must first rely on legislation 
enacted to protect those constitutional rights in question, before relying on the 
common law or the Constitution.863  Accordingly, a land owner seeking to vindicate his 
                                            
854City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 
337 (SCA) para 104. 
855 Pienaar Land Reform 775. 
856 2013 4 SA 212 (GSJ). 
857 Hlophe v The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 2013 4 SA 212 (GSJ) para 10. 
858 Pienaar Land Reform 775-776. 
859 See para 3 of the order of the court in Hlophe v The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
2013 4 SA 212 (GSJ). 
860 Pienaar Land Reform 776.  
861 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 19-20; Van der 
Walt (2008) CCR 77.  
862 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36, 40-43, 81-91.  
863 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 23-24, 35. These principles provide guidance when dealing 
with more than one potentially applicable source of law and ensure selection of the source of law that 
will contribute to the development of a single system of law. See also Van der Walt Property and 
Constitution. See Chapter 2 in general. 
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or her right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his or her property864 must first rely on the 
provisions of PIE before relying on the law of delict or the Constitution.865 However, 
PIE does not provide for a compensatory mechanism which the land owner can rely 
on to vindicate his or her section 25(1) right. Accordingly, the land owner will have to 
determine whether he or she has a delictual claim in terms of the common law before 
relying directly on the Constitution. As mentioned above,866 it is not likely that a court 
will award delictual damages to a land owner suffering financial loss due to the 
deprivation of his or her property by way of unlawful occupation.867 The element of 
wrongfulness may also be problematic to succeed with a claim for delictual damages, 
because not every breach of a constitutional duty is equivalent to unlawfulness in the 
delictual sense and therefore not every breach of a constitutional obligation868 
constitutes unlawful conduct. 869   
 
Accordingly, in the absence of a compensatory mechanism in PIE and the unlikelihood 
of a court awarding delictual damages for the failure by the State to execute an eviction 
order, a land owner could claim direct constitutional damages.   
 
Thus far, the courts have used their own discretion, coupled with the listed factors in 
Kate870 to determine whether constitutional damages will be appropriate. In the 
absence of an overarching framework for determining whether direct constitutional 
damages will be appropriate in a particular case, reference is made to the framework 
as proposed and used by the Canadian court in Ward. The court in Ward establishes 
an approach whereby the South African courts can determine whether an award of 
                                            
864 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC); Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 190-333; Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-28; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1207 
1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235. 
865 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36, 40-43, 81-91. 
866 See 2 2 above.  
867 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-154. See Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 
SA 1247 (SCA); Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v Fair Cape Property Developers (Pty) 
Ltd 2003 6 SA 13 (SCA); Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape 2007 3 BCLR 300 
(CC) where courts have refused to develop common law administrative principles to provide for 
compensation where the constitutional right to administrative justice has been infringed. 
868 Section 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 
344-351; McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14.  
869 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 BCLR 300 (CC) paras 37-40.  
870 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 25.  
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direct constitutional damages will be appropriate in a particular case. In this regard, 
the factors laid down in Kate will serve an important role in determining whether it 
would be “appropriate and just” to award direct constitutional damages. This approach 
seems to be in line with the outcomes of the Modderklip CC and Blue Moonlight SCA 
decisions and could therefore be adopted by the South African courts. The adoption 
of a general framework for direct constitutional damages will provide certainty 
regarding the onus on each particular party and the implications thereof. The land 
owner claiming direct constitutional damages must prove that there has been a breach 
of his or her constitutional right to property and/or access to courts and establish that 
it would be appropriate and just to award direct constitutional damages. In this regard, 
the land owner may use the factors listed in Kate and circumstances specific to the 
case to show why it would be appropriate to award direct constitutional damages. 
Once these steps have been proved, a prima facie case is established against the 
State. In this regard, the onus shifts onto the State who must then provide the court 
with countervailing factors that will prove that it will be inappropriate to award 
constitutional damages.  
 
What is evident from the Modderklip cases is that the award for constitutional damages 
provided effective relief to the land owner. However, it is questionable whether the 
court effectively vindicated the rights of the unlawful occupiers. In order to effectively 
vindicate the rights of the unlawful occupiers, the State must provide access to land 
and housing, in accordance with its constitutional obligations. This necessitates that 
the State must provide services and devise legally secure tenure to the unlawful 
occupiers.871 Accordingly, even though the unlawful occupiers were permitted to 
remain on the property until the State could provide alternative land and 
accommodation, their occupation and tenure remained unlawful and insecure.872 
Accordingly, the court in Modderklip CC should have placed a positive duty on the 
State to provide services and devise legally secure tenure to the unlawful occupiers.873  
In the absence of legally secure tenure the vindication of the rights of the unlawful 
occupiers will remain ineffective.  
 
                                            
871 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 46-47; Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8; and Van Wyk (2005) Stell LR 466-487.  
872 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 46-47; Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8; and Van Wyk (2005) Stell LR 466-487.  
873 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 46-47; Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8; and Van Wyk (2005) Stell LR 466-487.  
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It is within this context where the particular facts and circumstances of Modderklip CC 
raise other possibilities that could possibly provide effective relief for both parties.  
In this regard, (a) expropriation as proposed by Viljoen and Strydom;874 (b) Ausgleich, 
also known as “equalisation measures”;875 and (c) “sharing”876 postulated by Dyal-
Chand, may provide effective relief for both the land owner and the unlawful 
occupier(s).  
 
Expropriation of the property would have allowed the State to acquire the land for a 
public purpose or a benefit in return for the payment of compensation. The provision 
of permanent land and adequate housing by way of expropriation, would arguably 
have realised the rights if the unlawful occupiers.877 On the other hand, the land owner 
would be compensated for the loss and infringement of his or her property rights.  
 
Although Ausgleich is similar to direct constitutional damages, the two forms of 
compensation differ. Constitutional damages are damages awarded in terms of the 
Constitution,878 whereas equalisation measures or payments are awarded in terms of 
specific authorising legislation879 which imposes a disproportionate burden on 
ownership rights.880 While both equalisation payments and direct constitutional 
damages compensate the land owner, neither of these forms of compensation give 
effect to the unlawful occupiers’ rights. Accordingly, neither direct constitutional 
damages, nor Ausgleich provide effective relief to the unlawful occupiers. The unlawful 
occupiers’ tenure and right to housing remain unrealised.   
 
Dyal-Chand promotes “sharing” as a way of solving complex property disputes. 
Sharing, coupled with the interest-outcome approach, can be particularly useful in 
                                            
874 Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1234; Viljoen (2015) SAPL 67. 
875 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 366-367 and 277-280; Strydom A hundred years of 
demolition orders 350. 
876 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 647-723 in general.  
877 Section 25(5) read with sections 26(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. See in general Van Wyk (2005) Stell LR 466-487; Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC);  Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; Muller The impact of 
section 26 of the Constitution 75-82, 93-99; McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14. 
878 Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151. See 2 above.  
879 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 277-280, 367; Stydom A hundred years of demolition 
orders 329, 350-351. 
880 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 366-367; Strydom A hundred years of demolition orders 
350-351; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1234. 
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cases where the facts, rights and interests of the respective parties and the 
circumstances of the case are complex in nature. One of the reasons direct 
constitutional damages was awarded in Modderklip CC, was precisely because of the 
difficulty of resolving the conflicting rights of the land owner and the unlawful occupiers.  
In terms of the interest-outcome approach an outcome and/or remedy is sought that 
will accommodate both the land owner and the unlawful occupiers. Such an outcome 
or remedy does not necessarily provide for compensation. Accordingly, the South 
African courts can use this approach in order to find a solution that will realise the 
rights of all the parties involved in an eviction case.881 This approach can also be used 
to find an effective remedy in cases where there was a failure to execute an eviction 
order. In this regard, the steps that the courts have to follow in terms of the interest-
outcome approach, aim to find an outcome (remedy) that would best serve each 
party’s legitimate interests, without the disadvantages linked to the payment of 
damages.   
6 Conclusion  
 
Indirect and direct constitutional damages may potentially provide effective relief to 
parties involved in the execution of court orders, including eviction orders. In this 
regard, a litigant must first determine whether he or she has a claim for indirect 
constitutional damages in terms of statute.882 As stated above, PIE does not provide 
for a compensatory measure to vindicate a land owner’s property rights.  Where a 
statute, such as PIE, does not provide for compensation, the land owner must then 
determine whether he or she has a claim for damages based on the common law. 
However, there are certain difficulties that arise where a land owner relies on the 
common law of delict to vindicate his or her property rights. In this regard, the 
Constitutional Court has stated that a breach of a constitutional duty883 is not wrongful 
in the delictual sense for that reason alone. In addition, it must be reasonable to 
compensate the land owner for his loss.884 This would entail proving that the State has 
                                            
881 Dyal-Chand (2013) Connecticut LR 677.  
882 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 35; Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 
(CC) para 67. See also Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; Van der Walt Property and 
Constitution 19-20, 36, 40-43, 81-91 read together; and Van der Walt (2008) CCR 77.  
883 Section 34 and effectively section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
884 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 BCLR 300 (CC) paras 37-40. 
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acted in bad faith or under corrupt circumstances or completely outside the legitimate 
scope of the empowering provision.885 Proving that the State had acted negligently in 
exercising its constitutional duties886 will therefore not be sufficient to justify awarding 
indirect constitutional damages. Accordingly, a land owner will have to rely on direct 
constitutional damages in cases where the common law of delict is not available to 
vindicate his or her property rights or where no statute provides for relevant 
compensation.887  
Cases where a land owner has relied on direct constitutional damages to vindicate his 
or her property rights are extremely rare.888 Thus far, Modderklip CC has been the 
only case in the context of evictions where constitutional damages have been 
awarded.  Therefore, it is proposed that a general framework for direct constitutional 
damages be developed which provides for the effective and direct vindication of 
constitutional rights infringed by the State, subject to the single-system-of-law concept 
and subsidiarity principles.889 It is averred that a general framework for direct 
constitutional damages may provide clarity with regard to when it will be appropriate 
to award direct constitutional damages. In this regard, the four step approach laid 
down in Ward could be utilised by the South African courts.  
In this regard, the factors set out in Kate can be utilised to determine whether it will be 
appropriate to order constitutional damages in a given case.890 Accordingly, the court 
must have regard to the nature and relative importance of the right; the consequences 
of the infringement of the right and whether alternative remedies might be available to 
assert and vindicate the rights in question.891 Other case-specific circumstances may 
also be considered by the court.  
It is apparent from the case law discussed above that all other forms of remedies, in 
terms of statute or the common law, must first be exhausted before direct constitutional 
damages may be awarded or relied on. This is in line with the methodology required 
by the single-system-of-law concept and subsidiarity principles. The extent of the 
                                            
885 Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 BCLR 300 (CC) para 55; Currie & 
De Waal The Bill of Rights 200. 
886 Section 34 read with section 164(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
887 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) paras 60, 67.  
888 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 439, 442. 
889 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 22.  
890 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 25. 
891 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 25. 
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deprivation or infringement will also be considered in determining whether it will be 
appropriate to award direct constitutional damages. Additionally, and at the very least, 
the land owner must have taken all reasonable steps necessary to vindicate his or her 
rights expeditiously.892  
However, where neither the structural interdict, nor indirect or direct constitutional 
damages will constitute appropriate and effective relief, alternative relief must still be 
sought.893   
  
                                            
892 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 
337 (SCA) para 71 where the Supreme Court of Appeal distinguished Blue Moonlight from President of 
the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC); President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) para 31; Pienaar Land 
Reform 773, 775. 
893 Such alternative relief will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4: Contempt of Court 
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1 Introduction 
 
Where litigants obtain a court order vindicating their right but there is a failure to 
execute the order, it cannot be said that the rights violations have been effectively 
remedied. A successful party is entitled to an order to the extent to which it can be 
made effective, even though it may not be possible to do so immediately.894 It follows 
that a failure to execute an eviction order regarding residential property will not provide 
effect relief to parties involved in an eviction case.  
In practice, court orders, such as eviction orders, can be difficult to enforce, not 
necessarily because State officials obdurately oppose the court’s authority, but simply 
due to inattentiveness, incompetence or because State departments lack the capacity 
to fulfil them.895  
One option available in ensuring that court orders are effectively implemented is civil 
contempt of court proceedings,896 which form the focus of this Chapter. In this regard, 
a common law distinction is drawn between orders ad factum praestandum 
(mandatory orders compelling someone to do or to refrain from doing something) and 
orders ad pecuniam solvendam (for the payment of a sum of money).897 The remedies 
available to enforce compliance with these different types of court orders differ, as set 
out below in more detail.898  
Where the State fails to execute a structural interdict (an order ad factum 
praestandum) an applicant may approach the court for a contempt of court order. A 
court may also raise the issue of contempt of court mero motu.899  Accordingly, the 
                                            
894 AC Cilliers, C Loots & HC Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen: The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa Volume 2 5 ed (2009) 1104-1105.  
895 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction: when is it appropriate, just 
and equitable?” (2005) 122 SALJ 325.  
896 Cilliers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1100; Fakie NO v CII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 
SA 326 (SCA) para 42; Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality and Another 2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) para 16. See in general R Roos “Statutory 
mechanisms to enforce judgment debts against the state: journal” (2005) 20 SA Public Law 167-175.  
897 Cilliers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1098, 1106; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a transformative Constitution (2010) 451. See in general Roos (2005) SA Public 
Law 167-175. 
898 NJJ Olivier & C Williams “State Liability for final orders sounding in money: At long last alignment 
with the Constitution” (2011) Obiter 489-520 493; Roos (2005) SA Public Law 167-175. 
899 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 2. However, the 
usual method of initiating such proceedings are by way of an application for the issue of a rule nisi. See 
Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1102-1193.  
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chapter begins with a discussion of orders ad factum praestandum in general and the 
necessary requirements as laid down in Fakie NO v CII Systems (Pty) Ltd (“Fakie”)900 
which have to be proved for a court to award a contempt of court order. The discussion 
of orders ad factum praestandum in general is followed by a discussion and analysis 
of the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
(No 2) (“Pheko 2”).901 In Pheko 2 the court, out of its own accord, raised the issue of 
contempt of court after subsequent and continuous failures by the State to execute the 
structural interdict granted in Pheko 1. The evaluation of the court’s order in Pheko 2 
highlights the importance of joinder and the role it can play in the eviction process. In 
this regard, joinder is often necessary for the obtainment of effective relief.  
Where the State fails to pay constitutional damages (an order ad pecuniam 
solvendam), a judgment creditor can enforce the money judgment, by way of an 
application for a writ of execution, which will lead to the attachment of assets and 
consequential sale.902 Accordingly, the discussion and analysis of Pheko 2 is followed 
by a discussion of orders ad pecuniam solvendam in general. A distinction is forthwith 
drawn between the execution of orders ad pecuniam solvendam before and after the 
decision in Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health 
Gauteng (“Nyathi 1”).903 The State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011, which was 
promulgated subsequent to the decision in Nyathi 1, now comprehensively regulates 
the procedure for enforcing money judgments and will accordingly be discussed.  
2 Failure to enforce orders ad factum praestandum  
 
Where a judgment debtor has been ordered to perform or refrain from doing something 
and that person or entity fails to do so, the judgment creditor can apply to court for an 
                                            
900 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA).  
901 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). See in general A du Plessis & A van den Berg “Some perspectives on 
constitutional conflict in local disaster management through the lens of Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality 2012 2 SA 598 (CC): case note” (2013) 28 SAPL 448-468; G Muller “Evicting unlawful 
occupiers for health and safety reasons in post-apartheid South Africa” (2015) 132 SALJ 616-638. 
902 Sections 61-79 of the  Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944 and sections 36, 39 and 40 of the Supreme 
Court Act 59 of 1959; Roos (2005) SA Public Law 167-175.  
903 2008 5 SA 94 (CC). See in general P de Vos “Between moral authority and formalism: Nyathi v 
Member of Executive Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng” (2009) 2 CCR 409-427; Olivier & 
Williams (2011) Obiter 489-520; S Bulbulia “Making the state pay for its misdeeds: the law” (2011) 11 
Without Prejudice 36-38.  
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order declaring the judgment debtor to be in contempt of court.904 Usually, an 
application for contempt of court is coupled with the request for an imposition of a 
sanction which has the object of inducing the non-complier to fulfil the terms of the 
previous order.905 If all the requisites to establish contempt of court have been proved, 
the court may grant an order committing the judgment debtor to jail.906  
In order to succeed with an application for civil contempt of court, the applicant must 
prove the following requisites beyond reasonable doubt. Firstly, the applicant must be 
able to prove the existence of a previously obtained court order.907 Secondly, the 
applicant must be able to prove that the order has been duly served on, or brought to 
the notice of the alleged contemnor.908 Lastly, the applicant must prove non-
compliance with the particular court order.909 Once the applicant has proved the 
abovementioned requisites beyond reasonable doubt, the respondent bears the 
evidential burden of proving that the non-compliance was not wilful and mala fide.910 
Ordinarily, a rule nisi is issued by the court calling upon the person or official to show 
cause why they should not be held in contempt before that person is committed to 
prison.911  If the respondent fails to discharge this evidential burden then contempt will 
be established and the court may commit a person for contempt of court.  
However, such a remedy has its limits, especially when it comes to its application in 
instances that involve public bodies being in non-compliance.912 It is clear that the 
                                            
904 Cilliers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1103; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 451. 
905 Cilliers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1103. 
906 Cilliers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1103. 
907 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 41. Meadow Glen Home Owners 
Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) para 16 and Pheko 
v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) 36 confirm the position laid down 
in Fakie. See also Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1103. 
908 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 41; Meadow Glen Home Owners 
Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA); Pheko v Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 36. 
909 Cilliers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1103; Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 
SA 326 (SCA) para 41. 
910 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 42; Cillers et al The civil practice of 
the High Courts 2 1103. City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 
(SCA) para 24 where the court held that “if the functionaries address the provision of temporary shelter 
to the occupiers diligently and in good faith, they would not be guilty of contempt of court even if their 
efforts prove to be unsuccessful”. For a discussion on the Hlophe case see B Ray “Courts, capacity and 
engagement: Lessons from Hlophe v City of Johannesburg: feature” (2013) 14 ESR Review 3-5; G 
Mirugi-Mukundi “Case Review - fundamental constitutional value of accountability requires municipal 
officials to obey court orders: feature” (2015) 16 ESR Review 7-8.  
911 Cilliers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1103; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 451.  
912 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) paras 22 and 24. 
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incarceration of state officials, acting as employees of the State, would be highly 
problematic.913  Although noting that a State official who is ordered by a court to do or 
to refrain from doing a particular act, and fails to do so, is liable to be committed for 
contempt,914 the court in Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality (“Meadow Glen”)915 emphasised that such an order can only 
be granted in respect of the relevant State official that had the duty to perform a task 
and has wilfully failed to do so.916 In this case, various home owner’s associations tried 
to enlist the Municipality’s help in controlling the expansion of an informal settlement 
in their neighbourhood. Various court applications and orders later, the court in 
Meadow Glen dealt with an attempt by the associations to incarcerate an official within 
the Municipality as a scapegoat for the failure to implement the previously obtained 
court order.917 Although the court found that there was no doubt that a public official 
who is ordered by a court to do or to refrain from doing a particular act, and fails to do 
so, is liable to be committed for contempt, Mr Fenyani, the Director of Housing 
Resource Management, was only responsible for seeing to the maintenance of the 
fence and the provision of basic services.918 Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to 
commit him to prison for the inadequacies in the Municipality’s compliance with the 
court order. Instead, the court found that the Municipal Manager, (as far as the officials 
of the Municipality are concerned), was the responsible person tasked with overseeing 
the execution of court orders against the Municipality.919 This official cannot pass 
                                            
913 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 
299 (SCA) para 20. 
914 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 30 where the court held as 
follow: “It goes without saying that a public functionary who fails to fulfil an obligation that is imposed 
upon him or her by law is open to proceedings for a mandamus compelling him to do so. That remedy 
lies against the functionary upon whom the statue imposes the obligation, and not against the provincial 
government”; Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) paras 20-22 and 30.  
915 2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA).  
916 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 
299 (SCA) paras 20-22; 24; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 
(SCA) paras 18-20 and 25.  
917 Contra City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) para 24 
where the occupiers did not claim an order that the functionaries be committed for contempt of court. 
Instead, they aimed to obtain a mandamus that obliges the functionaries to fulfil their own statutory 
obligations and to take the steps necessary to ensure that the City provides temporary shelter to the 
occupiers.  
918 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 
299 (SCA) para 21.  
919 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 
299 (SCA) paras 23-24. The court in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 
All SA 251 (SCA) paras 18-20 went further and identified the Executive Mayor, City Manager and 
Director of Housing as the functionaries statutorily obliged to ensure compliance with the court’s orders. 
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responsibility for these administrative duties on to a manager or a director who is not 
directly accountable in terms of their duties. In this regard, the importance of joinder 
as a mechanism to ensure that particular State officials are aware of what is expected 
of them in terms of court orders is crucial to the obtainment of effective relief. 
Accordingly, where the correct State officials are joined to the proceedings, the official 
responsible for the execution of the initial or relevant court order may be held 
personally accountable and may be held in contempt of court.  
However, in spite of the numerous court orders (stretching over a period of at least 
eight years) and the application for contempt of court and committal in Meadow Glen, 
the problems of neither the neighbouring private land owners, nor the unlawful 
occupiers had been solved. In this regard, the court opted for the use of a structural 
interdict, whereby the parties must find innovative methods and a workable solution to 
resolve the competing interests of the different factions of the community.920 It is 
questionable whether the very remedy first utilised to ensure compliance will be 
effective at this stage of the litigation process. A further structural interdict may seem 
redundant at this point in time. However, the joinder of the correct accountable parties 
may ensure that the initial structural interdict is executed at this stage. Arguably, the 
court in Meadow Glen could have posed specific timelines within which the 
accountable State officials and other parties involved in the case, ought to find a 
workable solution, given the long history of the case. Where the correct cited 
accountable State officials further fail to adhere to the court order, contempt of court 
proceedings may be instituted afresh.  
What is evident from Meadow Glen is that where a court finds a recalcitrant litigant to 
be possessed of malice, civil contempt remedies other than committal, such as 
declaratory relief, a mandamus demanding the contemnor to behave in a particular 
manner, a fine and any further orders that would have the effect of coercing 
compliance, may still be employed.921  
                                            
See also a discussion of Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) 
below at 3 1.  
920 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 
299 (SCA) para 36. 
921 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 37; Fakie NO v 
CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 65.  
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3 The use of civil contempt of court in South African eviction case law  
3 1 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2)  
 
3 1 1 Introduction 
In Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) (“Pheko 2”)922 the court initiated 
contempt of court proceedings mero motu following a failure by the State to execute 
the court order obtained in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 
(“Pheko 1”).923  
3 1 2 Background and facts of the case 
 
The court in Pheko 1924 found that the Municipality had violated the unlawful occupiers’ 
rights to dignity and access to adequate housing, following their forced removal from 
and demolishment of their homes.925 The court accordingly held that the Municipality 
had a duty to provide the unlawful occupiers of Bapsfontein Informal Settlement with 
suitable temporary accommodation and to engage meaningfully with them in order to 
identify alternative land.926  In order to ensure that the Municipality met these 
obligations, the court decided that it would supervise the process by way of granting a 
structural interdict. As explained above,927 the structural interdict imposed the 
obligation on the Municipality to report to court on the progress made in meeting their 
constitutional obligations and fulfilling the court order.928 However, ever since the order 
was granted in Pheko 1, there had been continuous failures to report back to court on 
the progress made within the time schedule set out by the court, or at all.929  
Accordingly, the issue before the court in Pheko 2 was whether the Municipality and 
its attorney were in contempt of court for failing to comply with the court’s orders in 
Pheko 1.  
                                            
922 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC).  
923 2012 2 SA 538 (CC), which is discussed in Chapter 2 at 4 4. See in general Du Plessis & Van den 
Berg (2013) SAPL 448-468; Muller (2015) SALJ 616-638 for a discussion of Pheko 1.  
924 See Chapter 2 at 4 4 above.  
925 See Chapter 2 at 4 4 3 above.   
926 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metopolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 538 (CC) paras 50, 53.  
927 See Chapter 2 at 4 4 3.   
928 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 3. 
929 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 9. 
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3 1 3 The judgment and order of the court 
 
As an opening statement the court eloquently reiterated that the rule of law requires 
that the authority of the court be upheld.930 The Constitution not only demands that all 
persons, including organs of State, must comply with court orders, but also commands 
that no one may interfere with any order of a court.931 In this regard “courts have the 
power to ensure that their decisions or orders are complied with by all”.932 Where there 
is a failure to execute court orders, the effectiveness thereof and the judicial authority 
of the court will be rendered a “mockery” and continual non-compliance with court 
orders will, inevitably, lead to a situation of constitutional crisis.933 In order to give effect 
to the rights of a successful litigant and uphold judicial authority it is thus unsurprising 
that a court may raise the issue of civil contempt of court mero motu.934  
Accordingly, the court in Pheko 2 instructed the State, and its legal representative 
respectively, to show good cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for 
its failure to execute the supervisory order granted in Pheko 1.935 In this regard, the 
court had to determine whether all the elements to establish contempt of court, as set 
out in Fakie, were present.936 The court found that there is no doubt that the 
Municipality failed to comply with the court’s order.937 However, the service of the order 
upon the Municipality, an essential element of establishing contempt,938 was 
wanting.939 Although it has to be accepted that the Municipality’s explanation may not 
be adequate, the undisputed evidence,940 confirmed under oath by the Municipality’s 
legal representative, that the Municipality was neither served with nor made aware of 
                                            
930 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 1. 
931 Sections 165(1) and (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Pheko v Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 1. 
932 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 2. Sections 8, 13; 
165 and 172 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
933 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 1, 26. See section 
1(c) read with section 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 in this regard. 
934 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 2. 
935 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 4, 12. 
936 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 25; Cillers et al 
The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1307. 
937 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 10-12. Similarly, 
the court in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) paras 
22 and 24 held that if the functionaries act diligently and in good faith, but they still fail to provide 
housing, they will not be held in contempt of court.  
938 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 42; Cilliers et al The civil practice of 
the High Courts 2 1102-1103. 
939 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 39-40. 
940 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 41. 
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the court order, negates a finding that proper service was established. Furthermore, 
the court could not infer and establish that the non-compliance was wilful and mala 
fide.941 Therefore, the Municipality had shown good cause why it should not be held in 
contempt. 
Regarding the attorney who was dealing with the matter, the court found that he did 
not inform the Municipality of the order because he had not received it.942 The reason 
for not receiving the court order was because his facsimile number was no longer 
linked to his email address after it was changed.943 It followed that the inference of 
wilfulness and mala fides could not be drawn. Therefore, contempt of court on the part 
of the attorney had not been established.944 While the evidence did not establish 
wilfulness or mala fides on the part of the attorney, the court nevertheless found that 
the attorney displayed a gross disregard for his professional responsibilities.945 The 
court held that the attorney, at the very least, had an obligation to notify his clients and 
the registrar of the court of any change of address. Failure to notify the registrar of 
such a change constituted gross negligence on his part.946 Therefore, the court 
granted a cost order de bonis propriis (out of own pocket) against the attorney.947  
While the courts do not countenance disobedience of judicial authority, it needs to be 
stressed that contempt of court does not exist out of mere disobedience of a court 
order, but out of the contumacious disrespect for judicial authority.948 Absent service 
or notice of the court order as well as mala fides and wilfulness as elements required 
to establish contempt of court, the court had no choice but to find that the State was 
not in contempt of court.949  
                                            
941 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 43. 
942 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC)) para 47. 
943 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 49. 
944 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 50.  
945 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 54. 
946 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 54. 
947 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 55; Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights 456 where she states that: “A cost order, as a form of penalty, can be regarded 
as a method for the court to express their displeasure in the actions of a particular party”. See also C 
Plasket “Protecting the public purse: Appropriate relief and cost orders against State officials” (2000) 
117 SALJ 151-158. 
948 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 42. 
949 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 42. 
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The fact that the Municipality was found not to be in contempt of court, does not detract 
from the fact that there has been a breach of their constitutional950  and statutory 
obligations.951 These obligations continue to form part of the Municipality’s ongoing 
responsibility towards the unlawful occupiers of Bapsfontein.952  
By virtue of their constitutional and statutory obligations, the court found that the 
Executive Mayor and the Municipal Manager are the State officials responsible for 
overseeing and managing the provision of services by Municipalities to local 
communities such as the Bapsfontein settlement.953 In addition to these statutory 
responsibilities, the Municipal Manager is also tasked with the implementation of 
national and provincial legislation applicable to the Municipality.954 Importantly, the 
Municipal Manager is also the person to be held accountable for overseeing and 
ensuring the execution of court orders.955 As the accounting officer, he or she is in a 
position to determine what is feasible and what is not in terms of the court order.956  
Furthermore, the Member of the Executive for the Gauteng Department for Human 
Settlements is also statutorily obliged to take all reasonable and necessary measures 
to support and strengthen the capacity of the Municipality in its provision of adequate 
housing.957 When the Municipality fails in its obligation to provide adequate housing, 
the MEC is obliged to intervene by taking appropriate steps.958  
Together, these State officials are responsible for the execution of eviction orders. It 
is precisely because of the leadership entrusted to these State officials that they have 
                                            
950 Sections 152; 26 and 165(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Pheko v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 44. 
951 Section 73 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, read with section 9(1) of 
the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
952 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 46 read with the 
order in Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 1) 2012 2 SA 598 (CC) paras 49-50. 
953Section 56(3) of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 and section 55(1)(d) of 
the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 respectively; Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 59; Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of 
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) paras 23-24; City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) paras 18-20. 
954 Section 55(1)(p) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
955 Section 82 read with sections 56(3); 54A; 55 and 60 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems 
Act 32 of 2000; Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
and Another 2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) para 24. 
956 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Another 
2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) para 24.  
957 Sections 7 and 9 of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
958 Section 7(2)(f) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997 read with section 139 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
 
a duty to undertake responsibility by implementing court orders.959 This does not mean 
that they have to be involved with the minutiae of executing an order and overseeing 
the practicalities of its realisation, but they must at least ensure that the municipal 
structures, for which they ultimately carry the legal and moral responsibility, respond 
appropriately. These State officials owe it to the courts and the unlawful occupiers, 
who depend on their diligent and expeditious exercise of power.960  
For the purpose of implementing the court’s supervisory order, and in light of the 
constitutional and statutory obligations of the relevant State officials, the court 
determined that the Executive Mayor, Municipal Manager and Head of the Department 
for Human Settlements as well as the Member of the Executive Council for Gauteng 
Department for Human Settlements, be joined to the proceedings.961  
3 1 4 Evaluation of the order granted 
 
Joinder will constitute one way of boosting compliance with court orders and ensuring 
accountability of individual State officials responsible for executing court orders.962  
In Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants La Colleen Court963  the court held 
that the interests of the unlawful occupiers, private land owner and the State would be 
protected if the State is joined to the proceedings, because the State has a duty to 
                                            
959 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 59, 63. Sections 
152 and 156 read with Schedule 4, Part A of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
960 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 64. 
961 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) paras 58-60.  
962 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 14; Meadow Glen 
Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Another 2015 1 All SA 299 
(SCA) para 31; S Liebenberg & G Muller “Developing the law of joinder in the context of evictions of 
people from their homes” (2013) 29 SAJHR 554 555-557; 569-570. See G Muller The impact of section 
26 on the Eviction of Squatters in South African Law LLD, Stellenbosch University (2011) 231-257 on 
“Joinder” which analyses the case law on necessary joinder of local authorities to eviction proceedings. 
See the following cases in this regard: ABSA Bank Ltd v Murray 2004 2 SA 15 (CC); Cashbuild (South 
Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Scott 2007 1 SA 332 (T); Lingwood v The Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of Erf 9 
Highlands 2008 3 BCLR 325 (W); Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants of La Colleen Court 
2008 6 BCLR 666 (W); Chieftain Real Estate Incorporated in Ireland v Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality 2008 5 SA 387 (T); Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 
2009 1 SA 470 (W); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties (Pty) 
Ltd 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 40; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 30 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 42-46; City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) para 37. 
962 Liebenberg & Muller (2013) SAJHR 554 555-557; 569-570; Sailing Queen Investments v The 
Occupants of La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W). 
963 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W). 
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provide the evicted occupiers with adequate land and housing.964 Joining the State (or 
more specifically the local government) to the eviction process can be regarded a 
matter of necessity, because it may ensure that the State fulfils its constitutional 
obligation.965 Ultimately, joinder of the relevant State officials to the implementation of 
court orders will ensure that State officials are aware of what is expected of them in 
terms of the Constitution and their statutory obligations. The parties responsible for 
the execution of a court order will not be able to aver that they did not have knowledge 
of the order. Accordingly, joinder of the correct and relevant parties, officials and 
departments during the procedural phase of the eviction process ensures that those 
responsible for the execution of a subsequent court order are aware of their duties and 
responsibilities.966 
In terms of the Constitution,967 the Housing Act 107 of 1997968 and the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000,969 read with the Constitution, the local 
authority has a direct interest being joined to eviction proceedings and the execution 
of such orders.970 Although contempt of court could not be proved, the joinder of the 
relevant individual State officials (the Mayor, MEC and particularly the Municipal 
Manager) responsible for executing the court order obtained in Pheko 1, constituted 
an appropriate and necessary remedy in the circumstances of the case.971 Hopefully, 
the effect of joining these State officials to the proceedings will provide effective relief 
for the unlawful occupiers in the near future.  
4 Reflection 
 
Contempt of court should be condemned in all cases, but more so in cases where the 
order which the State is unable to comply with concerns the realisation of basic human 
rights, such as the right to access to housing,972 and the right not to be arbitrarily 
                                            
964 Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants of La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W) paras 3, 6 
and 8; Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). 
965 Muller & Liebenberg (2013) SAJHR 555 and 569-570. 
966 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 59; City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2 All SA 251 (SCA) paras 18-20 and 22-24.  
967 Sections 152, 153 and 156 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
968 Sections 7 and 9 of the Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
969 Section 73 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
970 Liebenberg & Muller (2013) SAJHR 559-560; 569-570. 
971 Liebenberg & Muller (2013) SAJHR 558. 
972 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 61. 
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deprived of property.973 The problem is exacerbated when unwillingness and 
avoidance by the State to adhere to their constitutional and statutory obligations also 
enter into the picture. 
In theory, contempt of court can be viewed a judicial tool to enforce previously obtained 
court orders. One method of obtaining compliance is by way of an order for committal. 
In this regard, the correct parties responsible for the execution of court orders should 
be joined to the proceedings974 and the necessary requirements as laid out in Fakie 
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.975 Where the strict requirements to 
establish contempt of court cannot be proved, other remedies should be explored. 
Apart from committal, other remedies, such as declaratory relief, a mandamus, a fine 
and any further orders that would have the effect of coercing compliance may still be 
employed.976  
It is however questionable whether a further declaratory order or mandamus requiring 
the relevant State officials to adhere to a court order will provide effective relief. How 
can one expect and accept that the State will adhere to a further mandamus where 
there has already been a failure to adhere to a previously obtained mandamus in the 
form of a structural interdict? 
Where the State officials responsible for executing court orders are not joined to the 
execution of a structural interdict order, further joinder coupled with a declaratory order 
or mandamus, such as in the case of Pheko 2, could constitute appropriate relief.977 
However, just because contempt of court cannot be established does not mean that 
the State has realised the constitutional rights of the parties involved in the eviction 
process. A continuous failure to realise the rights of the land owner and/or the unlawful 
                                            
973 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general First National 
Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) which established the 
test for determining whether a deprivation amounts to a procedurally and/or substantively arbitrary 
deprivation. See in general AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law (2011) 190-333 where he 
comprehensively discusses the definition of an arbitrary deprivation of property. See also T Roux 
“Property” in S Woolman and M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 12 2003) 46-
17-46-28. J Strydom & S Viljoen (Maass) “Unlawful occupation of inner-city buildings: A constitutional 
analysis of the rights and obligations involved” (2014) 17 PELJ 1207, 1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235. 
974 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Another 
2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) para 16. 
975 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 42. 
976 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 37; Fakie NO v 
CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 65.  
977 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) paras 25-26. 
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occupiers amounts to a continuous infringement of rights. The parties will still be 
entitled to effective relief,978 even where contempt of court cannot be established. 
Accordingly, where the correct State officials are already joined as the responsible 
parties for  the execution of a structural interdict, and contempt of court cannot be 
established, further relief in the form of a fine or constitutional damages seems to be 
more appropriate.  
5 Failure to enforce orders ad pecuniam solvendam  
5 1 Introduction  
 
Effective relief will not be realised where a court awards constitutional damages to 
compensate a land owner for the arbitrary deprivation of his or her property,979  but 
there is a failure by the State to pay the amount. Accordingly, the enforcement of the 
money order will ensure that effective relief is provided to the land owner. Fortunately, 
there has been no case to date, where the State has failed to pay a party involved in 
an eviction case entitled to an order for constitutional damages.   
When the order is for the payment of money, such as an order to pay constitutional 
damages, it cannot be enforced by a committal for contempt even if the person ordered 
to pay has the means to do so but refuses to pay.980 Instead, the judgment creditor 
will be entitled to execute against the judgment debtor’s property in order to enforce 
the order ad pecuniam solvendam. In general, execution is a process in terms of which 
                                            
978 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) para 26.  
979 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See in general First National 
Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). See also Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 190-333 where he comprehensively discusses the definition of an arbitrary 
deprivation of property. See also Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-28; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) 
(2014) PELJ 1207 1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235. 
980 Cilliers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1106; A Ganesh “Contempt and execution in 
vindicating the right to education” (2014) 29 SAPL 19 25. The court in Nyathi v Member of the Executive 
Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC) para 76 held that the “committal of 
public officials would only result in the ‘naming and shaming’ of such officials and would produce no 
real remedy for the aggrieved party litigant who is primarily concerned with the payment of the judgment 
debt. The potential disruption of already overburdened state departments is also a result which should 
be avoided.”  
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a judgment debtor’s property is attached by the Sheriff and sold by public auction in 
order to raise funds to satisfy the judgment.981  
However, this route was precluded in respect of money judgments obtained against 
the State by the provisions of section 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 (“State 
Liability Act”),982 prior to the Constitutional Court’s judgment in Nyathi v Member of the 
Executive Council for the Department of Health Gauteng (“Nyathi 1”).983  
5 2 The execution of orders ad pecuniam solvendam prior to Nyathi 1 
 
Prior to Nyathi 1, litigants, in an attempt to get the State to comply with money 
judgments, ventured to obtain declarations of contempt of court against the State and 
relevant public functionaries responsible for overseeing compliance with court 
orders.984 The court in Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape985 
accordingly held that the common law distinction between orders ad pecuniam 
solvendam and orders ad factum praestandum should not apply in cases where the 
State was the judgment debtor. The court further held that the combined effect of the 
common law and the State Liability Act, if not developed, was that “those who sue the 
State run the risk of obtaining hollow and unenforceable judgments”.986 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare Eastern Cape (“Jayiya”)987 however, 
disagreed with this development. The court held that the common law could not evolve 
in conflict with legislation or basic principles of law.988 In addition, the court held that 
development had created a situation which endorses the retrospective creation of a 
new crime of contempt or the extension of the limits of the existing crime, which is 
                                            
981 Sections 61-79 of the Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944 and sections 36, 39 and 40 of the Supreme 
Court Act 59 of 1959; LN Wessels Tenuitvoerlegging van hofbevele teen die Staat LLM, Stellenbosch 
University (2006); Roos (2005) SAPL 167-175. 
982 Section 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 read as follow: “No execution, attachment or like 
process shall be issued against the defendant or respondent in any such action or proceedings or 
against any property of the State, but the amount, if any, which may be required to satisfy any judgment 
or order given or made against the nominal defendant or respondent in any such action or proceedings 
may be paid out of the National Revenue Fund or a Provincial Revenue Fund, as the case may be” (my 
emphasis); Wessels Tenuitvoerlegging van hofbevele 2-4.  
983 2008 5 SA 94 (CC); Olivier and Williams (2011) Obiter 489, 493. 
984 Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 452; Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 
4 SA 446 (Tk); East London Transitional Local Council v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape  2000 4 All SA 
443 (Ck).  
985 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk). See also Wessels Tenuitvoerlegging van hofbevele 25-41.  
986 Mjeni v Minister of Health and Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 4 SA 446 (Tk) 453I-454B.   
987 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA). 
988 Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA) para 18; Wessels Tenuitvoerlegging 
van hofbevele 42-45.  
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prohibited not only by general principles of the common law, but also in terms of 
section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution.989  
Subsequently, Froneman J in Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape990 severely criticised the judgment in Jayiya holding that:  
“It is one thing to realise the possibility as a matter of fact that the government might 
refuse to comply with court orders. It is something completely different to hold as a 
matter of law that courts are powerless to devise ways to ensure compliance with court 
orders in a constitutional State such as ours. In the former case the Government would, 
in refusing to comply with court orders, place itself outside the ambit of constitutional 
government and a constitutional crisis would be created. For the courts to do the latter 
would be to aid and abet the unconstitutional government. If the interpretation of 
section 3 of the State Liability Act in Jayiya means that the Government is not bound 
to comply with court orders sounding in money, or that the courts cannot devise other 
legal means to ensure compliance with court orders, then there is no possible way that 
I can think of how section 3 of the State Liability Act, if interpreted in this manner, can 
serve the rule of law and the Constitution”.991 
If litigants were left without any way of enforcing money judgments, then they would 
be left without an effective remedy to vindicate their rights. In the context of evictions 
it means that effective relief will not be realised, where the land owner is left without a 
means of enforcing an order for constitutional damages.  
On appeal in Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape (“Kate SCA”)992  
the court held that it is still possible to impose a mandamus on public functionaries 
where there has been a failure to enforce the court’s orders. Where the State official 
then fails to do so or refrains from doing something in terms of the mandamus granted, 
he or she will be liable to be committed for contempt in accordance with the ordinary 
principles, set out above.993 The court however conceded that a mandamus will have 
little practical value and would only lead to more litigation.994 Therefore, the decision 
                                            
989 Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2004 2 SA 611 (SCA) para 18; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 452. 
990 2005 1 SA 141 (SE); Wessels Tenuitvoerlegging van hofbevele 48-51. 
991 Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2005 1 SA 141 (SE) para 25. 
992 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA).  
993 See 1 and  5 1 above.  
994 Kate v MEC for the Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 19; Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights 453; Cillers et al The civil practice of the High Courts 2 1104-1110. 
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in Kate still did not provide a solution to the problem relating to functionaries who are 
not prepared to fulfil their constitutional obligations. 
5 3 The execution of orders ad pecuniam solvendam after Nyathi 1 
 
The Constitutional Court’s judgment in Nyathi 1 represented a “major breakthrough in 
enforcing money judgments against the State”,995 where the court declared section 3 
of the State Liability Act unconstitutional “to the extent that it does not allow for 
execution or attachment against the State and that it does not provide for an express 
procedure for the satisfaction of judgment debts”.996 The court reasoned that the 
prohibition on execution against property of the State in the Act unjustifiably limited the 
right to have equal protection of the law,997 the right to dignity998 and the right of access 
to courts.999 Furthermore, the court held that the procedure set out in the State Liability 
Act, read with the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 was “inaccessible to the 
majority of creditors and…far too complex to constitute a reasonable fulfilment of the 
State’s obligations in terms of the Constitution”,1000 which amounted to an ineffective 
remedy for the enforcement of judgment debts against the State. Legislative 
intervention was needed in order to provide for a more efficient and effective procedure 
for the settlement of money judgments against the State.1001  
The order was accordingly suspended for 12 months so as to allow parliament to pass 
legislation that provides for an effective procedure. Further extensions in respect of 
                                            
995  Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 453. 
996 Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC) 
para 92; Olivier and Williams (2011) Obiter 495-501. See also R Malherbe & M van Eck “State non-
compliance with legal duties: The Constitutional Court finally cracks the whip” (2009) TSAR 191-198; 
Roos (2005) SA Public Law 167-175; R Roos “Executive disregard of court orders: Enforcing judgments 
against the state” (2006) SALJ 744; Wessels Tenuitvoerlegging van hofbevele 61-84. 
997 Section 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Wessels Tenuitvoerlegging 
van hofvbevele 83-86.  
998 Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
999 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Nyathi v Member of the 
Executive Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 (CC) paras 36-47; Wessels 
Tenuitvoerlegging van hofbevele 71-83 submits that section 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 
unjustifiably limits sections 9 and 34 of the Constitution, in addition to being contrary to sections 165, 
173 and 195(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
1000 Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 
(CC) para 58. 
1001 Nyathi v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health, Gauteng 2008 5 SA 94 
(CC)   para 74, 83; Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 454; Olivier & Williams (2011) Obiter 506. 
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the suspended declaration of invalidity were granted by the court until 31 August 2011 
and an interim procedure to operate during the period of suspension was devised.1002  
The State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011 (“the Act”) now comprehensively deals 
with and regulates the manner in which a final court order sounding in money against 
the State must be satisfied.1003 In essence, the Act sets out the required procedure to 
execute money judgments.1004 If the procedure is followed it allows a judgment creditor 
to attach moveable property of the State, to satisfy a judgment sounding in money.1005  
The following procedure for issuing a writ of execution against the relevant State 
department must be followed in terms of the amended Act. Upon obtaining a final court 
order sounding in money against the State, the State attorney or attorney of record 
must notify the relevant department in writing within seven days.1006 According to the 
Act, the amount ordered by the court should be paid within 30 days.1007 If the court 
order is not satisfied the creditor may serve the order on the executive and accounting 
officer of the department and the State attorney or attorney of record appearing on 
behalf of the department concerned and the relevant treasury.1008 The relevant 
treasury official then has 14 days within which he or she must either satisfy the court 
order or make acceptable arrangements with the judgment creditor.1009 It follows that 
if the court order is not satisfied by the particular treasurer and/or acceptable 
arrangements are not made, the registrar or clerk may issue a warrant in relation to 
relevant moveable property owned by the State. At this point, the Sheriff can attach 
the moveable property belonging to the State, but he or she may not remove it.1010 
                                            
1002 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Nyathi 2010 4 SA 567 (CC); Olivier & Williams 
(2011) Obiter 506-513.  
1003 Section 3 of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011 (satisfaction of final court orders 
sounding in money) reads that “no execution, attachment or like process for the satisfaction of a final 
court order sounding in money may be issued against the defendant or respondent in any action or 
legal proceeding against the State, but the amount, if any, which may be required to satisfy any final 
order given or made against the nominal defendant or respondent in any such action or proceedings 
must be paid out…”(my emphasis). 
1004 For a detailed account of the procedure set out in the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011 see 
ME Ramonyai “State Liability Amendment Act: Process of attachment (practice note)” (2013) De Rebus 
20; L Boonzaaier “State Liability in South Africa: A more direct approach” (2013) 130 SALJ 330-368. 
1005 Section 3(7) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) SALJ 20. 
1006 Section 3(2) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) SALJ 20. 
1007 Section 3(a)(i) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) SALJ 20. 
1008 Section 3 (b)(ii) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) SALJ 20. 
1009 Section 3(5) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) SALJ 20. 
1010 Section 3(6) and 3(7)(a) and (b) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) 
SALJ 20. 
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Additionally, the Sheriff and the relevant State official may, by way of agreement 
determine which State-owned property may not be attached, removed or sold, 
especially where it will disrupt service delivery, threaten life or put public safety at 
risk.1011 If however, no agreement is reached, the Sheriff may attach any movable 
property owned by the State and used by the department concerned.1012 The Sheriff 
of the court may after the expiration of 30 days from the date of attachment, remove 
and sell the attached movable property in execution of the judgment debt.1013  
As of yet, there has been no cases in the context of evictions where a party has 
obtained an order sounding in money where the State has failed to pay such a party. 
However, where a court awards constitutional damages1014 to a land owner and the 
State fails to abide by the money judgment, a land owner will have to rely on the 
procedure set out in the Act for effective relief.   
6 Conclusion  
 
Where there is a failure to execute an eviction order, the court has a wide selection of 
remedies at its disposal so as to ensure that there is compliance. The court may decide 
to either grant a structural interdict1015 or constitutional damages1016 in the hope that it 
will provide relief to the affected parties.  
Where a structural interdict is issued and there is a further failure to adhere to or 
execute it, the court may either issue a follow-up and/or more specific structural 
interdict;1017 opt for alternative relief such as constitutional damages1018 or raise the 
issue of contempt of court mero motu.1019  
                                            
1011 Section 7(a) and (b) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) SALJ 20. 
1012 Section 3(7)(c) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) SALJ 20. 
1013 Section 3(7)(c) of the State Liability Amendment Act 14 of 2011; Ramonyai (2013) SALJ 20. 
1014 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of constitutional damages.  
1015 See Chapter 2 above in general.  
1016 See Chapter 3 above in general.  
1017 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) and 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2011 7 BCLR (CC). See 
Chapter 2 at 4 3 above.  
1018 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa 
v Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) and President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See Chapter 2 at 4 2 above.  
1019 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). See Chapter 2 at 4 4 
above.  
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Where further structural interdicts or constitutional damages are not utilised, the litigant 
may seek the enforcement of the order ad factum praestandum (whether it be a land 
owner or amicus of the court acting on behalf of the unlawful occupiers) or the court 
may raise the issue of contempt of court. In this regard, the requirements for contempt 
of court as laid down in Fakie, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. As is evident 
from Meadow Glen, joinder will play an important role in holding the correct individual 
State officials accountable for the execution of court orders.1020 Ultimately, joinder of 
the relevant State officials to the execution of court orders will ensure that State 
officials are aware of what is expected of them in terms of the Constitution and their 
statutory obligations. If they fulfil their constitutional and statutory obligations, effective 
relief will ultimately be realised. In this regard, contempt of court proceedings provides 
a way of executing orders ad factum praestandum. However, where there is no wilful 
disobedience and no mala fides on the part of the State, it will not be possible to find 
the defaulting party in contempt of court. In such cases, other relief, such as 
declaratory orders, further structural interdicts, a fine or constitutional damages will 
have to be utilised to ensure compliance and obtain eventual effective relief. Failure 
to comply with a further structural interdict may lead to further contempt of court 
proceedings or further litigation. Where this is the case, it means that there has already 
been a continuous failure to comply with orders of the court and providing effective 
relief, without addressing or solving the real problem - the provision and realisation of 
adequate housing for those in desperate need thereof. It is questionable whether the 
relief, if any, at this stage in the litigation process can be regarded as effective, having 
regard to the cost and time associated with obtaining relief.  
Where the State fails to adhere to an order ad pecuniam solvendam, at any stage of 
litigation, such as an order requiring the State to pay a fine or constitutional damages, 
the judgment creditor will have to follow the procedure set out in the State Liability 
Amendment Act to enforce the money order and ultimately obtain effective relief.  
 
 
                                            
1020 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Another 
2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) para 22; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All 
SA 251 (SCA) paras 18-20 and 25; Liebenberg & Muller (2013) SAJHR 569-570. 
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Chapter 5: Reflections, Recommendations and 
Conclusions  
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1 Summary  
 
In essence, effective relief regarding residential property following the failure to 
execute an eviction order, constitutes relief that will realise the rights of the respective 
parties involved in the particular case within a reasonable time. This thesis set out to 
establish whether the structural interdict, constitutional damages and contempt of 
court proceedings may be regarded as effective relief where there has been a failure 
to execute an eviction order.  
Chapter 2 began with an exposition of the general requirements for a structural 
interdict, followed by the nature, scope, purpose and features of the structural interdict. 
Having regard to the anatomy of the structural interdict, arguments against and in 
favour of the use of the structural interdict were explored. In this regard the structural 
interdict has been criticised for infringing the separation of powers doctrine. However, 
this main criticism can be addressed through formulating the structural interdict in such 
a way that it does not conflict with the separation of powers doctrine. Another way to 
address the criticisms is by way of using different models for supervision. In this 
regard, the models found in American jurisprudence have provided some insight. The 
bargaining, public hearing, expert remedial formulation, report back to court and 
consensual remedial formulation models provide different processes and methods for 
oversight, which are key to the structural interdict’s anatomy. It is clear that the 
formulation of the structural interdict and model used for oversight must be of such a 
nature so as to suit the very specific circumstances of each case. Changing 
circumstances, often encountered in eviction cases, may also justify and require an 
altered formulation and consequently changed model for oversight for finally obtaining 
effective relief.  In this regard, there is room for the South African courts to explore 
other models for oversight, apart from the report back to court model, which broadens 
the scope of outcomes in eviction cases.  
Having established that there may be different approaches to finding effective relief, 
the circumstances under which it would be appropriate to use the structural interdict 
are explored. In this regard, various factors emerge that may be used by a court to 
determine whether a structural interdict will be an appropriate form of relief in a 
particular eviction case. Factors such as a past failure to comply with a court order, 
the consequences of non-compliance with a court order, the lack of specificity with 
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regard to the formulation of a structural interdict and cases where it is desirable to 
inform the parties involved in the eviction case of the steps that will be taken by the 
State may be used to determine whether a structural interdict will constitute 
appropriate relief in a given case.  Appropriate relief does not necessarily mean that 
the relief granted is effective.  Accordingly, a discussion of the factors is followed by 
an examination of the use of the structural interdict in South African eviction case law 
specifically. The discussion of the case law considers whether the use of the structural 
interdict was appropriate in the specific case, in accordance with the factors identified 
by the courts and academic writers and whether it provided effective relief.  
Although the use of the structural interdict made sense at a theoretical level, it did not 
provide effective relief in all cases, for various reasons. In some cases it was not the 
appropriate remedy from the outset. In other cases is was not effective because of a 
further failure by the State to adhere to the structural interdict, for a variety of reasons. 
In such cases, further or alternative relief was required to realise the rights of the land 
owner and unlawful occupiers respectively.  
Chapter 3 set out to explore whether indirect or direct constitutional damages can 
provide relief in the eviction context where the structural interdict was not appropriate 
or was not executed.  In line with the single-system of law concept and subsidiarity 
principles, reliance should first be placed on indirect constitutional damages. Only 
where there is no legislation that provides for monetary compensation or where the 
common law does not provide effective relief within the eviction context, may reliance 
be placed on direct constitutional damages. In the context of evictions, PIE does not 
provide for a compensation remedy, nor does the law of delict provide for an effective 
remedy. In the absence of a regulatory framework providing for compensation in cases 
where the unlawful occupation of land amounts to an indefinite deprivation of the land 
owner’s property, reliance on direct constitutional damages is warranted. In this 
regard, the Canadian approach to direct constitutional damages, developed in the 
Ward judgment, is discussed. The framework may provide insight and guidance to the 
South Africa courts with regard to whether direct constitutional damages may be 
appropriate in a specific case. This discussion is followed by an analysis of the use of 
direct constitutional damages in South African eviction case law.  Using the four step 
framework laid down in Ward, coupled with the listed factors in Kate, the discussion 
and analysis of Modderklip CC considers whether the use of direct constitutional 
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damages was appropriate. While direct constitutional damages may have constituted 
appropriate relief in Modderklip CC, it did not provide effective relief. Accordingly, 
alternative forms of relief such as expropriation, Ausgleich and sharing are also 
considered briefly.  
Finally, by way of comparison, Blue Moonlight SCA illustrates when constitutional 
damages will not be regarded as appropriate relief. 
In Chapter 4, dealing with civil contempt of court proceedings, it was found that 
although contempt of court proceedings is not a remedy in itself, it can be regarded as 
a means to achieving effective relief. In principle, contempt of court orders force a 
defaulting party to execute a previously obtained court order (orders ad factum 
praestandum or ad pecuniam solvendam), which can ultimately result in effective relief 
for the respective parties involved in an eviction case. In this regard, it is important that 
the correct defaulting party be joined to the proceedings so as to promote greater 
efficacy. It is clear that the State has a role to play in the realisation of the land owner’s 
and unlawful occupiers’ rights. The State must protect the land owner’s property rights 
and provide the marginalised unlawful occupiers with the means of realising their right 
to have access to adequate land and housing.   
2 Reflection 
2 1 Introduction  
 
While the court has a wide selection of remedies at its disposal,1021 it has an integral 
role to play in the optimal balancing exercise in relation to the litigating parties, who 
often have conflicting rights and interests, especially in the context of evictions. The 
court also has an important role to play in officiating where other branches of 
government, namely the executive and the legislative branches, are relevant. While 
adjudicating it is also critical that the courts adhere to the separation of powers 
doctrine. In this regard, the extent of the judiciary’s control over the State (the 
                                            
1021 Section 38 read with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South  Africa, 1996; 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 18 
and 33. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; M Bishop 
“Remedies” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014); C 
Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation of court orders in South Africa: You are the “weakest 
link” in realising socio-economic right: Goodbye (2008) 5; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 377-461. 
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executive and the legislature) is indeterminate.1022 Generally, the courts have the 
jurisdiction to oversee and supervise State actions.1023  
In this regard, Froneman J held that:  
 
“[J]udges will invariably “create law” [when giving content to the values and principles 
in the Constitution]. For those steeped in the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, the 
notion of judges creating law, and not merely interpreting and applying law, is an 
uncomfortable one. Whether that traditional view was ever correct is debatable, but 
the danger exists that it will inhibit judges from doing what they are called upon to do 
in terms of the Constitution.”1024  
 
Accordingly, the court has the authority to ensure that empowered State officials carry 
out their constitutional duties so as to protect constitutional rights and provide effective 
relief. The court’s power to provide effective relief is dependent on a number of factors, 
including, but not limited to, the willingness of the judge to interfere with the execution 
of State action (which is often, but not always, politically driven),1025 the willingness of 
the State to cooperate with other spheres of governments, the attitude of the State 
officials in adhering to court orders and budgetary and other resource allocations.1026 
Ultimately, the State’s conduct is framed and set out in the Constitution and the 
adjudication thereof is guided by the law in its all-encompassing sense.  
 
Yet, given the court’s powers, it still remains unclear to what extent a court may 
intervene in State action.1027 Judicial deference or respect1028 may be required in 
cases where there are multiple social and/or economic consequences for the 
community; issues that are of a polycentric nature1029 or where the decision taken by 
                                            
1022 S Viljoen “The systemic violation of section 26(1): An appeal for structural relief by the judiciary” 
(2015) 30 SAPL 54.  
1023 Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) para 244. 
1024 Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 4 SA 235 (CC) paras 597-598. 
1025 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 55. 
1026 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 55; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation vi. 
1027 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 55. 
1028 C Hoexter Administrative law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 138-139; C Hoexter “The future of judicial 
review in South African administrative law” (2000) SALJ 507.  
1029 M Pieters “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 
295. 
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the executive branch of State is highly technical.1030 Regardless of the uncertainty, the 
court still has a duty to evaluate State action that concerns the infringement of 
constitutional rights.1031 Accordingly, while the court may not make budgetary 
allocations and determine how the State should structure its housing policies, it may 
still determine and adjudicate on whether the State has used its resources effectively 
for the realisation of constitutional rights.  
 
The court’s duty and role are crucial to the transformation of society, as it has to enjoin 
the executive and the legislature to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights.1032 This requires active involvement from the court, usually by requiring 
the State to take appropriate measures to give effect to constitutional rights.1033 The 
question remains how the court will hold the State accountable in cases where it failed 
to vindicate the rights of affected parties in eviction cases, without seizing the functions 
of the executive or the legislature. The realisation of the rights to have access to land 
and housing respectively, without infringing the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
property,1034 is especially difficult to adjudicate on “since it is a polycentric issue with 
multiple social and economic repercussions for the community”.1035 Apart from the 
inherent difficulties mentioned here, it is also practically challenging to dictate how the 
State should realise these rights as a number of different State actions taken at 
different governmental levels are necessary.1036 Nevertheless, the court must ensure 
that the State fulfils its constitutional obligations. This requires, at the very least, that 
the State provide the homeless with a secure space that will, to some extent, provide 
tenure security.1037 In this regard, the court serving in its supervisory role is required 
to have oversight in relation to the actual realisation of the land owner’s and unlawful 
                                            
1030 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) 
para 48. 
1031 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 56. 
1032 Section 7(2); read with sections 25(1), 25(6) and 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996. 
1033 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 56. See for example Pitje v Shibambo 2016 4 BCLR 460 (CC); City of 
Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA); Mahogany Ridge 2 Property 
Owners Association v Unlawful Occupiers of Lot 13113 Pinetown 2013 2 All SA 236 (KZD); 
Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v The Unlawful Occupiers of the Newtown Urban Village 
2013 1 SA 583 (GSJ). 
1034 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
1035 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 57. 
1036 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 57. 
1037 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 58; President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 22. 
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occupiers’ respective constitutional rights over a period of time. Ideally, the oversight 
should ensure that the State’s medium and long term plans pertaining to the provision 
of land and adequate housing are realised.1038 Arguably, the structural interdict could 
serve as a remedy and a means of ensuring that the State realises these rights.  
Having regard to the remedies discussed in this thesis, it should be noted that 
acquiring effective relief can be time-consuming and costly processes for private or 
State land owners seeking to evict unlawful occupiers from property used for 
residential purposes. Where an eviction order is granted, it must be executed with the 
assistance of the South African Police Force or other State officials or agents.1039 A 
failure to execute an eviction order granted by the court, can subsequently lead to 
further litigation between the affected parties.1040 Although not limited to the following 
remedies, the court may decide to either grant a structural interdict1041 or constitutional 
damages in cases where there has been a failure to execute an eviction order.1042 
However, the question remains whether these remedies will provide effective relief.  
2 2 Mechanisms to achieve effective relief  
 
An analysis of the structural interdict in Chapter 2 has shown that although the remedy 
may provide effective relief in theory, the lack of participation by the State to execute 
the remedy as a means of realising the rights of the parties, remains problematic and 
worrisome.1043 State participation is determined and impacted on by various factors, 
including capacity, resources, budgetary considerations, good governance and 
sustainability.1044 The particular disposition of the relevant State official or officials 
within a particular State department may also emerge at this point, ultimately impacting 
negatively on active participation. Peculiarly, the very circumstance that triggers the 
                                            
1038 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 58. 
1039 Section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 read with section 14 of the 
South African Police Service Act 65 of1995. 
1040 See for example Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2011 7 
BCLR (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 
(CC) and Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). These cases 
are discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. See also E MacDonnell Chilemba “Evictions in South 
Africa during 2014 - an analytical narrative: feature” (2015) 16 ESR Review 3-6.   
1041 See Chapter 2 in general.  
1042 See Chapter 3 in general.  
1043 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 57. 
1044 Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation vi. See in general Van Wyk (2011) PELJ 50-83; JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert “Uitsettings onder die Suid-Afrikaanse grondwet: die verhouding tussen artikel 
25(1), artikel 26(3) en die Uitsettingswet (slot)” (2006) 3 TSAR 522-536.   
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use of a structural interdict is also the determining factor linked to the successful 
implementation thereof. What is even more worrisome is that, while the State is 
constitutionally mandated to give effect to the rights in the Bill of Rights, it is often the 
transgressor.1045 Pheko 1, for example, shows that the State was reluctant to give 
effect to the rights enshrined in section 26 of the Constitution, as it failed to provide 
the unlawful occupiers with alternative, post-eviction land and housing.1046 Section 26, 
read with section 25(6) of the Constitution, envisions legally secure tenure.1047 By 
allowing the occupiers to remain on the land unlawfully, such as in the case of 
Modderklip CC (or Joe Slovo 1), the rights of the unlawful occupiers remain uncertain. 
Strydom notes that “unlawful occupation of land is incongruent with legally secure 
tenure”1048 and therefore cannot be sanctioned by the court.1049  
Olivia Road, where the structural interdict was awarded prior to the eviction, illustrates 
that issuing a structural interdict before considering and awarding an eviction order in 
terms of PIE may provide effective relief. In other cases analysed in Chapter 2, the 
structural interdict was awarded after an eviction order was already granted. In those 
cases, effective relief was not realised. Accordingly, Olivia Road highlights that the 
structural interdict has the potential to provide effective relief if it is awarded sooner, 
rather than later, during the course of the eviction proceedings. Requiring the parties 
to engage meaningfully with one another before considering and awarding an eviction 
order should ideally be required to be a compulsory procedural step.1050 Engagement 
in the early stages of the eviction processes will also ensure that the correct parties, 
such as amici curiae and State officials or departments, are identified and joined to the 
proceedings. Joinder of the correct and relevant parties, officials and departments at 
this stage ensures that those responsible for the execution of a subsequent court order 
are aware of their duties and responsibilities and can be held accountable.1051 A 
                                            
1045 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 53. 
1046 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 53; Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8.  
1047 Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8. 
1048 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 69-70. 
1049 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 47; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 
59 where the court made a similar finding to the extent that the unlawful occupiers could remain on 
private land; Viljoen (2015) SAPL 69-70. 
1050 B Ray “Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg: Enforcing the right to adequate housing 
through ‘engagement’” (2008) 8 HRLR 703-713 highlights the necessity of meaningful engagement 
before an eviction order is granted.  
1051 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 59; City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2 All SA 251 (SCA) paras 18-20 and 22-24.  
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situation such as in Pheko 2 can accordingly be avoided by way of joinder, because 
the party responsible for the execution of a court order will not be able to raise the 
defence that they were not aware of the court order.  
Despite its potential, in most cases, a structural interdict may not result in effective 
relief without close supervision by and scrutiny of the court, coupled with the 
willingness of the parties to engage meaningfully with one another and the State’s 
fulfilment of its constitutional duties.1052 Perhaps the degree of supervision and the 
model used should be adapted in direct correlation to changing circumstances in 
eviction cases to ensure that the State, over time, realises the rights envisioned by 
section 26 of the Constitution.  
Where the use of a structural interdict has not provided effective relief, the right to a 
remedy does not simply wither away. Parties are still entitled to effective relief 
regardless of whether the structural interdict was successful or not. Accordingly, where 
a structural interdict is issued and there is a further failure to adhere to or execute it, 
the court may either issue a declaration; a follow-up and/or more specific structural 
interdict;1053 opt for alternative relief such as constitutional damages1054 or raise the 
issue of contempt of court mero motu.1055 In such cases, the eviction process may 
become even more time-consuming and costly for the litigating parties with no 
guarantee of obtaining effective relief.  
Importantly, constitutional damages can be viewed as a primary remedy or an 
alternative remedy for the vindication of parties’ rights. Thus far, there has only been 
one case, Modderklip CC, where the court has awarded direct constitutional damages. 
The award for direct constitutional damages can be regarded as alternative relief, 
because the structural interdict was not executed in Modderklip HC. As of yet, the 
court has not used direct constitutional damages as a primary remedy in eviction 
cases. The adoption of a general framework for awarding direct constitutional 
                                            
1052 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 418-424. 
1053 See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisa Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC). 
See Chapter 2 at 4 3 above.  
1054 See Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery and President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC). See Chapter 2 at 4 2 above.  
1055 See Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). See Chapter 2 at 
4 4 above.  
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damages should be considered, developed and established to ensure and promote 
the use of direct constitutional damages as a primary remedy. A discussion of 
constitutional damages has revealed that although compensation may adequately or 
partially vindicate the rights of a private land owner, the rights of the unlawful occupiers 
will be violated on a continuous basis where the State fails to provide legally secure 
tenure. In effect the rights of the unlawful occupiers remain in limbo where the State 
fails to adhere to its constitutional obligations. Despite realising the rights of the land 
owner and unlawful occupiers partially, in retrospect the best option in the Modderklip 
cases would arguably have been to expropriate the property. 
Furthermore, constitutional damages are paid out of state funds comprised out of the 
taxpayer’s money. Accordingly, it is the taxpayer who effectively pays the award for 
constitutional damages, while the State escapes liability.1056 In this regard, state funds 
should be utilised more efficiently to address and cater for the provision of tenure 
security and adequate housing.1057  
The recurring pattern seems to be that the State continuously fails to give effect to its 
constitutional obligations, regardless of the remedy awarded by the court. In other 
words, it seems that both the structural interdict and constitutional damages provide 
some relief, but the relief provided does not necessarily amount to effective relief, 
because the orders of the court are not adhered to in full by the State.  
One way of ensuring that the orders of the court are fulfilled is to rely on civil contempt 
of court proceedings. As noted above,1058 contempt of court proceedings is not a 
remedy in its own right, but rather a means of contributing to the realisation of effective 
relief. Where there is a failure to execute a structural interdict within a reasonable time, 
or where further structural interdicts are awarded but not executed, the litigant seeking 
the execution of the order ad factum praestandum (whether it be a land owner or 
amicus of the court acting on behalf of the unlawful occupiers) or the court mero motu, 
may raise the issue of contempt of court. In this regard, the requirements for contempt 
of court as laid down in Fakie, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  
                                            
1056 BL Batchelor Constitutional Damages for the Infringement of a Social Assistance Right in South 
Africa: Are monetary damages in the form of interest a just and equitable remedy for the breach of a 
social right? LLM University Fort Hare (2011) 128.  
1057 Sections 25(6) and 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
1058 See 1 above.  
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In this context joinder is important for two main reasons. Firstly, it provides the court 
with an important and significant mechanism to involve relevant State departments 
and officials in the eviction process during the procedural and adjudication phases.1059  
In Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants of La Colleen Court1060 the court held 
that the interests of the unlawful occupiers, private land owner and the State would be 
protected if the State is joined to the proceedings, because the State has a duty to 
provide the evicted occupiers with adequate land and housing.1061 If State officials are 
joined during the procedural and adjudication phases, then the State, in its different 
formats and various levels, will have the full picture of land needs and demands.   
Muller and Liebenberg add that joining the State (or the local government more 
specifically) to eviction proceedings is a matter of necessity in insisting that it fulfils its 
constitutional obligations.1062 Secondly, as is evident from Meadow Glen, joinder will 
play an important role in holding the correct individual State officials accountable 
during the execution phase of the eviction process.1063 Ultimately, joinder of the 
relevant State officials or departments to the execution of an eviction order, during the 
eviction process as a whole, will ensure that State officials are aware of what is 
expected of them in terms of the Constitution and their statutory obligations. The 
parties responsible for the execution of a court order will not be able to aver that they 
did not have knowledge of the order. 
 
If the State sets out to fulfil its constitutional and statutory obligations, effective relief 
will ultimately be realised. However, where there is no wilful disobedience and no mala 
                                            
1059 See Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 231-257 on “Joinder” which analyses the 
case law on necessary joinder of local authorities to eviction proceedings. See the following cases in 
this regard: ABSA Bank Ltd v Murray 2004 2 SA 15 (CC); Cashbuild (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Scott 
2007 1 SA 332 (T); Lingwood v The Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of Erf 9 Highlands 2008 3 BCLR 325 
(W); Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants of La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W); Chieftain 
Real Estate Incorporated in Ireland v Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2008 5 SA 387 (T); Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 2009 1 SA 470 (W); City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) 
para 40; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 30 (Pty) Ltd 2012 
2 SA 104 (CC) paras 42-46; City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA) 
para 37. 
1060 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W). 
1061 Sailing Queen Investments v The Occupants of La Colleen Court 2008 6 BCLR 666 (W) paras 3, 6 
and 8; Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). 
1062 Muller & Liebenberg (2013) SAJHR 555 and 569-570. 
1063 Meadow Glen Home Owners Association and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
and Another 2015 1 All SA 299 (SCA) para 22; Liebenberg & Muller (2013) SAJHR 569-570. 
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fides on the part of the State, it will not be possible to find the defaulting party in 
contempt of court. In such cases, other relief, such as declaratory orders, further 
structural interdicts, a fine or constitutional damages will have to be utilised to ensure 
compliance with court orders.1064 Failure to comply with a further structural interdict 
may lead to even further contempt of court proceedings or a need for further relief. 
Where this is the case, it means that there have already been continuous failures to 
comply with orders of the court, without addressing or solving the real problem - the 
provision and realisation of adequate land and housing for those in desperate need 
thereof. It is questionable whether the relief, if any, at this stage in the litigation process 
can be regarded as effective, having regard to the cost and time associated with 
obtaining relief.  
Where the State fails to pay a sum of money (order ad pecuniam solvendam),1065 at 
any stage of litigation, the judgment creditor will have to follow the procedure set out 
in the State Liability Amendment Act to enforce the order and ultimately obtain 
effective relief. Thus far, there have been no cases before the court where the parties 
have made use of the procedure set out in the State Liability Amendment Act within 
the eviction context. The lack of court cases dealing with the efficacy of the procedure 
in the State Liability Amendment Act either means that the procedure is effective or 
that the procedure has not been utilised that often because there are so few cases 
where direct constitutional damages are awarded.   
2 3 Time considerations  
 
One of the main concerns with obtaining effective relief is the time it takes to achieve 
it. If the time lapse between the start of the proceedings and the realisation of the 
parties’ rights becomes too long, given the circumstances of the cases, it becomes 
questionable whether the relief provided can still be regarded as effective. For relief to 
be regarded as effective, the rights of the parties should be realised within a 
reasonable time. What constitutes a reasonable time in the context of evictions is 
case-specific, having regard to the particular circumstances of each case. 
Unfortunately, this means that what is deemed to be a reasonable time within the 
                                            
1064 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC) para 37; Fakie NO v 
CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 4 SA 326 (SCA) para 65. See Chapter 4, 3 1 3 in this regard.  
1065 Such as an order requiring the State to pay a fine or constitutional damages.  
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context of effective relief may be rather vague and uncertain. That is necessary as the 
time period linked to the execution of an eviction order cannot be fixed and ought to 
be flexible in light of changing circumstances, the conduct and attitude of the parties, 
budget restraints, resource allocation problems and competency issues within the 
different levels of government.  
 
The pertinent question in this regard is at what point during the course of litigation one 
may regard the period of time as unreasonable. The court in Blue Moonlight SCA1066  
held that a reasonable degree of patience should be expected of the land owner. The 
State must furthermore be given a reasonable time to comply with the accompanying 
order to provide alternative accommodation.1067 While being expected to wait until the 
“slow wheels of justice and equally slow, if not slower, wheels of [S]tate action [to] take 
their course,”1068 the land owner may potentially suffer massive financial loss.1069 It is 
conceivable that the delay in the execution of an eviction order and/or the failure to 
execute a structural interdict may result in an arbitrary deprivation of property.1070 
While this thesis is not focused on determining whether PIE results in arbitrary 
deprivation or whether PIE is constitutionally sound, it is undeniable that where a land 
owner has obtained an eviction order in terms of PIE, but there is a failure to execute 
it within an extended period of time, the owner is deprived of most, if not all, of his or 
her rights of use, benefit and exploitation of his or her property.1071  
 
Time considerations associated with the execution of an eviction order may also have 
an impact on whether there is an arbitrary deprivation of property. PIE does not intend 
to permanently deprive a land owner of ownership or enjoyment of property.1072 In Port 
                                            
1066 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA). 
1067 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 39 (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA (SCA) 337 
para 100; M Kruger “Arbitrary deprivation of property: an argument for the payment of compensation by 
the state in certain cases of unlawful occupation” (2014) 131 SALJ 328 329. 
1068 Kruger (2014) SALJ 329. 
1069 Kruger (2014) SALJ 334. 
1070 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC); Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 190-333; Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-28; J Strydom & S Viljoen (Maass) “Unlawful occupation 
of inner-city buildings: A constitutional analysis of the rights and obligations involved” (2014) 17 PELJ 
1207 1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235. 
1071 Kruger (2014) SALJ 340. 
1072 Grobler v Msimang 2008 3 ALL SA 549 (W) para 132; Ndlovo v Ngcobo and Bekker v Jika 2003 1 
SA 113 (SCA) para 23. 
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Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers1073 the Constitutional Court held that the 
court’s function is not to establish a hierarchy of rights between section 25 and section 
26 of the Constitution but rather to “balance out and reconcile opposed claims in as 
just a manner as possible, taking into account all the interests involved and the specific 
factors relevant in each particular case”.1074 However, in some instances the 
application of PIE results in individual property owners having to bear disproportionate 
harsh and excessive burdens for the sake of some public purpose.1075 In principle, this 
amounts to arbitrary deprivations of property that are invalid and unconstitutional for 
being inconsistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution.1076 The outcome in the 
Modderklip cases serves as an example of where the effect of a regulatory burden, 
such as the application of the provisions of PIE, may in some instances render the 
deprivation of property substantively arbitrary.1077  
 
Accordingly, in light of the ubi jus ibi remedium principle,1078 certain procedural and 
substantive recommendations are proposed that may promote or better ensure the 
realisation of effective relief for all parties involved in the eviction process.  
3 Recommendations 
3 1 Introduction  
 
In light of the three phases of the eviction process - the procedural, adjudicatory and 
execution phase respectively, particular recommendations are suggested that may, as 
a whole, ensure that effective relief is provided. In this regard, certain procedural 
suggestions in relation to the eviction process are discussed. Furthermore, the choice 
of oversight model and the formulation of the structural interdict may also contribute 
to the realisation of effective relief. In cases where the structural interdict does not 
                                            
1073 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
1074 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23; K Bezuidenhout 
Compensation for excessive but otherwise lawful regulatory State action LLD Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 247.  
1075 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 129. 
1076 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of South Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC); 
Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 1209. See in general Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
190-333. See also Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-28; Strydom & Viljoen (Maass) (2014) PELJ 
1207 1220, 1222-1223, 1231-1235. 
1077 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 250. 
1078 Minister of the Interior v Harris 1952 4 SA 769 (A) 781; Kruger (2014) SALJ 358. 
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provide for effective relief, alternative relief is needed. Compensation in the form of 
indirect or direct constitutional damages seems to provide effective relief to some 
extent. Accordingly, in light of the single-system-of-law concept1079 and subsidiarity 
principles1080 two options are proposed. Firstly, it is recommended that PIE be 
amended to include an automatic or discretionary right of compensation to cater for 
situations where there has been an unreasonable delay in the execution of an eviction 
order. In the event that such an amendment is not effected, it is recommended 
secondly, that a general framework for the use of direct constitutional damages be 
developed.  
3 2 Procedural suggestions during the eviction process 
 
In terms of the procedural phase,1081 the identification and joinder of the correct and 
relevant State officials or departments from the outset should be regarded as the first 
step and safeguard in ensuring that effective relief is ultimately achieved. This step 
ensures that there is not an unnecessary additional delay in the execution of a court 
order, as was the case in Pheko 2.1082 This step also ensures that the State cannot 
later aver that they had no knowledge of the order against them, whether it be an order 
ad factum praestandum or ad pecuniam solvendam. In this regard, joinder is not a 
remedy in itself, but rather a procedural safeguard for the effective execution of court 
orders that follow.  
 
                                            
1079 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 44; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 19-20; AJ van der 
Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 1 CCR 77.  
1080 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36, 40-43, 81-91.  
1081 The procedural phase is characterised by the necessary procedural steps that need to be taken by 
an owner (or a person in charge) or organ of State, in accordance with the Prevention of Illegal Eviction 
from Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 in order to launch an application for eviction of the 
unlawful occupier(s) from private or public land. See sections 4, 5 and 6 of the PIE in this regard. 
1082 Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) 2015 6 BCLR 711 (CC). See Chapter 4 at 3 1.  
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In terms of the adjudicatory phase1083 and in cases where it is appropriate to award a 
structural interdict1084 it may be more appropriate to award a structural interdict before 
awarding an eviction order, given the outcome in Olivia Road.1085 In this regard, it is 
proposed that the structural interdict be employed during the procedural phase of the 
eviction process. Allowing the affected parties to engage meaningfully with each other 
with a view of exploring mutually acceptable solutions1086 may increase the likelihood 
thereof that the rights of the respective parties will be realised. Once a mutually 
acceptable solution to the dispute is reached, a court may award an eviction order in 
terms of PIE. In other words, a plan to realise the respective rights of the parties is 
agreed to and set out before an eviction order is granted by the court. Provided that 
the solution crafted by the parties is reasonable and lawful the agreement may be 
seen as a self-imposed remedy that is more likely to be executed. Where the eviction 
order is consequently granted by the court and the agreement between the parties is 
set in motion, a further structural interdict may be used during the execution phase1087 
to supervise the progress of the plan and to ensure that the parties adhere to their 
proposed solutions. This leaves room for the use of the structural interdict after an 
eviction order has been granted. Accordingly, to realise effective relief, a structural 
interdict may be viable both before and after the granting of an eviction order. Ideally, 
                                            
1083 The adjudicatory phase entails a substantive determination by the court whether it is appropriate, 
just and equitable, after considering all the relevant circumstances of the case as required by the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction of Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998, to grant an eviction order 
- see sections 4(6) and 6(1) respectively. See for example Pitje v Shibambo 2016 4 BCLR 460 (CC); 
City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA); Mahogany Ridge 2 Property 
Owners Association v Unlawful Occupiers of Lot 13113 Pinetown 2013 2 All SA 236 (KZD); 
Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v The Unlawful Occupiers of the Newtown Urban Village 
2013 1 SA 583 (GSJ). See also in general Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 268-316, 349-351.                     
1083 Sections 4(6)-4(8), 5(1) and 6(3) respectively of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction of Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
1084 See Chapter 2 at 3 5 above.  
1085 See Chapter 2 at 4 5 above.   
1086 Occupiers of Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) and Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 418-424. 
1087 The execution phase is only applicable when an eviction order was granted by the court. In line with 
PIE, just and equitable dates, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, are also set for 
(a) eviction and (b) the execution of the eviction order. Where the land or property is vacated voluntarily 
on the date set, the eviction process is complete. However, when the land or property is not vacated as 
required, the eviction order is executed on a further date, as set out in the eviction order. This execution 
phase is invariably effected with the assistance of the South African Police Force or other State agents 
or officials and involves the removal of unlawful occupiers from the land or property in question. It is 
increasingly clear that an eviction order cannot be executed, unless the State provides some land: 
Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa v 
Modderklip Boerdery 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 26.   
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the structural interdict should be employed before the adjudicatory phase and during 
the execution phase in order to promote the realisation of effective relief.  
 
From the outset, the court should play an active role in determining the type of State 
action that would be regarded as acceptable. In this regard, the court should retain 
jurisdiction over the plans proposed by the State during the procedural and execution 
phases of the eviction process. During the procedural phase, the court should 
determine whether the steps or plans proposed by the State are reasonable and 
lawful. 1088 In this regard, the court should guide the State to “rule out options that are 
inherently incompatible with the transformative purpose of the Constitution”.1089  
During the execution phase, the court should oversee that the steps or plans 
formulated by the State are adequately implemented in due course.  
 
During the procedural and/or execution phases, the model for supervision used and 
the formulation of the structural interdict may also have an impact on whether effective 
relief is realised. 
3 3 The choice of oversight model 
 
The court’s supervisory role is important throughout the provision of structural 
relief.1090  In this regard, the courts have a choice between various models for oversight 
in terms of which the court’s oversight may be structured. The court may decide to use 
the bargaining, public hearing, expert remedial formulation, report back to court or the 
consensual remedial formulation model or a combination of the models to realise 
effective relief.1091 Each of these models provides different processes and methods for 
oversight. The choice of oversight model is dependent on the specific or changing 
circumstances of each eviction case. Depending on the circumstances of each case, 
different parties with different notions of what will constitute effective relief, may 
                                            
1088 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 68; B Ray “Proceduralisation’s triumph and engagement’s promise in socio-
economic rights litigation” (2011) 27 SAJHR 107 114 states that “procedural remedies like engagement 
promote that kind of dialogue and thus give the courts an important role to play while still democratizing 
the process of constitutional development. The result is a collaborative model of constitutional 
development in which courts, citizens and political branches each participate in negotiating the meaning 
of the Constitution”. 
1089 Sections 25(6) and 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Viljoen (2015) SAPL 
68. 
1090 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 68. 
1091 See Chapter 2 at 3 4 above.   
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become part of the court proceedings. In this context different affected parties may 
provide insight and guidance to the courts in determining what will constitute effective 
relief.  
 
Thus far, the court has primarily used the report back to court model. It is proposed 
that the courts should explore the use of the other models for oversight which may 
provide different ways of realising effective relief. In this regard, the particular model 
for oversight used, may impact on the formulation of the structural relief. Accordingly, 
the model used for oversight and the formulation of the structural interdict must be 
structured and used in such a way that combined, they will suit the very specific 
circumstances of each eviction case so as to provide effective relief.  
3 4 The formulation of the structural interdict 
 
“Structural interdicts can be structured to reach specific goals”.1092 Where a structural 
interdict is formulated in a very specific manner or by way of restrictive terms it poses 
the risk that the remedy may become obsolete if changing circumstances necessitate 
a drastic adaption thereof or calls for an alternative remedy. Accordingly, depending 
on a number of factors, for example, the willingness and the attitudes of the parties 
and the personal circumstances of the unlawful occupiers, the formulation of the 
structural interdict will vary. For instance, if the attitudes of the parties are of a 
recalcitrant nature and the eviction order will render the unlawful occupiers homeless, 
it may be necessary for the court to formulate the structural interdict in a form of a 
command, which leaves little room for dialogue and negotiations between the parties. 
However, if the attitudes of the parties are of a cooperative nature and the eviction 
order will not necessarily render the unlawful occupiers homeless, then it is proposed 
that the court formulate its orders in such a way that it may leave room for negotiations 
and meaningful engagement between the parties. In this regard, the court identifies 
issues that have to be discussed between the parties, but it does not direct the parties 
in detail how to do so.  
 
Strydom recommends that relief should be formulated to address the “systemised 
reform of the [S]tate’s conception of the content of section 26(1) and its obligations in 
                                            
1092 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 66. 
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relation to this right - that is, section 26(2)”.1093 She suggests that the structure of this 
form of relief should consist of a number of different facets. Firstly, the formulation of 
the structural interdict should incorporate a declaratory order in cases where the State 
is in contravention of the Constitution and infringed section 26 rights. The right to 
access to housing will be contravened when there is a failure to assist evictees post-
eviction with access to alternative accommodation, or at the very least, suitable land 
for resettlement. It is crucial that the court identify the State action that amounted to 
the violation of constitutional rights. The identification of the State action responsible 
for the violation(s) should create some awareness regarding the meaning of 
reasonable State action.1094 Secondly, the formulation of the structural interdict 
“should be directed at the prioritisation of the”1095 unlawful occupiers. Meaningful 
engagement, as it was formulated in Olivia Road, should be used by the State to 
determine the specific circumstances and needs of those facing eviction and 
homelessness.1096 Thirdly, the formulation of the structural interdict should be directed 
at the vindication of constitutional rights by the State.1097 Various models for 
supervision, alluded to above, can be used in this regard.1098 Ordinarily, the court will 
order the State to formulate a comprehensive plan based on the knowledge 
ascertained during meaningful engagement.1099 The plan may be structured to include 
successive phases which could lead to long-term housing solutions in accordance with 
section 26(1) of the Constitution. In accordance with section 25(5) and (6) of the 
Constitution, these solutions must also address (a) access to land; and (b) tenure 
security. The former requires finding and designating suitable land to unlawful 
occupiers and the latter requires a solution that transforms gross tenure insecurity into 
legally secure tenure.1100  
Where there is a lack of adherence to the plan formulated before and after the 
execution of the eviction order, which results in an unreasonable delay in the 
realisation of rights, alternative relief is needed.  
                                            
1093 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 66. 
1094 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 66. 
1095 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 66-67. 
1096 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 66-67. 
1097 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 67. 
1098 See Chapter 2 at 3 4 above. 
1099 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 67. 
1100 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 67. 
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3 5 Alternative relief 
3 5 1 Background  
 
Courts cannot be allowed to condemn situations where an unreasonable delay in the 
execution of an eviction order negates the realisation of effective relief. Accordingly, 
in light of the single-system-of-law concept and subsidiarity principles, it is proposed 
that there are two options available to the court. The first option available to the court 
it to declare PIE unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it does not afford a land 
owner a compensatory remedy against the State for loss incurred due to an 
unreasonable delay in the execution of an eviction order. In this regard, it is proposed 
that PIE be amended to include a compensatory mechanism. If PIE provided for a 
compensatory remedy to address instances where there is a disproportionate and 
continued violation of the land owner’s property rights, then the land owner instituting 
a claim for the eviction of the unlawful occupiers, would have to rely on the provisions 
of PIE to protect his or her property rights.1101  
In the absence of a regulatory compensatory mechanism in PIE, the alternative and 
second option for the court would be to step in and award constitutional relief such as 
direct constitutional damages. In this regard, it is proposed that a general framework 
for awarding direct constitutional damages be developed. These recommendations 
are accordingly explored.  
3 5 2 The amendment of PIE 
 
PIE serves an important public purpose, especially in ensuring that evictions take 
place in a humane and constitutional manner.1102 However, Kruger argues that PIE 
fails to strike a proper balance between the right of the land owner and the rights of 
the unlawful occupier(s).1103 Apart from PIE’s Preamble, it is only concerned with 
section 26(3) rights and not with section 25(1) rights.1104   
 
                                            
1101 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 36; Kruger (2014) SALJ 329; Strydom A hundred years of 
demolition orders (2012) 350. 
1102 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 19; Pienaar Land Reform 
(2014) 667-670, 688. 
1103 Kruger (2014) SALJ 328; 339-340.  
1104 Kruger (2014) SALJ 328; 339-340. 
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Currently, PIE does not provide for situations where there has been an unreasonable 
delay in the execution of an eviction order. The unreasonable delay may result in an 
indefinite period of unlawful occupation which extends beyond that which can be 
reasonably expected of a private land owner to endure without compensation.1105   In 
this regard, it may be unfair to expect of private land owners “to bear the harsh and 
disproportionate burden that results from a regulatory measure,”1106 such as PIE, in 
the public interest, without compensation. Accordingly, it is proposed that PIE be 
amended to include a compensatory mechanism which may reduce the 
disproportionate burden placed on the land owner.1107   
 
While the courts have a variety of remedies available at their disposal,1108 it is not for 
the courts to determine how the legislation should be amended, for that is the role of 
the legislature.1109  In this regard, it is recommended that PIE be amended to provide 
for an automatic1110 or discretionary right of compensation.1111 Both proposed 
amendments may provide effective relief to the land owner. These two proposed 
amendments are set out briefly below.  
3 5 2 1 An automatic right of compensation 
 
PIE may be amended to provide for an automatic right of compensation, whenever the 
execution of an eviction order is unreasonably delayed and amounts to an indefinite 
deprivation of the land owner’s property. Accordingly, where a court finds that there 
has been an unreasonable delay in the execution of an eviction order, an automatic 
                                            
1105 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 204, 213; Kruger (2014) SALJ 362.  
1106 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 204. 
1107 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 204, 212-213 252-253 See Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 277-280, 367; Stydom A hundred years of demolition orders 329, 350-351 
and Bishop “Remedies” in CLOSA 9-151 in this regard.  
1108  Section 38 read with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South  Africa, 1996; 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) paras 18 
and 33. See also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR (CC) para 69; Bishop “Remedies” 
in CLOSA 9-65-9-78; Mbazira Strategies for effective implementation 5; Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights 377-461. 
1109 Kruger (2014) SALJ 359; 361-362; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 
1 SA 46 (CC) para 41.   
1110 Kruger (2014) SALJ 361. 
1111 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363. 
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right of compensation on the part of the claimant exists. Such a right will only be 
subject to the determination of the quantum by the court. 1112  
3 5 2 2 A discretionary right of compensation  
 
PIE may be amended to include a discretionary right of compensation in cases where 
an eviction order is not executed within a reasonable time. Accordingly, where a court 
finds that there has been an unreasonable delay in the execution of a court order, it 
will have to determine whether the claimant has a right to claim compensation. In other 
words, the court has the discretion, in terms of PIE, to determine whether it will be just 
and equitable, in light of the unique circumstances of each case, to award 
compensation to the land owner.1113   
 
Arguably, some of the factors akin to those listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution1114 
could serve as a guide for the court in determining whether to award compensation.1115 
Accordingly, the following non-exhaustive list of factors can be included in the 
amendment of PIE: 1116 (a) the current use of the land;1117 (b) the history of the 
acquisition of the property;1118  (c) the use of the land before it was unlawfully 
occupied;1119 (d) the actual loss suffered as a consequence of the continued unlawful 
occupation;1120 (e) the length of time the land has been unlawfully occupied after an 
eviction order was granted;1121 (f) the degree to which the delay in the execution of the 
eviction order could be attributed to the land owner;1122 (g) the degree to which the 
delay in the execution of the eviction order could be attributed to the State;1123 (h) the 
extent of the steps taken by the land owner during the eviction process;1124 (i) the steps 
                                            
1112 Kruger (2014) SALJ 361. 
1113 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363. 
1114 Section 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides “the amount of 
compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable 
balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances”.  
1115 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363. 
1116 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363. 
1117 Section 25(3)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
1118 Section 25(3)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
1119 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363. 
1120 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363; MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 25. 
1121 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363. 
1122 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363. 
1123 Kruger (2014) SALJ 363. 
1124 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 25. 
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taken by the State during the eviction process; and (j) the availability of alternative 
relief.1125 
If such an amendment is effected, the need of the land owner to rely on an award of 
direct constitutional damages to vindicate his rights will be negated. A land owner will 
then rely solely on the provisions of PIE to execute an eviction order and claim 
compensation, which may provide effective relief. However, where such an 
amendment does not take effect, it becomes necessary to consider the implication of 
a court’s power and discretion to award direct constitutional damages.1126  
3 5 3 A framework for direct constitutional damages 
 
In accordance with the single-system-of-law concept and subsidiarity principles, Fose 
confirms that direct constitutional damages, as a constitutional remedy is only 
applicable where indirect remedies such as the interpretation of legislation or the 
development of the common law are incapable of vindicating infringed constitutional 
rights.1127 Furthermore, the court in Fose confirms that it is not  possible to claim direct 
constitutional damages over and above the compensation provided for in legislation 
or the common law if such a remedy already vindicates the claimants right(s) 
sufficiently.1128 
However, in the absence of a regulatory framework providing for compensation and in 
instances where PIE or the law of delict cannot be interpreted or developed to bring it 
in line with the Constitution,1129 it becomes necessary for the court to step in and award 
direct constitutional damages.1130 In this regard, it is accordingly recommended that 
the courts must develop the doctrine of direct constitutional damages which will afford 
                                            
1125 MEC for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2004 6 SA 40 (SCA) para 25. See also Viljoen (2015) 
SAPL 68 who states that: “An obvious example would be for the State to lease privately [owned] land 
that is unlawfully occupied. The State would act as public sector landlord, while the unlawful occupiers 
would in fact no longer occupy the land unlawfully. They would occupy the land as public sector tenants. 
The owner would receive some form of rental income, which the state would have to subsidise. An 
agreement of this kind can include a range of terms and conditions to suit the specific needs of all the 
parties involved…Alternatively, the state can expropriate the property”. 
1126 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 213. 
1127 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) paras 67; 98-99; Bezuidenhout 
Compensation for excessive State action 255. 
1128 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 67; Bezuidenhout Compensation 
for excessive State action 255. 
1129 Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
1130 Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 251. 
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a land owner a right to claim some measure of compensation from the State.1131 The 
Canadian approach to direct constitutional damages as developed in the Ward case 
could be adopted and adapted for use by the South Africa courts. In addition to the 
four step approach established in Ward, the factors listed in Kate and/or the proposed 
factors with regard to the amendment to PIE mentioned above, may also be used to 
determine whether to award constitutional damages.  
 
It is assumed, that the amendment of PIE or the development of a framework for direct 
constitutional damages will provide greater judicial certainty in relation to the 
application for indirect or direct constitutional damages in eviction cases.1132 The 
framework may also serve as a guideline for courts to determine whether to award 
direct constitutional damages. However, while a framework for direct constitutional 
damages may provide greater judicial certainty and may provide relief to a land owner, 
it still does not guarantee long term secure tenure for the unlawful occupiers.1133 
Accordingly, direct constitutional damages does not amount to effective relief for all 
parties involved in the eviction process.  
4 Conclusion 
 
Rights are of little value absent a remedy that can be executed within a reasonable 
time.1134 It is clear that the landowner’s property rights protected by section 25(1) of 
the Constitution and the unlawful occupiers’ rights entrenched in sections 25(5), 25(6), 
26(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution have the potential to create conflict.1135 In this 
regard, the court’s role is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement between the 
different rights and interests involved, but rather to “balance out and reconcile the 
opposed claims in as just a manner as possible, taking account of all the interests 
                                            
1131 Kruger (2014) SALJ 330, 362; Bezuidenhout Compensation for excessive State action 251; Fose v 
Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 58. 
1132 Barns (2013) Responsa Meridiana 21. 
1133 Viljoen (2015) SAPL 69-70; Pienaar (2015) SAPL 7-8.  
1134 Kruger (2014) SALJ 358. See also article 6, the right to a fair trial of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which holds that “[E]veryone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law” read with section 13, the right to an 
effective remedy which provides that “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 
1135 S Wilson “”Breaking the tie: Evictions from private land, homelessness and a new normality” (2009) 
126 SALJ 270; Kruger (2014) SALJ 328.  
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involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case”.1136 While the court 
has many remedies available at its disposal, it may still prove to be a complex and 
difficult task to reconcile these constitutionally protected rights.  
 
Landowners are expected to have a reasonable degree of patience pending the 
execution of an eviction order.1137 While patiently waiting for the State to take action 
and provide land and adequate housing to the unlawful occupiers, land owners’ 
property rights are continuously or, in some cases, indefinitely infringed. Land owners 
may also suffer massive financial loss in such cases. If one considers the practical 
difficulties, resource constraints and the time lapse associated with the execution of 
an eviction order,1138 the eviction process, as envisaged by PIE, struggles to 
sufficiently balance out and reconcile opposing claims of the land owners and the 
unlawful occupiers.1139 Accordingly, effective relief is needed to realise the respective 
rights of the parties.  
 
Where an eviction order was granted on the basis that it is just and equitable in the 
circumstances, ideally, and in theory, an effective remedy will embody immediate 
execution thereof.1140 However, in the context of the eviction process, such a remedy 
only exists in theory. Practically, it may not be possible for the State to execute an 
eviction order immediately, because land or adequate housing may not be readily 
available. In this regard, the right to access to housing does not imply that housing is 
available immediately. Instead it means that the State has to progressively realise the 
right over a period of time within its available resources, as envisaged in section 26(2) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  Nevertheless, the court should 
strive to find or forge1141 the best possible remedy for a particular eviction case.1142 
                                            
1136 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23.  
1137 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 
104 (CC) para 100.  
1138 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 
104 (CC) para 99.  
1139 Kruger (2014) SALJ 329.  
1140 Section 25(1) and sections 26(1) and (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
respectively. In this regard see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 17-18 and Roux “Property” in 
CLOSA 41-1-41-37; Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights 344-351; Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution 75-82, 
93-99; McLean “Housing” in CLOSA 55-8-55-14.  
1141 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69.  
1142 Kruger (2014) SALJ 328 358; DH Ziegler “Rights require remedies: A new approach to the 
enforcement of rights in the federal courts” (1987) 38 Hastings LJ 665 678; E Ling “From paper 
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The court will have to decide, having regard to the unique circumstances of each 
eviction case, which remedy may be the most appropriate and effective. 
 
This thesis set out to establish whether the structural interdict, constitutional damages 
and/or contempt of court proceedings may provide effective relief to the parties in a 
given case. While these remedies may provide some relief to the respective parties, 
each remedy has inherent problems. In this regard particular amendments aimed at 
procedural and substantive matters are necessary. These amendments have been 
addressed by way of particular recommendations regarding the amendment of PIE 
and the development of a framework for direct constitutional damages. The structural 
interdict, constitutional damages and contempt of court proceedings are furthermore 
all remedies that are time-consuming and take up a lot of State and private resources 
that could have been used for other, more pressing, problems.  
 
Despite the inherent problems, it was found that both structural interdicts and 
constitutional damages may be regarded as effective relief depending on the unique 
circumstances of each eviction case. Contempt of court proceedings, as a means of 
enforcing the execution of the structural interdict or constitutional damages may also 
have a role to play in the realisation of effective relief. The circumstances of a particular 
case may require that different remedies be used at different stages of the eviction 
process1143 and/or that the remedies discussed in this thesis be used in conjunction 
with each other. In other words, it may be necessary to use a structural interdict before 
and after granting an eviction order to realise the respective rights of the land owner 
and the unlawful occupiers in practice. Constitutional damages may also be used as 
a primary or alternative remedy to realise the respective rights of the land owner and 
the unlawful occupiers.  It may even be necessary to use a structural interdict and 
compensate a land owner for the loss of his property to ensure the realisation of 
effective relief. Contempt of court may be raised by the court or the parties in cases 
where there is a failure to give effect to a structural interdict and/or constitutional 
                                            
promises to real remedies: The need for the South African Constitutional Court to adopt structural 
interdicts in socio-economic rights cases” (2015) 9 HKJLS 51 52; S Liebenberg “South Africa’s Evolving 
Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights: An effective tool in challenging poverty?” (2002) 6 Law, 
Democracy and Development 1; DE Hirsch “A defence of structural injunctive remedies in South African 
law” (2007) 9 Oregon Review of International Law 1 14-15. 
1143 See Chapter 1 at 1 above.   
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damages order. Contempt of court then serves as a means of realising the remedy 
granted by the court.   
 
Because problems identified in the thesis require attention at legislative and 
conceptual levels, existing remedies have to prevail at present. The study has shown 
that a combination of procedures and remedies, set out in the thesis, may be 
necessary for effective relief to be realised presently.  
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